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ABSTRACT	
The	 research	 reported	 here	 gives	 priority	 to	 understanding	 the	 inter‐temporal	 resource	
allocation	requirements	of	a	program	of	technological	changes	that	could	halt	global	warming	by	
completing	 the	 transition	 to	 a	 “green”	 (zero	 net	 CO2‐	 emission)	 production	 regime	within	 the	
possibly	brief	 finite	 interval	 that	 remains	before	Earth’s	 climate	 is	driven	beyond	a	 catastrophic	
tipping	point.	 	This	paper	formulates	a	multi‐phase,	just‐in‐time	transition	model	incorporating	
carbon‐based	 and	 carbon‐free	 technical	 options	 requiring	 physical	 embodiment	 in	 durable	
production	facilities,	and	having	performance	attributes	 that	are	amenable	to	enhancement	by	
directed	R&D	expenditures.	Transition	paths	that	indicate	the	best	ordering	and	durations	of	the	
phases	 in	which	 intangible	and	 tangible	capital	 formation	 is	 taking	place,	and	capital	 stocks	of	
different	 types	 are	 being	 utilized	 in	 production,	 or	 scrapped	when	 replaced	 types	 embodying	
socially	more	efficient	technologies,	are	obtained	from	optimizing	solutions	for	each	of	a	trio	of	
related	 models	 that	 couple	 the	 global	 macro‐economy’s	 dynamics	 with	 the	 dynamics	 of	 the	
climate	 system.	 	 They	 describe	 the	 flows	 of	 consumption,	 CO2	 emissions	 and	 the	 changing	
atmospheric	 concentration	 of	 green‐house	 gas	 (which	 drives	 global	warming),	 along	with	 the	
investment	 dynamics	 required	 for	 the	 timely	 transformation	of	 the	production	 regime.	 	These	
paths	 are	 found	 as	 the	welfare‐optimizing	 solutions	 of	 three	 different	 “stacked	Hamiltonians”,	
each	corresponding	to	one	of	our	trio	of	integrated	endogenous	growth	models	that	have	been	
calibrated	 comparably	 to	 emulate	 the	 basic	 global	 setting	 for	 the	 “transition	 planning”	
framework	 of	 dynamic	 integrated	 requirements	 analysis	 modeling	 (DIRAM).	 As	 the	 paper’s	
introductory	section	explains,	this	framework	is	proposed	in	preference	to	the	(IAM)	approach	
that	environmental	and	energy	economists	have	made	familiar	in	integrated	assessment	models	
of	 climate	 policies	 that	 would	 rely	 on	 fiscal	 and	 regulatory	 instruments	 ‐‐	 but	 eschew	 any	
analysis	of	the	essential	technological	transformations	that	would	be	required	for	those	policies	
to	 have	 the	 intended	 effect.	 	 Simulation	 exercises	 with	 our	 models	 explore	 the	 optimized	
transition	 paths’	 sensitivity	 to	 parameter	 variations,	 including	 alternative	 exogenous	
specifications	of	 the	 location	of	 a	pair	 of	 successive	 climate	 “tipping	points”:	 the	 first	 of	 these	
initiates	 higher	 expected	 rates	 of	 damage	 to	 productive	 capacity	 by	 extreme	 weather	 events	
driven	by	 the	 rising	 temperature	of	 the	Earth’s	 surface;	whereas	 the	 second,	 far	more	 serious	
“climate	 catastrophe”	 tipping	 point	 occurs	 at	 a	 still	 higher	 temperature	 (corresponding	 to	 a	
higher	 atmospheric	 concentration	 of	 CO2).	 In	 effect,	 that	 sets	 the	 point	 before	 which	 the	
transition	 to	 a	 carbon‐free	 global	 production	 regime	 must	 have	 been	 completed	 in	 order	 to	
secure	the	possibility	of	future	sustainable	development	and	continued	global	economic	growth.			
	
JEL	codes:	Q540,	Q550,	O310,	O320,	O330,	O410,	O440.	
Keywords:	global	warming,	tipping	point,	catastrophic	climate	instability,	extreme	weather‐
related	damages,	R&D,	directed	technical	change,	capital‐embodied	technologies,	optimal	
sequencing,	multi‐phase	optimal	control,	sustainable	endogenous	growth.	
E‐mail	contacts:	*Corresponding	author‐‐Adriaan.vanZon@MaastrichtUniversity.NL;	pad@stanford.edu	
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1.	Introduction:	Climate	Instability	and	Environmental	Policy	Research		
Economic	 developments	 thus	 far	 in	 human	 history	 have	 been	 linked	 closely	 with	
progress	 in	methods	 for	 the	bulk	 conversion	 into	useful	work	of	 the	 energy	 stored	 in	 carbon‐
based	fuels.1	Burning	wood,	coal,	oil,	and	natural	gas	gives	rise	to	CO2‐emissions	that,	together	
with	 releases	 of	 other	 greenhouse	 gasses	 (GHG’s)	 like	 methane,	 are	 now	 thought	 to	 be	
responsible	 for	 the	 considerable	 warming	 of	 the	 earth’s	 atmosphere	 since	 the	 industrial	
revolution	 of	 the	 late	 eighteenth	 century	 and	 the	 worrying	 prospect	 of	 that	 upward	 trend	
continuing	for	years	to	come.2		
1.1	Motivation:	climate	science	and	climate	policy	
The	 implied	 future	 consequences	 are	 “bad	 news”	 on	 a	 number	 of	 related	 counts:	 sea	
levels	will	 rise,	 tropical	 diseases	will	 become	more	wide‐spread,	 storms	will	 be	more	 violent,	
patterns	 of	 rainfall	 will	 change	 (affecting	 agriculture),	 and	 fresh‐water	 supply	 shortages	 will	
become	a	problem	due	to	global	glacier	retreat,	and	so	on.3	 	Most	of	these	consequent	changes	
represent	significant	costs	to	society	en	route	to	the	potential	emergence	of	catastrophic	climate	
instability.4	 But,	 more	 worrying	 still	 is	 the	 possibility	 that	 the	 environmental	 changes	 set	 in	
motion	 by	 the	 warming	 of	 Earth’s	 land	 surface	 and	 oceans	 may	 impart	 a	 self‐reinforcing	
momentum	and	thus	accelerate	the	rise	of	global	mean	temperature	to	a	pace	 faster	 than	that	
resulting	solely	from	anthropogenic	releases	of	GHG.	
The	past	20	years	have	brought	revolutionary	advances	 in	the	study	of	climate	history	
based	on	the	deep‐ice	cores	of	the	millennia	between	the	last	glacial	maximum	and	the	opening	
of	the	(present)	Holocene	era.5	 	Among	the	many	important	findings	are	those	that	have	given	
greater	 plausibility	 and	 disturbing	 palpability	 to	 the	 conjectured	 existence	 of	 global	 climate	
“tipping	points”	 that	 can	 trigger	 “abrupt”	 changes	 in	 the	climate	 system.6	To	allow	 the	Earth’s	
                                                            
1	That	is	to	say,	“work”	in	the	sense	that	the	term	is	used	in	physics.	See	Cipolla	(1972)	for	an	elegantly	concise	and	
penetrating	presentation	of	this	theme	in	economic	history.		
2	We	put	aside	here	discussion	of	remaining	scientific	uncertainties	regarding	the	pace	of	warming	and	the	extent	to	
which	 it	 is	 attributable	 to	 anthropogenic	 sources,	 and	 observations	 on	 the	 role	 of	 	 active	 climate	 change	 denial	
(whether	from	ignorance,	innate	skepticism	or	strategic	perception	of	material	self‐interest).	See	the	comments	and	
references	in	David	and	van	Zon	(2012:	esp.	sect.	2).			
3	See,	e.g.	Dyer	(2010)	and	Lynas	(2007)	on	the	disruptive	social	and	political	sequelae.		Lynas	provides	a	journalistic	
view	on	 the	 consequences	 for	 the	world	of	 up	 to	6	degrees	 additional	warming	 for	 each	degree	of	 extra	warming,	
while	 Dyer	 provides	 scenarios	 regarding	 the	 struggle	 for	 resources	 necessary	 to	 fulfil	 basic	 needs,	 like	water	 and	
arable	(and	habitable)	land,	as	these	are	likely	to	arise	with	on‐going	global	warming.				
4		See	the	Stern	Review	(Stern	2007),	and	ICPP	(2007);	also	David	and	van	Zon	(2012:	sect	2.,1)	for	further	discussion	
of	the	current	science	consensus	of	the	literature	on	global	warming,	ecological	disruptions,	including	loss	of	life	and	
economic	welfare	damages	–	upon	which	the	following	paragraph	draws.		
5 See	e.g.,	Alley	(2002),	Burroughs	(2005),	Cronin	(2009).	
6	The	term	“tipping	point”	has	been	used	in	discussions	of	global	change	to	describe	a	variety	of	phenomena,	including	
the	 appearance	 of	 	 positive	 feedbacks,	 reversible	 phase	 transitions,	 phase	 transitions	 with	 hysteresis	 effects,	 and	
bifurcations	where	the	transition	is	smooth	but	the	future	path	of	the	system	depends	on	having	been	perturbed	at	a	
critical	point.	 	On	abrupt	climate	changes	 	and	“earth	 tipping	points”	see	Alley	 ,	Marotzke,	 	Nordhaus,	 	Overpeck	et	
al.(2003);	 	National	Research	Council	 (2003).	 	 Stern	 (2007:	 pp.	 11‐14)	 provides	 an	 	 overview	of	 positive	 feedback	
processes	involving	reduction	of	albedo	through	reduced	ice‐coverage	of	the	arctic	regions,	thawing	of	permafrost	and	
induced	release	of	methane.	The	broader	term	“tipping	elements”	is	introduced	by	Lenton,	Held,	Kriegler	et	al.	(2008)	
to	describe	subsystems	of	the	Earth’s	geophysical	system	that	are	at	least	sub‐continental	in	scale	and	under	certain	
conditions	can	be	switched	into	a	qualitatively	different	state	by	small	perturbations.		The	tipping	point	is	a	structural	
feature	of	such	a		sub‐system,	corresponding	to	the	critical	point	in	the	forcing	process	at	which	the	future	state	of	the	
global	climate	system	would	be	qualitatively	altered	–	but	not	necessarily	involving	a	self‐reinforced,	irreversible	state	
change.	 	 The	 Atlantic	 Meridional	 overturning	 in	 the	 thermohaline	 circulation,	 the	 West	 Antarctic	 ice	 sheet,	 	 the	
Greenland	ice	sheet,	and	the	Amazon	rainforest	and	the		El	Nino/Southern	Oscillation	are	the	sub‐systems	identified	
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mean	 global	 temperature	 to	 rise	 above	 a	 critical	 threshold	 of	 that	 kind	 would	 launch	 a	 self‐
reinforcing	 and	 irreversible	 warming	 process	 that	 could	 manifest	 itself	 eventually	 in	
catastrophic	climate	“flickering”	–	characterized	by	recurring	abrupt	climate	changes,	switching	
back	and	forth	at	high	frequency	between	spatially	uncorrelated	bouts	of	pronounced	warming	
and	cooling.7	
	 More	 than	 simply	 adding	 another	 ground	on	which	 the	 “precautionary	principle”	 calls	
urgently	 for	 mitigation	 of	 CO2	 emissions,	 that	 existential	 threat	 undermines	 sanguine	
presuppositions	 that	 “adaptations"	 by	 contemporary	 societies	 to	 a	 continuing	 gradual	 rise	 in	
global	 mean	 temperature	 would	 eventually	 bring	 humanity	 to	 a	 significantly	 warmer	 but	
nonetheless	viable	equilibrium	environment;	that	that	current	climate	policy	should	be	aimed	to	
effect	 a	 correspondingly	 gradual,	 economic	 welfare‐maximizing	 approach	 to	 that	 distant	 but	
attainable	goal.		The	alternative	prospect	now	more	clearly	envisaged	by	many	climate	scientists	
–namely,	 that	 the	 rising	 trend	 of	mean	 global	 temperature	 could	 take	 Earth’s	 climate	 system	
beyond	a	“catastrophe	tipping	point”	without	the	consequences	manifesting	themselves	plainly	
for	some	time	to	come	‐‐	raises	grave	doubts	about	the	formulaic	economic	advice	that	continue	
to	be	widely	espoused.	Climate	policy,	 it	 is	 said,	 should	devise	 instruments	 to	guide	 the	world	
economy	along	an	optimal	path	 that	balances	 the	present	value	of	 social	welfare	sacrificed	by	
actions	to	restrict	CO2	emissions,	against	the	present	value	of	the	future	net	social	welfare	gains	
resulting	 from	 slowing	 the	 accumulation	 of	 atmospheric	 CO2	 –	 just	 enough	 to	 allow	 	modern	
civilization	 sufficient	 time	 to	 adapt	 itself	 to	 environments	 that	 will	 be	 on	 the	 whole	 rather	
warmer,	but	in	which	adaptation	will	bring	benefits	to	set	against	what	has	been	lost.8			
	 There	is	much	to	be	said,	instead,	for	timely	actions	aimed	to	sharply	slow	and	eventually	
halt	global	warming	by	reducing	the	flow	of	GHG	emissions,	as	well	as	to	increase	the	capacity	of	
human	societies	to	carry	on	in	the	(hopefully	viable)	circumstances	that	the	peoples	of	the	world	
will	face	when	they	succeed	in	stabilizing	its	many	climates.	“Defensive”	adaptation	to	curtail	the	
extent	of	the	economic	and	social	damages	wrought	by	increasingly	frequent	and	severe	storms,	
coastal	 flooding	 and	 drought	 must,	 undoubtedly,	 be	 made	 part	 of	 the	 response	 to	 global	
warming	 ‐‐	 if	 only	 because	 much	 of	 the	 warming	 that	 will	 drive	 them,	 and	 accompanying	
alterations	of	future	regional	weather	patterns	are	“in	the	pipeline”	already,	as	a	consequence	of	
past	anthropogenic	GHG	emissions.9	With	the	current	level	of	atmospheric	concentration	of	CO2	
                                                                                                                                                                                         
most	 frequently	 experts	 as	 	 harboring	 “large‐scale	 discontinuities”	 –	 i.e.,	 dangerous	 “tipping	 point”	 potentialities	
under	anthropogenic	global	warming.	
7	See,	Hall	and	Behl	(2006)	on	the	“Clathrate	Gun”	hypothesis	that	has	been	advanced	in	explanation	of	abrupt	climate	
change	and	the	onset	of	the	phenomenon	of	“climate	flickering”	at	the	end	of	the	last	ice	age,	and	further	discussion	
with	other	references	in	David	and	van	Zon	(2012:sect.	2.1).	
8	 See	 Hall	 and	 Behl	 (2006)	 on	 the	 persisting	 failure	 of	 the	 economic	 literature	 on	 integrated	 assessment	 models	
(IAMs)	 to	 address	 the	 implications	 of	 climate	 scientists’	 conclusions	 and	 explanatory	 conjectures	 based	 on	 the	
paleoclimate	 evidence	 of	 “climate	 flickering”;	 esp.,	 pp.	 461‐462,	 for	 a	 detailed	 critique	 of	 the	 representation	 of	 the	
climate	 sub‐system	 in	 Nordhaus	 and	 Boyer’s	 (2000)	 updating	 of	 the	 original	 (Nordhaus	 1994)	 DICE	 model.	 The	
assumption	that	radiative	forcing	due	to	the	accumulation	of	atmospheric	CO2	would	drive	a	smooth	transition	to	a	
higher	equilibrium	temperature	of	the	Earth’s	surface	is	retained	in	the	latest	update	of	DICE	(see	Nordhaus	2010),	as	
well	 as	 in	 the	 annualized	 version	 of	 the	model	 that	 Cai,	 Judd	 and	 Lontzek	 (2012)	 create	 en	 route	 to	 SDICE,	 their		
stochastic	control	version	of	DICE	–	which	in	other	respects	constitutes	a	significant	advance	in	the	IAMs	literature.									
9  As	will	be	seen	(in	sect.	3.2),	the	third	of	the	models	presented	here	allows	for	warming	–driven	damages	to	global	
productive	capacity,	but	does	not	also	consider	 	 the	option	of	undertaking	“defensive”	capital	 formation	that	would		
reduce	those	damages.	Such	investment	should	be	viewed	as	a	form	of	“adaptation”	and	although	its	importance	has	
become	more	widely	appreciated,	it	remains	the	case	that	most	of	the	available	integrated	policy	assessment	models	
do	not	 	 explicitly	 treat	 that	 option.	 	A	noteworthy	 exception	 is	 “AD‐DICE”,	 an	 IAM	 that	 allows	explicit	 quantitative	
examination	of	the	trade‐offs	between	adaptation	and	mitigation	of	CO2	emissions	by	means	of	carbon	taxes.	See	de	
Bruin,	Dellink	and	Tol	(2009),	and	notes	in	sects.	3.2	and	4.2,	below,		for	further	discussion.			
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and	 the	high	 rate	of	 continuing	emissions,	 it	 is	 becoming	more	and	more	doubtful	 that	 global	
warming	can	be	kept	from	adding	a	gain	of	more	than	2o	Kelvin	to	the	mean	surface	temperature	
that	 prevailed	 throughout	 the	 recorded	 pre‐industrial	 millennium.	 	 Such	 a	 large	 temperature	
gain	is	considered	to	be	a	threshold	that	ought	not	to	be	crossed,	for	fear	of	triggering	runaway	
global	warming	and	the	attendant	societal	chaos	and	widespread	human	losses.10		
	 Unfortunately,	 the	 mere	 acknowledgement	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 climate	 catastrophe	
tipping	 points	 is	 not	 enough	 to	 ensure	 that	 CO2	 and	 other	GHG	 emissions	will	 be	 sufficiently	
reduced.	 The	 BRIC	 group	 of	 industrially	 developing	 countries	 has	 maintained	 astonishingly	
rapid	 rates	 of	 economic	 growth	 during	 the	 past	 two	 decades,	 relying	 heavily	 on	 fossil	 fuel	
sources	 of	 energy.	 The	peoples	of	 these	nations	 think	 it	 entirely	 appropriate	 that	 they	 should	
continue	 not	 only	 to	 lift	 their	 remaining	 masses	 from	 poverty,	 but	 advance	 toward	 levels	 of	
economic	welfare	comparable	to	those	in	the	West.	 	 	 It	goes	without	saying	that	the	nations	of	
the	West	also	feel	similarly	entitled,	not	only	to	maintain	but	to	also	pursue	still	higher	welfare	
levels.		As	a	consequence,	the	global	provision	of	energy	will	be	under	pressure	to	accommodate	
these	widely	shared	aspirations.	This,	unfortunately,	is	already	reflected	in	the	fact	that	many	of	
the	recently	built	electricity	generating	plants	in	China	and	India,	and	hundreds	more	proposed	
for	construction	there	and	elsewhere,	are	to	be	coal‐fired.11	Were	that	prospect	not	discouraging	
enough,	the	2011	tsunami	and	Fukushima	Daiichi	nuclear	disaster	has	led	authorities	in	Japan,	
and	 the	 governments	 of	 other	 countries	 to	 begin	 taking	 steps	 to	 reduce	 their	 economies’	
dependence	on	nuclear	power;	the	closing	of	a	significant	number	of	nuclear	power	stations	has	
been	 announced	 in	 Germany,	 raising	 concerns	 that	 the	 electric	 generation	 capacity	 thus	
abandoned	will	be	replaced	with	new	coal‐fired	plants.12	In	short,	there	are	strong	political	and	
economic	pressures	 that	continue	 to	promote	adherence	 to	a	highly	carbon‐intensive	growth–
path	for	the	global	economy‐‐with	mounting	risks	of	triggering	runaway	climate	change.13	
                                                            
10	See,	e.g.,	Hansen,	Sato,	Ruedy	et	al.	(2006:	p.1):	“Comparison	of	measured	sea	surface	temperatures	in	the	Western	
Pacific	 with	 paleoclimate	 data	 suggests	 that	 this	 critical	 ocean	 region,	 and	 probably	 the	 planet	 as	 a	 whole,	 is	
approximately	as	warm	now	as	at	the	Holocene	maximum	and	within	≈1°C	of	the	maximum	temperature	of	the	past	
million	 years.	 	We	 conclude	 that	 global	warming	 of	more	 than	 ≈1°C,	 relative	 to	 2000,	will	 constitute	 ‘‘dangerous’’	
climate	change	as	judged	from	likely	effects	on	sea	level	and	extermination	of	species.” 
11	According	to	a	World	Resources	Institute	report	(see	Yang	and	Cui	(2012))	a	recent	WRI	survey	found	1,199	coal‐
fired	plants	currently	proposed	globally	 in	59	countries,	over	 two‐thirds	of	 them	in	China	and	India	with	aggregate	
capacity	representing	about	three‐quarters	of	the	projected	global	additions	to	installed	mega‐wattage.	The	number	
of	projects	planned	in	India	(455)	exceeds	those	in	China	(363),	but	the	latter’s	plants	are	on	average	larger,	so	that	
their	 total	 	 installed	mega‐wattage	would	be	about	10	per	 cent	 greater	 than	 India’s	 (510K	MW).	Whether	 these	all	
these	plans	will	materialize	is	another	matter,	however:	in	China	stricter	new	regulations	in	response	to	air	pollution	
problems,	and	prospective	water	shortages	(for	cooling)	may	militate	against	it,	and	the	Indian	power‐plant	boom	of	
the	past	decade	ended	with	many	projects	having	been	discontinued.			
12 In	terms	of	the	implications	for	global	warming,	coal	is	among	the	worst	of	available	fossil	fuel	options:	the	ratio	of	
grams	of	CO2	per	 joule	of	energy	obtained	from	coal	 is	1.69	times	higher	than	that	from	natural	gas	(cf.	Wikipedia:	
“Energy	density”).	That	comparison,	however,	substantially	understates	the	comparative	“dirtiness”	of	coal‐fired	vis‐
à‐vis	natural	gas	electric	power	generation	plants	over	their	respective	full	 life‐cycles	(from	ground‐breaking	to	fuel	
sources,	waste	management	and	return	to	greenfield	site):	three	meta‐analyses	of	many	studies	concur	in	placing	the	
corresponding	ratio	of	CO2	g	per	KWhe			for	coal‐fired	plants	(with	scrubbers)	to	that	for	natural	gas‐fired	plants	in	the	
narrow	range	1.96‐2.17	(cf.	Wikipedia:“Life‐cycle	greenhouse‐gas	emissions	of	energy	sources.”	 In	addition	to	being	
climatically	“dirty,”	and	emitting	soot	and	other	health‐injurying	pollutants,	the	trouble	with	building	new	coal‐fired	
power	plants	 is	 that	 the	 low	 international	 price	 of	 coal	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 kept	 down	by	 the	 expansion	of	 still	 cheaper	
substitutes	like	natural	gas,	and	increasing	coal	extraction	rates	(induced	by	expectations	of	future	carbon	taxes).	This	
would	 tend	keep	 these	durable	power	 station’s	marginal	 costs	 from	rising	as	 they	age,	 so	 that	 they	 could	 continue	
yielding	quasi‐rents	and	remain	in	commercial	operation	for	many	decades,	unless	forcibly	shut	down	by	regulatory	
actions.		
13	Obviously,	that	threat	may	be	mitigated	by	fundamental	changes	in	lifestyles,	at	least	for	the	well‐to‐do	part	of	the	
global	population	 that	presently	 are	major	users	of	 energy	 from	 fossil	 fuels.	But	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 imagine	 that	 such	an	
impulse	would	 gather	 political	 force	 spontaneously	 from	 a	 transcendent	 ideological	movement,	 or	 that	 it	 could	 be	
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	 With	 humanity	 today	 seemingly	 headed	 almost	 unavoidably	 towards	 a	 worrisomely	
problematic	 future	 climate,	 it	 is	 all	 the	more	 pertinent	 to	 thoroughly	 explore	 what	 economic	
theory	informed	by	climate	science	can	tell	us,	firstly	about	the	broad	requirements	for	satisfying	
the	 desire	 to	 sustain	 development	 and	 the	 future	 growth	 of	 economic	 welfare	 by	 allocating	
resources	 so	 as	 to	 avert	 drifting	 irreversibly	 into	 a	 catastrophically	 transformed	 global	
environment;	 secondly	 what	 the	 role	 of	 both	 existing	 and	 new	 technologies	 and	 their	
embodiment	in	irreversible	investment	may	be	in	effecting	a	transition	from	“business‐as‐usual	
to	a	viably	low	carbon	production	regime	that	would	stabilize	the	climate;	and	thirdly	whether	
such	a	“tech	fix”	program	would	be	technically	and	economically	feasible	to	execute	within	the	
finite	time	limits	that	may	remain	to	design	and	implement	the	necessary	steps	in		that	program	
before	 arriving	 at	 a	 tipping	 point	 into	 irreversible	 “runaway”	 climate	 change	 (TPIRCC,	
hereinafter).	
	 	Only	 when	 we	 have	 a	 clearer	 vision	 of	 what	 would	 be	 required	 to	 travel	 the	
technological	 path	 to	 a	 stabilized	 global	 climate	 that	would	be	 least	 costly	 in	 terms	of	 human	
welfare	 (i.e.,	 “first‐best”	 welfare‐optimal),	 will	 we	 then	 be	 in	 a	 better	 position	 than	 now	 to	
realistically	 consider	 the	policy	measures	 that	might	be	 able	 to	 realize	 such	 a	program;	or,	 to	
stating	the	nature	of	latter	challenge	more	precisely,	to	re‐focus	negotiations	about	national	and	
international	 agreements	 on	 continuously	 monitor‐able	 actions	 to	 implement	 a	 socially	 and	
politically	 feasible	 approximation	 to	 the	 idealized,	 first‐best	 welfare	 optimum	 path	 toward	
sustainable	development	in	stabilized	global	climate.14		
	 Unfortunately,	in	our	view,	much	too	much	time	already	has	passed	during	which	serious	
people	 approaching	 this	 dauntingly	 formidable	 policy‐design	 challenge	 have	 tried	 to	 avoid	
tackling	it	head‐on,	and	have	opted	instead	for	a	different	strategy	‐‐based	on	trying	to	deal	with	
the	challenge	of	global	warming	by	directly	addressing	its	root	economic	causes.	These	may	be	
found	in	humans’	historical	propensity	to	burn	carbon,	and	to	continue	doing	so	without	regard	
for	the	cost	 in	terms	of	environmental	harms	that	such	activities	impose	upon	others,	and	will	
eventually	impose	far	more	heavily	on	still	unborn	generations.		Such	costs,	falling	upon	others‐‐	
whether	 through	 immediate	 localized	 pollution	 of	 the	 nano‐particle	 laden	 air	 inhaled	 by	 the	
population	in	urban	areas,	or	the	rising	concentration	of	atmospheric	GHG	and	all	of	its	present	
and	 future	 global	 consequences–‐are	 labeled	 as	 “externalities”.	 They	 are	 not	 reflected	 fully	 in	
“free	market	prices”	of	carbon	fuels,	and	hence	do	not	register	among	the	private	costs	of	those	
engaged	in	combusting	those	materials.	
	 	Starting	 from	 this	 diagnosis	 of	 the	 source	 of	 the	 climate	 problem,	 a	 substantial	
consensus	 among	 environmental	 and	 energy	 economists	 has	 found	 the	 indicated	 course	 of	
climate	 policy	 response	 to	 be	 elegantly	 simple:	 directly	 address	 the	 “externality”	 of	 GHG	
emissions	by	using	fiscal	or	a	combination	of	regulatory	and	fiscal	instruments	to	set	taxes	so	as	
to	generate	market	prices	of	carbon	(or	for	licenses	to	burn	fossil	fuels	)	that	will	fully	reflect	the	
marginal	social	costs	of	using	those	materials	as	sources	of	energy.			Then,	it	is	said,	the	workings	
of	the	free	market	will	take	care	of	the	rest	of	the	problem;	raising	the	carbon	price	will	create	
private	 incentives	 to	 reduce	 CO2	 emissions	 in	 ways	 that	 will	 be	 least‐costly	 to	 the	 actors;	
“getting	the	prices	right”	now	and	in	the	future	therefore	will	be	sufficient	to	fix	the	“externality”	
that	has	allowed	economically	self‐interested	humans	to	set	their	planet	on	its	warming	course.		
	 There	 have	 been	 real	 advances	 in	 analyzing	 the	 likely	 effects	 of	 using	 fiscal	 and	
regulatory	instruments	in	the	most	welfare	efficient	ways	to	fix	the	CO2	emissions	“externality,”	
                                                                                                                                                                                         
effective	 without	 the	 facilitation	 and	 reinforcement	 of	 extensive	 technological	 changes	 in	 the	 global	 production	
regime.			
14	See	Schelling	(2009)	on	the	distinction	between	setting	outcome	targets	and	agreeing	on	scheduled	actions.	
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indeed,	advances	upon	which	this	paper	is	able	to	build.	Yet,	at	the	same	time	there	has	been	a	
discernible	 and	 unwarranted	 reluctance	 among	 economists	 to	 examine	 the	 technological	
requirements	of	what	“the	market”	would	have	to	accomplish	by	altering	private	 incentives	to	
curtail	 the	emissions	of	CO2.	 	 It	 is	as	 if	 those	researchers	had	said,	perhaps	not	aloud:	 “I’m	an	
economist	 not	 an	 engineer,	 and	 since	 I	 have	 good	 cause	 to	 expect	 that	 markets	 will	 do	 an	
efficient	job	of	resource	allocation	once	we	have	removed	the	troublesome	externality,	why	do	I	
have	 to	 be	 concerned	 about	 the	 details	 of	 the	 technological	 solutions	 that	 rational	 economic	
agents	will	arrive	at	when	guided	by	the	right	prices?”	
	 	The	evident	problem	with	this	line	of	response	is	that	“getting	the	global	price	of	carbon	
right,”	 and	 keeping	 it	 right,	 are	 not	 so	 simple	 tasks	 for	 “institutional	 engineering”	 and	
international	 political	 economy	 as	 it	 is	 convenient	 to	 imagine	 while	 formulating	 and	 solving	
those	 integrated	assessment	models	 (IAMs).15	 	 Secondly,	 if	 economists’	 attention	were	 to	 turn	
away	 from	 the	 problem	 of	 the	 CO2	 emissions	 externality	 for	 a	 moment	 or	 two,	 they	 would	
remember	 that	 there	 are	 other,	 well‐known	 externalities	 that	 are	 likely	 to	 thwart	 the	
spontaneous	 emergence	 of	 socially	 efficient	 decentralized	 responses	 to	 rightly‐priced	 carbon.		
	 Two	 such	 externalities	 are	 so	 familiar	 that	 they	 may	 be	 mentioned	 without	 further	
elaboration:	existing	technological	knowledge	must	be	implemented,	and	implementation	under	
actual	 field	 conditions	 may	 require	 investment	 in	 researching	 incremental	 adaptations	 and	
interactions	 between	 providers	 of	 equipment	 embodying	 that	 knowledge	 and	 its	 users.	 But	
there	 are	 knowledge	 benefits	 from	 learning‐by‐doing,	 and	 investments	 in	 research	 that	 are	
difficult	 if	not	 impossible	 for	private	agents	 in	competitive	markets	 to	appropriate	completely,	
giving	 rise	 to	 well‐known	 information	 transaction	 externalities	 and	 “spill‐overs”	 that	 lead	 to	
socially	 inefficient	 resource	 allocation.16	 Likewise,	 investment	 decisions	 relating	 to	 the	
implementation	of	existing	technologies	(and	of	recent	innovations,	a	fortiori)	may	be	distorted	
by	the	existence	of	other	knowledge	spill‐overs	from	learning	by‐doing,	and	learning‐by‐using.17			
                                                            
15	 Beyond	 the	 issues	 of	 negotiating	 and	 enforcing	 coordinated	 international	 commitments	 to	 a	 cap‐and‐trade	
mechanisms	that	already	have	been	exposed	by	the	experience	with	the	UN	Kyoto	Protocols	and	the	attempts	to	go	
beyond	 them	 at	 the	 2009	 Copenhagen	 Conference,	 there	 is	 the	 another	 specific	 problem	 the	 dependence	 of	 such	
mechanisms	on	markets	for	“licenses”	or	permits	(either	permits	to	emit	CO2	and	other	GHGs	in	the	case	of	so‐called	
downstream	cap‐and	trade),	or	licenses	allowing	first		vendors	to	transact	in	combustible	forms	of	carbon	(in	the	case	
of	upstream	cap‐and‐trade).	Transferable	permits	and	licenses	constitute	a	financial	asset.	They	are	desirable	because	
it	is	envisaged	that	they	would	be	traded	in	markets	in	which	price	adjustments	would	be	endogenous	and	automatic	
(not	 requiring	 repeated	 government	 actions,	 assuming	 the	 caps	were	 set	 correctly	 at	 the	 outset).	 Financial	 assets,	
however,	will	permit	securitization,	and	bonds	will	engender	the	formation	of	markets	for	derivatives,	and	so	on.	It	is	
not	a	trivial	problem	to	arrange	for	the	monitoring	and	regulating	of	the	issue	of	these	new	financial	instruments,	and	
to	 integrate	 global	markets	 for	 the	 varied	 types	 of	 licenses,	 so	 that	 the	 current	 and	 expected	 future	 prices	 of	 the	
underlying	assets	will	be	able	to	become	wildly	wrong.		Indeed,	the	difficulties	of	achieving	such	a	desirable	result	and	
the	costs	of	 failure	to	do	so	(again)	have	been	demonstrated	in	the	destructive	financial	crisis	of	2008‐2010	and	its	
economically	 and	 socially	 painful	 aftermath.	 	 Aside	 from	 these	 practical	 institutional	 details,	 and	 the	 political	
problems	 of	 arranging	 for	 national	 legislative	 bodies	 constituted	 of	 political	 representatives	 with	 short	 career	
horizons	 to	 commit	 themselves	 and	 their	 successors	 to	 distant	 future	 schedules	 of	 taxes	 on	 fossil	 fuels,	 there	 are	
serious	questions	about	 the	general	equilibrium	effects	of	a	commitment	 to	raise	 the	 future	relative	price	of	 	 those	
energy	sources.	These	 include	possible	adverse	effects	on	private	 incentives	to	 invest	 in	 improving	the	efficiency	of	
carbon‐based	technologies,	and	perverse	“anti‐conservation”	responses	from	owners	of	fossil	fuel	deposits	that	could	
vitiate	the	direct	effect	of	the	carbon	tax	or	might	even	force	down	the	near	term	after	tax	price	of	using	carbon	energy	
sources.	For	references	and	more	detailed	discussion	see	David	2009,	David	and	van	Zon	(2012:	sect.	1),	and	van	der	
Ploeg	and	Withagen	(2010),specifically	on	potential	anti‐conservation	(“Green	Paradox”)	effects	of	carbon‐pricing.			
16	 For	 recognition	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 “the	 second	 externality”	 in	 the	 context	 of	 environmental	 policy,	 see	 the	
discussion	of	the	so‐called	“appropriability	problem”	in	Jaffe,	Newell	and	Stavins	(2003:	section	3,	esp.	pp.	471‐473).		
17	This	has	long	been	recognized	in	the	literature	on	the	economics	of	science	and	technology	policy,	and	particularly	
in	contributions	that	reflect	“evolutionary”	economic	analysis	and	modeling	(see,	 for	discussion	and	references,	e.g.,	
David,	1992;	Aghion,	David	and	Foray,	2008).	The	corollary	is	that	with	more	than	one	externality	there	will	be	a	need	
for	more	than	one	public	policy	mechanism	to	correct	 likely	misallocation	of	resources.	The	relevance	of	this	 in	the	
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1.2	The	Research	approach	and	methods:	An	overview			
There	is	a	more	fundamental	reason	for	economists	to	devote	more	serious	attention	to	
examining	technology	policy	options,	and	in	this	paper	it	proceeds	simply	from	the	fact	that	in	
one	way	or	other	technological	implementations	of	policy	measures	designed	to	curtail	warming	
will	 be	 required.	 Investment	 (either	 in	 generating	 future	 knowledge	 or	 in	 tangible	 production	
facilities	embodying	mature	and	novel	technologies)	is	the	‘conditio	sine	qua	non’	for	a	successful	
transition	towards	a	sustainable	 future.	The	transition	towards	sustainability	will	 therefore	be	
determined	by	 finding	 the	right	balance	between	two	important	aspects	of	 investment:	on	 the	
one	hand	we	have	to	face	the	fact	that	the	irreversibility	of	investment	implies	a	certain	degree	
of	inertia	to	change,	while	on	the	other	hand	investment	is	literally	the	carrier	of	technological	
progress	and	so	‘enables’	(productivity‐)	change.	
	 	This	“double‐role”	of	investment	underlines	the	importance	of	the	timing	of	investment	
decisions:	it	 is	unwise	to	invest	too	early	because	one	runs	the	risk	of	missing	out	on	potential	
productivity	 improvements	still	to	come,	and	neither	should	one	invest	too	 late	because	of	the	
rising	opportunity	cost	of	continuing	to	use	old	technologies	instead	of	new,	superior,	ones.	This	
setting	 naturally	 gives	 rise	 to	 such	 questions	 as	 how	 long	 to	 continue	 using	 and	 investing	 in	
present	carbon‐based	technologies,	how	much	and	how	long	to	spend	efforts	on	improving	‘new’	
carbon‐free	 technology,	 and	when	 to	 stop	 improving	 such	 carbon‐free	 technologies	 and	 start	
implementing	and	using	them,	this	all	in	the	face	of	having	to	stop	cumulative	emissions	just	in	
time	and	just	below	the	TPIRCC.		In	other	words,	the	design	of	emission‐mitigating	policies	calls	
for	“thinking‐in‐time”	about	complicated	questions	about	which	investment	options	to	consider,	
how	much	investment	has	to	be	undertaken,	and	in	what	order	it	will	be	best	to	do	it.		It	calls	for	
beginning	a	stage	before	assessing	the	effects	of	alternative	policy	choices,	 the	stage	that	deals	
with	 questions	 that	 engineers	 and	 planners	 of	 systems	with	 improved	 performance	 property	
refer	to	as	“requirements	analysis”.		
	 It	 also	 will	 be	 instantly	 recognized	 as	 “planning	 analysis”	 posited	 on	 the	 assumed	
existence	of	a	socially	benevolent	and	omniscient	planning	agent,	and	therefore	setting	aside	for	
the	purposes	of	the	analysis	all	considerations	of	the	problems	of	how	to	implement	the	actions	
required	to	achieved	the	system’s	desired	performance	if	the	system	in	question	happens	to	be	
one	 in	 which	 resource	 allocation	 is	 decentralized	 and	 reflects	 the	 distributed	 decisions	 and	
behaviors	of	many	human	agents.	Optimal	planning	models,	whether	of	the	deterministic	or	the	
stochastic	 variety,	 are	 familiar	 tools	 in	modern	economics	and	our	 research	simply	 (or	not	 so	
simply)	 extends	 their	use	 in	 the	 literature	of	macroeconomic	growth	models	by	applying	 it	 to	
examine	a	global	economy	whose	planner	has	 to	answer	 to	 resource	allocation	questions	 that	
are	 complicated	 by	 having	 to	 take	 into	 account	 the	 dynamic	 interconnections	 between	 his	
economy	and	the	geophysical	system	in	which	it	happens	to	be	inextricably	embedded.		
	 To	 find	 answers	 to	 these	 questions,	 we	 formulate	 an	 optimum	 control	 model	 that	
borrows	heavily	from	the	AK‐model	from	the	endogenous	growth	literature	(cf.	Rebelo	(1991)	in	
particular),	but	that	also	expands	upon	this	AK‐setting	in	a	number	of	ways.	First,	we	allow	for	
different	 technologies	 that	 can	 be	 used	 either	 next	 to	 each	 other	 or	 sequentially.	 Secondly,	 a	
technology	 is	characterized	not	only	by	 its	capital	productivity,	but	also	by	CO2‐emissions	per	
unit	real	output.	In	the	initial	business‐as‐usual	phase,	“carbon‐free”	technologies	will	be	taken	
to	 allow	production	with	 zero	net	 emissions	of	CO2,	 although	doing	 so	 at	 higher	unit	 costs	 of	
                                                                                                                                                                                         
context	 of	 climate	 policy	 seems	 only	 quite	 recently	 to	 have	 impressed	 itself	 upon	 leading	 contributors	 to	 the	
theoretical	literature	on	endogenous	economic	growth	(see	Acemogulu	et	al.,	2012).	
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capital	 (i.e.	 e.,	 being	 characterized	by	 a	 lower	 average	 and	marginal	 productivity	 of	 capital).18	
The	term	“net	emissions”	here	refers	to	the	flow	of	production‐generated	CO2			 	that	is	in	excess	
of	 the	 natural	 abatement	 capacities	 of	 the	 Earth’s	 oceans	 and	 forests,	 and,	 rather	 than	 being	
trapped	and	stored	there,	eventually	adds	to	the	concentration	of	atmospheric	GHG.	
			 	Third,	 we	 allow	 for	 the	 deactivation	 of	 existing	 technologies,	 i.e.	 the	 ‘scrapping’	 of	
existing	 technologies,	 as	 in	 the	 vintage	 literature.	 We	 show	 how	 the	 time	 of	 deactivation	 of	
existing	capacity	depends	on	 technological	parameters	but	also	on	emission	characteristics,	 in	
combination	with	 the	 shadow	 price	 of	 emissions.	 The	 latter	 suggests	 that	 the	 position	 of	 the	
climate	catastrophe	“tipping	point”	directly	influences	the	optimal	timing	of	such	moves	towards	
completing	the	switch	away	from	carbon‐based	production	‐‐	through	its	impact	on	the	shadow	
price	 of	 emissions.	 An	 exogenous	 shock,	 shrinking	 the	 space	 left	 for	 further	 accumulation	 of	
atmospheric	CO2	 (such	as	would	come	 in	 the	 form	of	 compelling	 evidence	 that	 the	onset	of	 a	
runaway	 process	 of	 warming	 could	 be	 triggered	 by	 a	 rise	 in	 the	 CO2	 –equivalent	 GHG	
concentration	 level	beyond	450	ppmv,	now	that	we	are	already	close	to	the	400	ppmv)	would	
send	 the	 shadow	 value	 of	 emissions	 suddenly	 upwards,	 forcing	 drastic	 actions	 to	 curtail	 the	
output	 of	 	 consumption	 goods	 toward	 subsistence‐satisfying	 levels	 so	 that	 as	 much	 of	 the	
operating	 capacity	 that	 remained	 could	 be	 used	 to	 rapidly	 build	 up	 the	 stock	 of	 carbon‐free	
capital.			
	 	Fourth,	 we	 allow	 for	 endogenous	 R&D	 based	 technical	 change.	 This	 requires	 a	
specification	 of	 the	 R&D	 function	 that	 is	 different	 from	 the	 ones	 found	 in	 Romer	 (1990),	 or	
Aghion	 and	Howitt	 (1991),	 for	 example,	 because	 technical	 change	 in	 our	model	 setting	 is	 not	
meant	 to	 compensate	 for	 the	 loss	 in	 capital	 productivity	 resulting	 from	 capital	 accumulation	
under	neo‐classical	conditions,	as	in	Lucas	(1988)	and	Romer	(1990),	for	instance.	Rather,	in	an	
AK‐setting,	capital	productivity	is	constant	by	assumption,	and	so	technical	change	specified	in	
the	usual	way	would	produce	a	continuously	accelerating	growth	rate	rather	than	just	a	higher,	
but	 still	 constant,	 rate	 of	 growth.	We	will	 come	back	 to	 this	 in	more	 detail	 later	 on.	 Fifth,	we	
explicitly	focus	on	the	timing	of	the	switches	between	investment	in	the	one	technology	and	in	
the	other,	and	on	the	timing	of	the	deactivation	of	old	technologies,	since	the	deactivation	and	
activation	of	technologies	that	differ	w.r.t.	their	emission‐coefficients	have	a	direct	impact	on	the	
macro‐emission	rate	and	therefore	on	the	time	left	until	the	TPIRCC	will	be	hit.	
	 As	 the	 foregoing	 overview	of	 our	 approach	 implies,	 a	 central	 issue	 in	 the	model	 to	 be	
presented	here	is	the	fact	that	the	transition	towards	a	carbon‐free	production	system	entails	a	
switch	 in	 the	 deployment	 of	 production	 technologies	 that	 require	 the	 buildup	 of	 carbon‐free	
capacity	and	the	simultaneous	rundown	of	carbon‐based	capacity,	simply	because	the	one	type	
of	 capacity	 cannot	 be	 changed	 into	 the	 other	 type	 of	 capacity	 without	 new	 tangible	 capital	
formation.	 	 Therefore	we	 have	 opted	 for	 an	AK‐model	 setting	 (cf.	 Rebelo,	 1991)	 in	which	we	
allow	for	two	technologies	that	both	can	produce	output,	one	of	which	results	in	CO2	emissions	
whereas	the	other	does	not.		
		 The	 present	 paper	 summarizes	 part	 of	 the	 work	 conducted	 by	 the	 authors	 on	 the	
construction	 (and	 further	 extension)	 of	 a	 multi‐phase	 transition	 models	 incorporating	 the	
concepts	of	changes	in	technologies	that	are	embodied	in	tangible	and	durable	capital	goods,	and	
of	 the	 irreversibility	 of	 investment	 decisions.	 From	 these	 basic	 premises	 it	 follows	 that	 the	
“smooth”’	 transition	 toward	 a	 carbon‐free	 future	 will	 need	 to	 be	 prepared	 by	 means	 of	 the	
                                                            
18	The	latter	is	a	necessary	assumption	to	make	the	model	consistent	with	the	observation	that	the	present	state	of	the	
economy	is	characterized	by	the	intensive	use	of	carbon‐based	energy	rather	than	carbon‐free	energy.	If	the	capital	
productivity	 of	 the	 latter	 technology	 would	 exceed	 that	 of	 the	 former,	 then	 the	 carbon‐free	 technology	 would	 be	
superior	to	the	carbon‐based	technology	on	all	accounts,	which	is	not	really	the	case.		
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accumulation	 and	 subsequent	 run	 down	of	 carbon‐based	 production	 capacity,	 simply	 because	
capital,	whether	carbon‐based	or	carbon‐free,	 is	a	produced	means	of	production.	The	focus	of	
the	resulting	models	therefore	is	on	the	selective	build‐up	and	deactivation	of	different	types	of	
capital	stocks,	the	time	this	takes,	and	the	implications	of	this	process	for	the	development	over	
time	of	welfare	specified	in	terms	of	the	flow	of	consumption.		
	 The	 premise	 that	 embodiment	 in	 physical	 capital	 goods	 is	 necessary	 to	 implement	
changes	in	the	technologies	that	would	lower	the	global	production	regime’s	carbon‐intensity,	as	
well	 as	 to	 increase	 the	 capacity	 of	 the	 carbon‐based	 capital	 stock,	 therefore	 is	 a	 distinctive	
feature	of	the	modelling	approach	pursued	here.	 	Although	energy	technologists	and	engineers	
have	 in	 effect	 long	 recognized	 that	 the	 “embodiment”	 of	 techniques	 in	 fixed	 reproducible	
structures	 and	 equipment	 cannot	 be	 ignored	 when	 considering	 the	 impact	 of	 technical	
innovations	in	energy	supply	systems,19	our	explicit	recognition	of	this	in	the	very	structure	of	
the	model	 presented	 here	 (and	 its	 account	 of	 the	 dynamics	 of	 the	 optimal	 climate‐stabilizing	
transition	path)	represents	a	major	departure	from	the	ways	in	which	the	effects	of	endogenous	
technological	 change	 have	 been	 treated	 in	 previous	 economic	 contributions	 to	 the	 integrated	
assessment	of	climate	policy	measures.20			
	 Our	multi‐phase	modeling	approach	also	offers	some	novel	additions	to	the	existing	but	
still	relatively	small	literature	concerned	with	the	optimal	timing	of	switches	among	alternative	
production	 technologies.	 Several	 points	 of	 comparison	 with	 the	 present	 analysis	 are	 worth	
remarking	upon	 in	regard	 to	 three	notable	preceding	contributions	 in	 this	vein,	 	by	Tahvonen	
and	Salo	(2001),	Valente	(2009)	and	Schumacher	(2011),21	Tahvonen	and	Salo	(2001)	focus	on	
the	 timing	 of	 the	 switch	 between	 alternative	 resource	 extraction	 technologies	 that	 differed	 in	
their	 variable	 costs,	 whereas	 Valente	 (2009)	 examines	 the	 switch	 between	 two	 macro‐
production	 technologies	 in	 a	 setting	 without	 irreversibility	 of	 investments	 in	 production	
capacity	nor	endogenous	technical	changes	resulting	from	investments	in	R&D.		The	location	of	a	
single	 optimal	 switching	moment	 in	Valente’s	 (2009)	 analysis	 is	 found	 in	 a	 standard	dynamic	
optimization	setting	using	a	CIES	utility	function.		By	contrast,	our	supposition	that	formation	of	
physical	 production	 capacity	 embodying	 each	 technology	 must	 have	 occurred	 before	 that	
                                                            
19	The	development	and	use	of	energy	technologies	is	viewed	as	an	integrated	system	comprising	research	discoveries	
and	 inventions,	 the	 creation	 of	 commercial	 products	 and	 processes,	 their	 initial	 deployment	 and	 adoption	 into	
commercial	operations,	and	subsequent	wider	diffusion	–	the	view	embraced	recently	by	the	Report	of	the	President’s	
Council	 of	 Advisors	 on	 Science	 and	 Technology	 (PCAST,	 2012).	 	 Accordingly,	 Ernest	 Moniz	 (2012:	 p.	 82),	 former	
Undersecretary	of	the	U.S.	Department	of	Energy	and	a	PCAST	member,	emphasizes	the	importance	of	tangible	fixed	
capital	 formation	 in	 considering	 policies	 designed	 to	 stimulate	 “energy	 technology	 innovation”:	 	 “Adoption	 and	
diffusion	are	the	stages	at	which	materiality	of	[novel]	products	and	processes	are	realized	(or	not).	Innovation,	as	I	
use	it	here,	refers	to	the	end‐to‐end	system	including	market	diffusion,	not	front‐end	R&D	alone.”			
20	 One	may	 compare	 the	 implicit	 assumption	 –	 common	 to	 each	 of	 the	 following	 salient	 research	 contribution	 on	
endogenous	 technological	 change	and	climate	policy	analysis	 ‐‐	 that	 innovations	resulting	 from	R&D	or	 learning	by	
doing	 are	 of	 the	 disembodied	 kind,	 	 and	 	 therefore	 their	 effects	 are	 not	 intermediated	 by	 timing	 and	 volume	 of	
investments	 in	tangible	capital	 formation:	Goulder	and	Schneider	(1999),	Nordhaus	(2002),	Bounanno,	Carraro	and	
Galeotti	 (2003),	 Edenhofer,	 Carrero	 and	 Galeotti	 (2004),	 Popp	 (2004),	 Lessman,	 Kemfert	 et	 al.	 (2006),	 Sue	 Wing	
(2006).		Rather	strikingly,	the	discussion	of	these	and	other	items	in	the	literature	survey	by	Gillingham,	Newell	and	
Pizer	(2008),	remains	silent	on	the	distinction	between	embodied	and	disembodied	technological	changes,	and	omits	
mention	of	adoption	as	a	determinant	of	general	or	energy	sector‐specific	change	in	productivity	or	GHG‐emissions	
intensity.	 	While	 commenting	 on	 several	 aspects	of	 an	 	 earlier	 literature	 review	 	by	Azar	 and	Dowlatabadi	 (1999),	
Gillingham	et	al.	(2008)	gives	no	notice	of	its	useful	discussion	of	the	evidence	documenting		the	comparatively	slow	
pace	of	technology	diffusion	in	the	energy	sector,		the	responsiveness	of	private	adoption	decisions	there	to	changes	in	
performance	 standards	 and	 subsidies,	 and	 the	 role	 of	 infrastructure	 externalities	 and	 uncertainty	 in	 setting	 	 high	
hurdle	rates	of	return	required	for	lumpy	investments.			
21	A	recent	addition	to	the	theoretical	 literature	by	Boucekkine	et	al.	(2012)	provides	the	mathematical	foundations	
for	 formulating	 and	 solving	 an	 optimal	 control	 resource	 extraction	 problem	 with	 multiple	 irreversible	 ecological	
regimes.		
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capacity	actually	can	be	utilized		–	a	fundamental	aspect	of	the	“embodiment”	condition	–	carries	
the	 implication	that	at	 least	 two	optimal	switching	moments	must	be	considered,	even	though	
only	two	technologies	are	involved	in	the	switch.22		Schumacher	(2011)	focusses	on	the	timing	of	
a	 switch	 towards	production	based	upon	a	 renewable	 resource	 that	would	be	 induced	 by	 the	
increasing	 probability	 of	 climate	 disasters	 under	 a	 non‐renewable	 production	 regime.	 	 His	
analysis,	however,	posits	a	production	structure	in	which	renewables	and	non‐renewables	form	
a	 ‘complex’	 of	 perfectly	 substitutable	 inputs	 that,	 together	 with	 ‘generic’	 capital,	 produce	 the	
economy’s	 aggregate	 output.	 Schumacher	 thus	 ignores	 the	 embodiment	 of	 technologies	 in	
specific	types	of	capital	goods,	and	suppresses	consideration	of	the	need	for	a	sufficient	amount	
of	 time	 during	 which	 to	 build	 up	 the	 carbon‐free	 capacity	 that	 is	 required	 to	 satisfy	 future	
consumption	and	investment	needs.	
	
	 1.3	Organization	of	the	Paper	
	 The	 organization	 of	 the	 presentation	 that	 follows	 is	 straight‐forward.	 Section	 2	
introduces	 the	 basic	 form	 and	 features	 of	 the	 multi‐phase	 optimum	 control	 model	 (in	 sub‐
section	2.1)	and	describes	the	two	ways	in	which	it	 is	extended	in	this	paper.	The	Basic	Model	
(BAM	 for	 short)	 captures	 the	 essential	 features	 of	 the	 transition	 problem	 of	 an	 economy	 that	
must	 complete	 the	 switch	 from	 initial	 dependence	 on	 production	 facilities	 that	 embody	 a	
carbon‐using	 technology	 to	 producing	 exclusively	 with	 capital	 that	 embodies	 a	 “carbon‐free”	
technology,	 i.e.,	 one	 that	 enables	 it	 to	 utilize	 only	 non‐carbon	 sources	 of	 energy.	 Sub‐sections	
2.2‐2.3	set	out	the	formal	structure	and	the	analysis	of	the	optimal	dynamics	of	this	transition	‐‐	
which	must	 be	 completed	before	 the	CO2	 emitted	 in	 the	process	has	pushed	 the	 atmospheric	
concentration	of	GHG	to	the	(TPIRCC)	level	that	would	trigger	a	catastrophically	unstable	climate	
regime.	 The	 inter‐temporal	 optimization	 described	 in	 sub‐section	 2.4	 involves	 solving	 the	
“stacked	Hamiltonians”	 (in	 2.5)	 to	 obtain	 the	 durations	 of	 the	 three	 phases	mentioned	 above	
(see	footnote	22),	and	the	magnitude	of	the	sequenced	tangible	investments	required	to	build	up	
each	 of	 the	 kinds	 production	 facilities,	 utilize	 them	 jointly	 and	 eventually	 shut	 down	 un‐
depreciated	 fossil‐fueled	 capacity	 before	 entering	 the	 final	 phase	 of	 sustainable	 “green”	
economic	growth	in	a	stabilized	climate	system.		
	 Section	3	sets	out	the	formal	structure	and	analysis	of	the	two	models	that	extend	BAM.	
The	 introduction	 of	 endogenous	 R&D‐driven	 capital	 augmenting	 changes	 in	 the	 carbon‐free	
technology	prior	 to	 its	 embodiment	 and	deployment	 is	 shown	 (in	 3.1)	 to	 result	 in	 a	modified	
three‐phase	 model,	 referred	 to	 as	 “BAM+R&D”.	 A	 third	 model,	 labeled	 “BAM+R&D+UCL”	 is	
obtained	(in	3.2)	by	adding	a	climate	change	feedback	effect	in	the	form	of	heightened	expected	
annual	 rates	 of	 damage	 to	 the	 extant	 capital	 stock	 ‐‐	 driven	 by	 the	 rising	 atmospheric	
concentration	of	CO2,	the	consequent	warming	of	the	earth’s	surface	and	increasing	moisture	in	
the	atmosphere	due	to	the	faster	evaporation	from	the	oceans’	surface,	bringing	more	frequent	
severe	storms,	seaboard	and	riverine	 flooding	and	droughts	 in	 interior	regions.	The	onset	of	a	
higher	 expected	 (proportional)	 rate	 of	 “unscheduled	 capital	 losses”	 (UCLs)	 as	 the	 direct	 and	
indirect	 consequences	of	 damages	 to	 reproducible	 capital	 and	 ecosystem	services,	 is	modeled	
here	simply	as	endogenous	 jump	 in	 the	capital	 stock’s	 rate	of	 technical	decay,	 triggered	when	
cumulative	CO2	 emissions	 reach	 a	 (joint)	weather‐systems	and	 ecosystems	 tipping	point.	The	
latter	is	positioned	at	an	atmospheric	concentration	level	below	that	of	the	climate	catastrophe	
                                                            
22	In	our	case	too,	there	must	be	at	least	three	phases:	a	pure	carbon	phase,	a	mixed	carbon	and	carbon‐free	phase	and	
a	pure	carbon‐free	phase.	The	simple	reason	is	that	capital	is	a	produced	means	of	production,	and	the	very	first	units	
of	carbon‐free	capacity	must	be	produced	using	carbon‐based	capacity	if	we	start	out	with	a	pure	carbon	phase	first.	
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tipping	point	(TPIRCC)	which	 is	specified	uniformly	 for	BAM	and	successive	extensions	of	 that	
model.			
	 Section	4	describes	 the	calibration	of	 the	 three	models	 (in	4.1).	We	comment	 there	on	
the	 quantitative	 implications	 of	 two	 specifications	 and	 one	 parameter	 assumption	 that	 have	
been	made	to	simplify	the	computational	solutions	of	these	models,	and	which	together	yield	an	
“optimistic”	impression	of	the	resource	mobilization	challenges	that	climate	stabilization	would	
pose	 even	 under	 the	 DIRAM’s	 idealized	 “social	 planning”	 assumptions.	 	With	 that	 caveat,	 the	
following	 three	 sub‐sections	 (4.2	 –	 4.4)	 turn	 present	 the	 optimal	 solutions	 obtained	 for	 the	
transition	 path	 of	 BAM	 and	 the	 two	 extensions	 of	 that	 model,	 along	 with	 the	 corresponding	
results	for	each	version	of	some	parameter	sensitivity	experiments.	
	 	The	paper	concludes	in	section	5	with	a	summary	of	the	salient	findings	that	emphasizes	
the	 intricate	 dynamics	 of	 the	 multi‐phase	 transition	 path	 which	 result	 from	 explicit	
consideration	of	the	investments	required	to	first	improve	and	then	deploy	non‐fossil‐fuel	based	
technologies	 that	 are	 embodied	 in	 durable	 tangible	 capital	 goods.	 We	 then	 comment	 on	 the	
implications	of	having	 re‐formulated	 the	problem	of	designing	a	 ‘tech‐fix’	 climate	 stabilization	
policy	as	one	of	 spending	 that	 entire	 “allowable	budget”	of	GHG	emissions	 (in	CO2‐equivalent	
ppmv)	on	the	transition	to	a	carbon	free	global	production	regime	that	is	social	welfare	optimal	‐
‐given	 the	 constraint	 that	 it	 must	 be	 completed	 in	 time	 to	 avert	 the	 onset	 of	 catastrophic	
“runaway”	global	warming.	These	comments	close	with	brief	reminders	of	the	limitations	of	the	
present	work	that	point	to	priorities	for	further	research	that	will	build	upon	the	foundations	of	
this	exploratory	research.			
	
	
2. The	Basic	Model	and	Its	Extended	Versions	
	
2.1 Introduction	
We	use	the	simplest	possible	endogenous	growth	setting	 in	which	there	are	two	broad	
classes	 of	 (linear)	 technologies.	 One	 of	 them	 is	 an	 established	 technology	 (called	 the	 A‐
technology)	with	a	relatively	high	productivity	of	capital	that	uses	carbon‐based	energy	and	that	
produces	CO2	emissions	in	the	process.	As	stated,	these	emissions	add	to	the	stock	of	GHG’s	and	
so	 affect	 the	 probability	 of	 the	world	 getting	 into	 a	 situation	 of	 runaway	 global	warming	 and	
catastrophe	 in	 the	 end.	 The	 alternative	 technology	 (further	 called	 the	B‐technology)	 does	 not	
generate	CO2	emissions,	 but	has	 a	 relatively	 low	 capital	 productivity	 that	needs	 to	be	 further	
developed	 (through	R&D)	 and	 scaled	up	 (through	 investment	 in	physical	 capital)	 to	 a	 level	 in	
which	it	can	contribute	significantly	to	the	consumption	needs	of	the	population	at	large.	
The	most	elementary	setting	for	growth	models	that	allow	formal	characterization	of	the	
foregoing	technological	options	is	provided	by	models	of	the	‘AK+BK’	form,	where	AK	represents	
the	output	potential	of	capital	embodying	the	carbon‐based	technologies,	and	BK	represents	the	
corresponding	 capacity	 of	 the	 capital	 stock	 embodying	 technologies	 permitting	 reliance	 on		
renewable,	 non‐carbon	 energy	 sources.	 In	 this	 framework,	 the	 variables	 A	 and	 B	 denote	 the	
respective	average	productivities	of	the	two	kinds	of	capital	goods.	We	proceed	by	formulating	a	
sequential	 Hamiltonian	 system	 that	 describes	 three	 distinct	 phases	 in	 the	 transition	 from	
carbon‐based	 to	 carbon‐free	production.	 In	 the	 first	 phase,	 called	 the	 business‐as‐usual	phase	
(BAU	 for	 short),	 only	 the	 already	 existing	 AK	 production	 capacity	 is	 active,	 and	 in	 the	 Basic	
Model	 it	 is	 assumed	 that	 during	 the	 BAU	 phase	 the	 technical	 innovations	 needed	 to	 create	
production	 capacity	 of	 the	 BK	 kind	 are	 available	 but	 have	 not	 been	 implemented	 by	 capital	
formation	of	the	kind	that	would	be	required,	because	the	latter	would	be	less	productive	than	
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capital	 that	 embodies	 the	 carbon‐using	 technology.	 	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 known	 alternative	
technologies	 would	 be	 relatively	 costly	 in	 terms	 of	 instantaneous	 consumption	 possibilities	
foregone,	and	that	disadvantage	is	not	perceived	to	be	offset	by	being	carbon‐free.	As	cumulative	
CO2	emissions	grow	with	 the	continuing	use	of	 the	A	 technology,	 the	 latter	becomes	ever	 less	
(socially)	 advantageous	 vis‐à‐vis	 the	 option	 to	 build	 and	 substitute	 capital	 embodying	 the	 B	
technology.			
Active	utilization	of	a	 technology	 implies	 two	 things.	First,	 the	basic	 features	of	 such	a	
technology	must	be	known,	while	secondly	these	features	are	embodied	in	new	capital	goods.	A	
technology	 can	 be	 de‐activated	 by	 not	 using	 the	 capital	 goods	 embodying	 that	 technology	
anymore.	Because	capital	goods	are	technology	specific,	this	implies	that	a	new	technology	can	
take	over	from	an	old	one	only	by	actively	investing	in	the	capital	goods	that	implement	the	new	
technology	and	by	switching	production	from	the	old	to	the	new	technology.		
In	 such	 a	 setting	 characterized	 by	 linear	 production	 technologies	 and	 linear	 cost	
functions,	it	can	be	shown	that	it	is	not	optimal	to	invest	in	both	technologies	at	the	same	time,	if	
these	 technologies	 differ	 with	 respect	 to	 their	 net	 productivity	 (i.e.	 net	 of	 depreciation).	 The	
reason	is	that	a	unit	of	investment	for	both	technologies	would	represent	the	same	marginal	cost	
in	terms	of	consumption	forgone,	and	so	the	technology	with	the	highest	net	marginal	product,	
would	generate	the	highest	net	marginal	welfare	gain.	Hence,	if	investment	in	the	A	technology	is	
taking	place,	then	investment	in	the	B‐technology	will	be	zero	and	the	other	way	around.	We	will	
also	allow	for	the	possibility	that	there	is	a	phase	in	which	no	investment	in	A	takes	place,	even	
though	the	existing	capital	stock	is	used	to	produce	output	while	investment	in	and	production	
using	the	B‐technology	is	happening	at	the	same	time.	This	second	phase	will	therefore	be	called	
the	joint	production	phase	(JPR	for	short).	In	the	final	phase,	only	investment	in	and	production	
with	the	B‐technology	occurs,	while	the	A‐technology	capital	stock	has	been	deactivated	at	the	
beginning	of	that	phase.	This	is	the	carbon‐free	phase	(CFR	for	short).	
The	 effects	 of	 the	 production	 and	 investment	 activities	 during	 the	 separate	 phases	
distinguished	 in	 the	model	can	be	summarized	as	 in	Figure	1.	TBAU,	TJPR	and	TCFR	mark	the	
moments	in	time	at	which	the	BAU,	JPR	and	CFR	phases	begin.			
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In	 the	 BAU	 phase	 (which	 starts	 at	 t=TU=0),	 the	 cumulative	 emissions	 (labeled	 E)	 are	
increasing	 exponentially	 as	 the	 stock	 of	 carbon‐based	 capital	 is	 growing.	 In	 the	 JPR	 phase	
investment	in	technology	A	stops,	and	output	using	technology	A	(i.e.	YA)	is	at	its	maximum	level	
but	starts	to	decrease	over	time,	because	of	technical	decay.	The	stock	of	technology	B	capital	is	
built	 up	 from	 scratch	 starting	 with	 the	 arrival	 of	 the	 JPR	 phase	 at	 t=TJ.	 Production	 using	
technology	 B	 (i.e.	 YB)	 is	 at	 full	 capacity	 and	 exponentially	 increasing	 during	 the	 JPR	 phase.	
Cumulative	emissions	are	still	increasing,	albeit	at	a	decreasing	rate	as	the	stock	of	carbon‐based	
capital	is	run	down.	During	the	JPR	phase,	total	output	is	still	growing,	but	at	a	slower	rate	than	
the	 growth	 of	YB.	 Phase	CFR	 starts	when	 cumulative	 emissions	E	 hit	 (at	 t=TF)	 the	 cumulative	
emissions	threshold	atܧത,	just	below	the	climate	catastrophe	tipping	point.	During	the	final	phase,	
only	 investments	 capital	 goods	 embodying	 technology	 B	 are	 possible	 and	 carbon‐based	
production	must	stop	completely	even	though	there	is	un‐depreciated	capacity	of	the	latter	type.	
That	 shut‐down	 causes	 a	 drop	 in	 the	 level	 of	 output,	 which	 is	 shown	 in	 Figure	 1	 to	 jump	
discontinuously	from	point	I	to	point	II	before	resuming	its	growth	from	the	latter	level	during	
the	CFR	phase.	
Clearly,	the	various	phases	in	the	model	are	seen	to	be	qualitatively	different.	In	the	first	
(BAU)	 phase,	 the	 high	 productivity	 carbon‐based	 capital	 is	 use	 to	 rapidly	 build	more	 of	 that	
production	capacity,	in	order	to	produce	new	capital	embodying	the	alternative	technology.	But,	
unfortunately,	that	quickly	raises	the	stock	of	cumulative	CO2	emissions	towards	its	admissible	
the	upper	boundary.		Before	cumulative	emissions	reach	ܧത,	however,	phase	JPR	must	have	seen	
carbon‐free	productive	capacity	brought	to	a	level	that	will	allow	a	shut‐down	of	carbon‐based	
production	that	doesn’t	force	too	punishing	a	drop	in	consumption.	The	latter	is	implied	by	our	
assumption	 that	 the	 social	 planning	 agent	 has	 internalized	 consumers’	 relative	 aversion	 to	
negative	 consumption	 shocks	 (i.e.,	 their	 representative	 “felicity	 function”	 has	 a	 positive	
coefficient	of	relative	risk	aversion,	i.e.,	 >	0),	and	therefore	the	optimization	of	social	welfare	
seeks	 to	smooth	changes	 in	 the	 level	of	consumption	over	 time	as	much	as	possible,	given	the	
macroeconomic	and	climate	system	constraints.	From	TF	onwards	the	world	economy	is	“green”	
(having	 entered	 the	CRF	phase),	 and	will	 have	 to	 grow	 at	 a	 relatively	 slower	pace	 due	 to	 the	
higher	unit	cost	of	capital	embodying	the	carbon‐free	technology.	.	
In	addition	to	the	Basic	Model,	the	follow	section	formulates	two	models	that	extend	it	in	
two	 directions,	 sequentially	 incorporating,	 first,	 another	 technology	 policy	 option	 and,	 next,	
introducing	 an	 adverse	 feedback	 effect	 from	 the	 climate	 system.	 In	 the	 second	 version	 of	 the	
transition	model	 that	will	 be	 analyzed,	 the	 productivity	 of	 capital	 embodying	 the	 carbon‐free	
technology	 can	 be	 raised	 through	 (endogenously	 determined)	 R&D	 expenditures	 before	
undertaking	 the	 capital	 formation	 that	 is	 necessary	 to	 deploy	 it	 in	 production.	 The	 third	
transition	model	combines	the	endogenous	R&D	features	of	the	second	version	and	a	constraint	
that	will	be	imposed	on	the	growth	of	productive	capacity	when	cumulative	CO2	emissions	pass	
a	threshold	level	that	causes	the	global	environment	to	tip	into	a	phase	characterized	by	higher	
expected	 rates	 of	 weather‐related	 physical	 damages	 that	 result	 in	 “unscheduled	 losses”	 of	
services	 from	 the	 global	 stock	 of	 capital.	 The	 latter	 regime‐shift	 is	 modeled	 simply	 as	 an	
endogenously	timed	one‐time	jump	in	the	total	annual	rate	of	scheduled	physical	depreciation	
plus	“unscheduled	capital	 losses”	(UCL).	Being	anticipated,	this	 impending	state	change	will	be	
reflected	 in	 the	 current	 shadow	 price	 of	 CO2	 emissions,	 and	 so	 feeds	 back	 to	 affect	 the	
(optimized_	allocation	of	tangible	and	intangible	investments	prior	to	the	systems’	arrival	at	the	
high‐damages	tipping	point.		
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	 2.2	Phase	structure	of	the	Basic	Model:		
The	 endogenous	 growth	 framework	 of	 BAM	 borrows	 heavily	 from	 the	 AK‐model	 by	
Rebelo	(1991).	However,	contrary	to	the	original	AK‐setting,	we	distinguish	between	two	types	
of	capital:	carbon‐based,	or	black,	capital	further	denoted	by	KA	and	carbon‐free,	or	green,	capital	
further	 denoted	 by	KB.	 The	 capital	 stocks	 in	 this	model	 are	 subjected	 to	 exponential	 decay	 at	
rates	ߜ௫,	for	ݔ ∈ ሼܣ, ܤሽ.	Because	of	the	linearity	of	the	production	functions	in	an	AK‐setting,	and	
since	 one	 unit	 of	 capital	 takes	 one	 unit	 of	 consumption	 foregone	 for	 the	 two	 technologies	
distinguished,	 it	 follows	 that	 there	will	always	by	 investment	 in	 just	one	 type	of	 capital	at	 the	
time.	Hence,	gross	investment	in	a	particular	technology	is	either	equal	to	zero,	or	it	is	equal	to	
total	 savings.	Welfare	 in	 this	 setup	 comes	 from	consumption	 only,	 and	we	use	 the	CIES	 inter‐
temporal	welfare	function	to	describe	the	total	flow	of	welfare	over	time.	The	activities	during	
the	different	phases	are	summarized	in	Table	1.	
	
		
Activities	 BAU	Phase		 JPR	Phase		 CFR	Phase		
Investment	 ܫ஺ ൐ 0	 ܫ஻ ൐ 0	 ܫ஻ ൐ 0	
Production	 ஺ܻ ൌ ܣ. ܭ஺	 ஺ܻ ൌ ܣ. ܭ஺	
஻ܻ ൌ ܤ. ܭ஻	
஺ܻ ൌ 0	
஻ܻ ൌ ܤ. ܭ஻	
Capital	
Accumulation	
ܭ஺ሶ ൌ ஺ܻ െ ߜ஺. ܭ஺ െ ܥ	 ܭ஺ሶ ൌ െߜ஺. ܭ஺	
ܭ஻ሶ ൌ ஺ܻ ൅ ஻ܻ െ ߜ஻. ܭ஻ െ ܥ
ܭ஻ሶ ൌ ஻ܻ െ ߜ஻. ܭ஻ െ ܥ	
CO2	Emissions	 ܧሶ ൌ ߝ஺. ܭ஺	 ܧሶ ൌ ߝ஺. ܭ஺	 ܧሶ ൌ 0	
	
Table	1.	BAM	activities	
	
In	this	table,	Ix	refers	to	the	amount	of	investment	in	capital	of	type	x,	where	ݔ ∈ ሼܣ, ܤሽ	
refers	 to	 ‘Carbon‐based’	capital	and	carbon‐free	capital,	 respectively.	Similarly,	Yx	 refers	 to	the	
flow	 of	 output	 using	Kx,	 where	Kx	 is	 the	 stock	 of	 capital	 of	 type	 x.	We	 also	 assume	 that	Yx	 is	
proportional	to	Kx	with	a	constant	productivity	of	capital	as	a	factor	of	proportion.	Typically,	we	
use	A	and	B	to	denote	the	capital	productivities	of	technologies	A	and	B,	implying	that	YA=A.KA,	
etcetera.	Finally,	the	instantaneous	flow	of	CO2	emissions	is	proportional	to	the	capital	stock	in	
use	with	 a	 constant	 factor	 of	 proportion	 ߝ௫	 for	 ݔ ∈ ሼܣ, ܤሽ.	 Obviously,	 ߝ஻ ൌ 0.	 Note	 that	 when	
production	on	some	type	of	carbon‐based	capital	ceases,	 this	very	 fact	 initiates	another	phase,	
since	this	introduces	a	difference	between	the	composition	of	activities	between	the	JPR	and	CFR	
phases.	So	YA=0	implicitly	defines	the	arrival	time	of	the	CFR	phase,	and	the	scrapping	of	carbon‐
based	capital	at	t=TF.	
	
	 2.3	BAM:	The	inter‐temporal	optimization	setting	
It	should	be	noted	that	the	fact	that	the	final	phase	of	BAM	is	a	pure	AK‐setting,	allows	us	
to	 obtain	 the	 optimum	 consumption	 path	 for	 the	 CFR	 phase	 directly,	 given	 an	 initial	 value	
forܭ஻்ி.23	The	welfare	generated	during	the	CFR	phase	depends	therefore	on	the	terminal	value	
of	KB	at	the	end	of	the	JPR	phase.	It	follows	that	the	distribution	of	a	state	variable	over	the	entire	
path	is	optimal	when	the	marginal	costs	of	having	to	deliver	an	extra	unit	of	the	state	variable	in	
its	role	as	a	terminal	value	at	some	time	t*	is	exactly	matched	by	the	marginal	benefits	that	this	
extra	unit	of	the	state	variable	generates	as	the	initial	value	for	the	optimum	continuation	from	
t*.	Since	these	marginal	benefits	and	marginal	costs	are	captured	by	the	co‐state	variables	(see	
                                                            
23	See,	Barro	and	Sala‐i‐Martin	(2004),	chapter	4	in	particular.	
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Leonard	and	Van	Long	(1992:	Ch.	4),	the	 latter	need	to	be	continuous	along	an	optimum	path:	
states	and	co‐states	don’t	jump.	24	
An	optimum	path	can	be	 thought	of	 as	a	 combination	of	an	optimum	 first	 step	and	an	
optimum	continuation	(as	in	dynamic	programming	problems),	which	allows	us	to	interpret	our	
multiphase	transition	model	as	a	finite	horizon	optimum	control	problem	with	a	 free	endpoint	
and	a	scrap	value	function,	as	described	in	Leonard	and	Van	Long	(1992:	Ch.	7),	hereafter	L&VL:	
ch.7).	 This	 is	 the	 situation	 that	 is	 of	 direct	 relevance	 in	 our	 case,	 since	 we	 do	 not	 know	 on	
beforehand	 when	 the	 next	 phase	 will	 start.	 However,	 on	 an	 optimum	 path,	 postponing	 or	
extending	a	particular	phase	by	an	infinitesimal	amount	of	time	shouldn’t	change	the	valuation	
of	the	entire	path.	L&VL	show	that	the	derivative	of	the	value	function	(in	our	case	the	present	
value	of	 total	welfare)	with	respect	 to	 the	 terminal	date	(of	a	phase)	matches	 the	value	of	 the	
Hamiltonian	 at	 that	 date.	 This	 makes	 sense,	 as	 the	 Hamiltonian	 at	 some	 moment	 in	 time	
measures	the	contribution	to	the	value	function	of	the	optimal	use	of	all	resources	available	at	
that	moment	 in	time.	But	 in	a	sequence	of	phases,	 lengthening	the	one	phase	by	a	unit	of	time	
implies	shortening	the	next	phase	by	the	same	unit	of	time.	So	we	should	keep	on	postponing	the	
arrival	of	the	next	phase	as	long	as	the	Hamiltonian	of	the	earlier	phase	exceeds	that	of	the	later	
phase.	The	optimum	switching	moment	between	any	two	phases	is	therefore	implicitly	defined	
by	 the	 requirement	 that	 the	 Hamiltonians	 of	 two	 adjoining	 phases	 must	 be	 the	 same	 when	
evaluated	at	the	moment	of	the	phase‐change.	Again,	this	makes	perfect	economic	sense,	as	the	
value	of	the	Hamiltonian	at	the	end	of	the	current	phase	can	be	seen	as	the	benefits	of	expanding	
the	current	phase	by	a	marginal	unit	of	time,	while	the	Hamiltonian	at	the	beginning	of	the	next	
phase	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 the	 opportunity	 cost	 of	 that	 expansion.	 In	 practice,	 the	 equality	 of	 the	
Hamiltonians	evaluated	under	the	conditions	relevant	in	either	of	the	phases	just	before	and	just	
after	a	phase	change,	will	 result	 in	a	 condition	 that	needs	 to	be	met	by	a	set	of	 states	and	co‐
states	evaluated	at	the	moment	of	the	phase‐change.	
The	differences	 in	 the	nature	of	 the	activities	at	 the	moment	of	a	phase	change	can	be	
used	to	implicitly	describe	the	conditions	that	should	be	met	at	the	moment	of	a	phase	change.	
For	example,	at	 t=TF	 it	must	be	 the	case	 that	carbon‐based	capital	 is	deactivated.	For	 t>=TF	it	
must	 therefore	 be	 the	 case	 that	 the	 shadow	 price	 of	 	 carbon‐based	 capital	 is	 zero,	 since	 the	
cumulative	emission	threshold	has	been	reached	and	carbon‐based	capital	can	therefore	not	be	
used	anymore	and	has	become	worthless	from	then	on.	
	
	 2.4	BAM:	Formal	description	of	the	optimal	3‐phase	transition	path	
The	overall	welfare	 function	 consists	 of	 a	 summation	 of	 integral	welfare	 derived	 from	
the	flow	of	consumption	during	the	three	phases	distinguished	in	BAM:	
	
଴ܹ ൌ ׬ ௘
షഐ∙೟∙ሺ஼೟ሻభషഇ
ሺଵିఏሻ ݀ݐ ൅
்௃
଴ ׬ ௘
షഐ∙೟∙ሺ஼೟ሻభషഇ
ሺଵିఏሻ ݀ݐ ൅ ׬
௘షഐ∙೟∙ሺ஼೟ሻభషഇ
ሺଵିఏሻ ݀ݐ
ஶ
்ி
்ி
்௃ 	.	 	 	 (1)	
	
In	equation	(1)	W0	measures	the	present	value	of	total	welfare	at	time	t=0,	at	which,	by	
assumption,	phase	U	begins.	In	equation	(1),	ߩ	is	the	rate	of	discount,	while	1 ߠ⁄ 	is	the	(constant)	
inter‐temporal	 elasticity	 of	 substitution.	 Ct	 is	 consumption	 at	 time	 t,	 while	 TJ	 and	 TF	 are	 the	
moments	in	time	at	which	the	JPR	and	CFR	phases	begin.	Given	the	exposition	on	inter‐temporal	
optimization	above,	the	time	paths	that	would	maximize	(1)	can	be	obtained	by	solving	the	time	
paths	for	the	Hamiltonian	problems	that	can	be	defined	for	the	individual	phases,	while	linking	
those	time	paths	together	by	means	of	the	requirements	of	optimum	phase	lengths	(implying	the	
                                                            
24	In	the	case	of	pure	state‐constraints,	however,	co‐states	can	jump	(cf.	Leonard	and	Van	Long	(1992:	Ch.	10).	
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equality	of	the	Hamiltonians	for	phases	U	and	J	at	t=TJ	and	for	the	JPR	and	CFR	phases	at	t=TF).	
Effectively	this	comes	down	to	maximizing	(1)	with	respect	to	the	flows	of	consumption	during	
each	phase	and	the	phase‐lengths	themselves,	subject	to	the	constraints	of	the	technologies	that	
are	 relevant	 in	 each	 phase,	 by	 the	 stocks	 inherited	 from	previous	 phases,	 the	 tangible	 capital	
formation	constraint		
	
	 	 ( )A A AK A K C R     ,		 	 	 	 		 	 	 (2)	
cand	by	 the	 thresholds	 that	are	relevant	during	 the	various	phases.	We	will	now	solve	
the	Hamiltonian	problems	for	each	individual	phase.	
The	BAU	phase	
Using	 the	superscripts	U	(for	BAU),	 J	 (for	 JPR)	and	F	(for	CFR)	 	 to	denote	 the	phase	 to	
which	a	particular	variable	pertains,	while	dropping	the	time	subscript	for	ease	of	notation,	the	
present	value	Hamiltonian	HU	is	given	by:	
		
ܪ௎ ൌ ௘షഐ∙೟∙ሺ஼ೆሻభషഇሺଵିఏሻ ൅ ߣ௄ಲ௎ ∙ ቀሺܣ െ ߜ஺ሻ ∙ ܭ஺௎ െ ܥ௎ቁ ൅ ߣா௎ ∙ ߝ஺ ∙ ܭ஺௎	 .	 	 	 (3)	
	
In	equation	(3),	C	is	the	only	control	variable,	while	KA	and	E	are	the	state	variables	and	
ߣ௄ಲ௎ and	ߣா௎	are	the	corresponding	co‐states.	As	first	order	conditions	we	have:	
	
డுೆ
డ஼ೆ ൌ ݁ିఘ∙௧ ∙ ሺܥ௎ሻିఏ െ ߣ௄ಲ௎ ൌ 0 ⇒ ܥ௎ ൌ ൛݁ఘ∙௧ ∙ ߣ௄ಲ௎ ൟ
ିଵ/ఏ	 	 	 	 (4)	
డுೆ
డ௄ಲೆ
ൌ ߣ௄ಲ௎ ∙ ሺܣ െ ߜ஺ሻ ൅ ߣா௎ ∙ ߝ஺ ൌ െߣሶ௄ಲ௎ 		 	 	 	 	 	 (5)	
డுೆ
డாೆ ൌ 0 ൌ െߣሶா௎	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (6)	
డுೆ
డఒ಼ಲೆ
ൌ ܭ஺௎ሶ ൌ ൬ሺܣ െ ߜ஺ሻ ∙ ܭ஺௎ െ ൛݁ఘ∙௧ ∙ ߣ௄ಲ௎ ൟ
ିଵ/ఏ൰	 	 	 	 	 (7)	
డுೆ
డఒಶೆ ൌ ܧ
௎ሶ ൌ ߝ஺ ∙ ܭ஺௎	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (8)	
	
Equation	 (7)	 is	 obtained	 by	 means	 of	 substitution	 of	 equation	 (4)	 into	 the	 macro‐
economic	 budget	 constraint	 which	 states	 that	 output	 is	 used	 for	 consumption	 and	 (gross)	
investment	 purposes.	 Equations	 (5)‐(8)	 constitute	 a	 simultaneous	 system	 of	 differential	
equations	 that	can	be	solved	 forward	 in	 time,	given	a	set	of	 initial	values	 for	 the	various	state	
and	 co‐state	 variables.	 This	will	 give	 rise	 to	 terminal	 values	 of	 those	 same	 state	 and	 co‐state	
variables	at	the	terminal	date	of	phase	U,	i.e.	at	t=	TJ,	the	value	of	which	is	unknown		so	far.		
	
The	JPR	phase	
The	 JPR	 phase	 differs	 from	 the	 BAU	 phase	 since	 investment	 in	 the	 A	 technology	 has	
stopped	and	that	in	the	B‐technology	begins.	However,	the	carbon‐based	capital	stock	KA	is	still	
used	for	production	purposes.	The	present	value	Hamiltonian	for	the	JPR	phase,	i.e.	H	J	,	is	now	
given	by:	
		
ܪ௃ ൌ ௘షഐ∙೟∙ሺ஼಻ሻభషഇሺଵିఏሻ ൅ ߣ௄ಲ
௃ ∙ ൫െߜ஺ ∙ ܭ஺௃൯ ൅ ߣ௄ಳ௃ ∙ ቀሺܤ െ ߜ஻ሻ ∙ ܭ஻௃ ൅ ܣ ∙ ܭ஺௃ െ ܥ௃ቁ ൅ ߣா௃ ∙ ߝ஺ ∙ ܭ஺௃							.		(9)	
	
As	in	the	BAU	phase,	we	have	just	one	control,	 i.e.	C	 J,	but	three	states	KA,	KB	and	E	and	
corresponding	co‐states		ߣ௄ಲ௃ 	,	ߣ௄ಳ௃ and	ߣா௃ .	As	first	order	conditions	we	have:	
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డு಻
డ஼಻ ൌ ݁ିఘ∙௧ ∙ ሺܥ௃ሻିఏ െ ߣ௄ಳ
௃ ൌ 0 ⇒ ܥ௃ ൌ ൛݁ఘ∙௧ ∙ ߣ௄ಳ௃ ൟ
ିଵ/ఏ	 	 	 	 (10)	
డு಻
డ௄ಲ಻
ൌ ߣ௄ಲ௃ ∙ െߜ஺ ൅ ߣ௄ಳ௃ ∙ ܣ ൅ ߣா௃ ∙ ߝ஺ ൌ െߣሶ௄ಲ௃ 	 	 	 	 	 	 (11)	
డு಻
డ௄ಳ಻
ൌ ߣ௄ಳ௃ ∙ ሺܤ െ ߜ஻ሻ ൌ െߣሶ௄ಳ௃ 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (12)	
డு಻
డா಻ ൌ 0 ൌ െߣሶா
௃ 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (13)	
డு಻
డఒ಼ಲ
಻ ൌ ܭ஺௃ሶ ൌ െߜ஺ ∙ ܭ஺௃	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (14)	
డு಻
డఒ಼ಳ
಻ ൌ ܭ஻௃ሶ ൌ ሺܤ െ ߜ஻ሻ ∙ ܭ஻௃ ൅ ܣ ∙ ܭ஺௃ െ ൛݁ఘ∙௧ ∙ ߣ௄ಳ௃ ൟ
ିଵ/ఏ		 	 	 	 (15)	
డு಻
డఒಶ಻
ൌ ܧ௃ሶ ൌ ߝ஺ ∙ ܭ஺௃	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (16)	
	
Equation	(15)	is	again	obtained	by	means	of	substitution	of	optimum	consumption	levels	
(as	 given	by	 equation	 (10))	 into	 the	macro‐economic	 budget	 constraint.	 	As	before,	 equations	
(11)‐(16)	constitute	a	simultaneous	system	of	differential	equations	that	can	be	solved	forward	
in	 time,	 given	 initial	 values	 for	 the	 various	 state	 and	 co‐state	 variables.	 Note	 that	 the	 initial	
values	in	the	JPR	phase	for	those	state	and	co‐state	variables	that	both	systems	have	in	common,	
are	the	same	as	the	terminal	values	for	those	variables	at	the	end	of	the	BAU	phase	because	of	
the	continuity	of	state‐	and	co‐state	variables	along	an	optimum	path.	For	a	given	value	of	TF,	
this	 system	of	 differential	 equations	 allows	 the	 forward	 calculation	 of	 terminal	 values	 for	 the	
states	and	co‐states	in	the	JPR	phase	at	time	t=TF,	which	will	then	function	as	the	initial	values	
for	the	states	and	co‐states	during	the	carbon‐free	phase.		
	
The	CFR	phase	
Phase	 F	 differs	 from	 phase	 J	 in	 that	 the	 carbon‐based	 capital	 stock	 is	 discarded,	 and	
consequently	the	flow	of	CO2	emissions	drops	to	zero.	From	t=TF	production	is	totally	“green”.	
The	present	value	Hamiltonian	for	phase	F,	i.e.	HF,	is	now	given	by:		
ܪி ൌ ௘షഐ∙೟∙ሺ஼ಷሻభషഇሺଵିఏሻ ൅ ߣ௄ಳி ∙ ቀሺܤ െ ߜ஻ሻ ∙ ܭ஻ி െ ܥிቁ ൅ ߣாி ∙ 0	 	 	 	 (17)	
	
As	in	the	BAU	and	JPR	phase,	we	have	just	one	control,	i.e.	CF,	but	two	state	variables,	KB	
and	E	and	the	corresponding	co‐state	variables		ߣ௄ಳி and	ߣாி.		As	first	order	conditions	we	have:	
	
డுಷ
డ஼ಷ ൌ ݁ିఘ∙௧ ∙ ሺܥிሻିఏ െ ߣ௄ಳி ൌ 0 ⇒ ܥி ൌ ൛݁ఘ∙௧ ∙ ߣ௄ಳி ൟ
ିଵ/ఏ	 	 	 	 (18)	
డுಷ
డ௄ಳಷ ൌ ߣ௄ಳ
ி ∙ ሺܤ െ ߜ஻ሻ ൌ െߣሶ௄ಳி 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (19)	
డுಷ
డாಷ ൌ 0 ൌ െߣሶா
௃ 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (20)	
డுಷ
డఒ಼ಳಷ
ൌ ܭ஻ிሶ ൌ ሺܤ െ ߜ஻ሻ ∙ ܭ஻ி െ ൛݁ఘ∙௧ ∙ ߣ௄ಳி ൟ
ିଵ/ఏ	 	 	 	 	 	 (21)	
డுಷ
డఒಶಷ ൌ ܧ
ிሶ ൌ 0	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (22)	
	
As	 before,	 equation	 (21)	 is	 obtained	 by	 substituting	 equation	 (18)	 into	 the	 macro‐
economic	 budget	 constraint.	 Again,	 equations	 (19)‐(22)	 constitute	 a	 simultaneous	 system	 of	
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differential	equations	that	can	be	solved	forward	in	time,	given	initial	values	for	the	various	state	
and	co‐state	variables	that	have	been	inherited	from	phase	J.		In	this	case,	however,	the	terminal	
values	 for	 the	 states	 and	 co‐states	 are	 implicitly	 described	 by	 the	 standard	 transversality	
conditions	 in	 an	 AK	 setting	 that	 require	 the	 present	 value	 of	 the	 carbon‐free	 capital	 stock	 to	
approach	zero	at	the	terminal	date,	i.e.	in	this	case	at	time	infinity.	For	cumulative	emissions,	the	
terminal	value	had	already	been	reached	at	t=TJ,	just	before	the	atmospheric	concentration	level	
of	CO2	ppmv	(i.e.,	cumulative	net	emissions)	reached	the	“catastrophe	tipping	point.”		
	
Transversality	conditions	
For	 the	CFR	phase	 the	 standard	 transversality	 condition	 (further	 called	TVC	 for	 short)	
applies	regarding	the	value	of	carbon‐free	capital	at	time	infinity:	
	
lim௧→ஶ 	ߣ௄ಳ,೟ி ∙ ܭ஻,௧ி ൌ 0		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (23)	
	
where	we	have	now	added	time‐subscripts.	Note	that	(18)	can	be	 integrated	directly	to	obtain	
the	time	path	for	ߣ௄ಳ,௧ி 	which	can	then	be	substituted	into	(20)	to	obtain	the	time	path	for		ܭ஻,௧ி .		
	 This	yields:	
	
ߣ௄ಳ,೟ி ൌ ߣ௄ಳ,೅ಷி ∙ ݁ିሺ஻ିఋಳሻ∙ሺ௧ି்ிሻ	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (24)	
	
ܭ஻,௧ி ൌ
௘ష
೟ഐషሺ೟ష೅ಷሻሺಳషಌాሻ
ഇ ఏ∙ቀఒ಼ಳ,೅ಷಷ ቁ
షభ ഇ⁄
ఘାሺఏିଵሻሺ஻ିஔ୆ሻ ൅ ݁ሺ௧ି୘୊ሻሺ஻ିஔ୆ሻሺܭ஻,்ிி െ
௘ష
౐ూഐ
ഇ ఏ∙ቀఒ಼ಳ,೅ಷಷ ቁ
షభ ഇ⁄
ఘାሺఏିଵሻሺ஻ିஔ୆ሻ ሻ	 (25)	
	
Equations	(23)	and	(24)	can	be	substituted	into	TVC	(22),	and	we	find	that	in	order	for	
TVC	(22)	to	hold	the	following	conditions	must	be	satisfied:	
	
ఘାሺఏିଵሻሺ஻ିఋಳሻ
ఏ ൐ 0	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (26)	
	
ܭ஻,்ிி ൌ
௘ష
౐ూഐ
ഇ ఏ∙ቀఒ಼ಳ,೅ಷಷ ቁ
షభ ഇ⁄
ఘାሺఏିଵሻሺ஻ିஔ୆ሻ 	 .	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (27)	
When	substituting	(26)	into	(24),	we	find	that:	
	
ܭ஻,௧ி ൌ ܭ஻,்ிி ∙ ݁
ሺಳషಌాషഐሻሺ೟ష೅ಷሻ
ഇ 	 .	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (28)	
	
It	follows	from	(28)	that	if	the	structural	parameters	are	such	that	(265)	is	met	and	if	we	
pick	 consumption	at	 time	TF	 (hence	ߣ௄ಳ,೅ಷி 	 (see	equation	 (16))	 such	 that	 (27)	 is	met,	 then	 the	
carbon‐free	 capital	 stock	will	 grow	 at	 the	 steady	 state	 growth	 rate	 ሺܤ െ δB െ ߩሻ/ߠ	 from	 time	
t=TF.	
Apart	from	the	TVC	above,	we	require	that:	
ߣ௄ಲ,೅ಷ௃ ൌ 0		 ,	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (29)	
	
which	sets	the	shadow	price	of	carbon‐based	capital	to	zero	at	the	end	of	the	JPR	phase	(i.e.,	at	
the	moment	 it	 is	 discarded),	 because	 an	 extra	 unit	 of	 capital	 added	 then	would	 not	 produce	
anything	and,	being	useless,	would	be	worth	nothing.			
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Lastly,	 there	are	 two	TVCs	 that	pertain	 to	 the	optimum	 length	of	 the	BAU	and	 the	 JPR	
phase,	and	that	require	the	equality	of	the	Hamiltonians	of	the	various	phases	at	different	points	
in	 time.	 For	 the	 optimum	 length	 of	 the	 BAU	 phase	 (given	 by	 the	 value	 of	 TJ,	 since	 TU=0	 by	
assumption),	we	must	 have	 	ܪ்௃௎ ൌ ܪ்௃௃ 	 25,	whereas	 the	 optimum	 start	 date	 for	 the	 F	 phase	 is	
determined	by	the	requirement	thatܪ்ி௃ ൌ ܪ்ிி .		Using	the	definitions	of	the	Hamiltonians	in	(2),	
(8)	and	(16),	as	well	as	imposing	the	F.O.C.	regarding	consumption	in	(3),	(9)	and	(17)	together	
with	the	continuity	constraints	on	states	and	co‐states	that	feature	in	both	adjoining	phases,	we	
obtain	implicit	descriptions	of	the	arrival	dates	of	the	JPR	and	CFR	phases.	These	are	given	by:	
	
	ߣ௄ಲ,೅಻௃ ൌ ߣ௄ಳ,೅಻௃ 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (30)	
	
ܣ ∙ ߣ௄ಳ,೅ಷ௃ ൌ െߝ஺∙ߣா,்ி௃ 	 .	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (31)	
	
Equation	(30)	states	that	investment	in	the	carbon‐based	technology	should	stop	at	the	
moment	that	the	shadow	price	of	the	A	technology	is	equal	to	(and	thereafter	drops	below)	the	
shadow	price	of	 the	B	 technology.	 Since	 the	marginal	 cost	of	obtaining	 a	unit	 of	 capital	 is	 the	
same	in	both	cases	(i.e.	one	unit	of	consumption	foregone),	equation	(30)	is	consistent	with	the	
maximization	of	the	(present	value)	welfare	surplus	associated	with	investment.	Equation	(31)	
states	that	production	using	carbon‐based	capital	should	stop	the	moment	that	the	benefits	from	
continuing	to	use	a	unit	of	capital	–	on	the	LHS	of	the	equation,	since	a	unit	of	capital	produces	A	
units	of	output	and	each	unit	of	output	is	worth	ߣ௄ಳ,೅ಷ௃ 	in	present	value	welfare	terms	at	t=TF	–	is	
matched	 by	 the	 cost	 of	 doing	 that,	which	 is	 shown	on	 the	 equation’s	 RHS:	 one	 unit	 of	 capital	
produces	ߝ஺	units	of	CO2	emissions,	each	at	a	marginal	social	cost	of	െߣா,்ி௃ 	26.	Equation	(31)	is	
therefore	 consistent	 with	 the	 zero	 quasi‐rent	 condition,	 which	 is	 familiar	 from	 the	 clay‐clay	
vintage	literature	as	an	implicit	description	of	the	optimum	moment	to	scrap	existing	capacity.27	
	
2.5 BAM:	Sequential	numerical	solution	of	the	differential	equation	systems	
				
The	three	systems	of	differential	equations,	further	called	SU,	SJ	and	SF,	can	in	principle	
be	 solved,	 as	 the	 initial	 and	 terminal	 values	we	have	available	 for	 the	 state	variables,	 and	 the	
TVCs	that	provide	either	some	fixed	points	for	the	time	paths	of	the	co‐states	(cf.	equation	(29)),	
or	 link	 the	co‐states	 to	a	state‐variable	which	 time	path	has	been	 fixed	 through	a	given	 initial	
value	(cf.	equation	(27)),	or	that	links	different	co‐states	at	some	point	in	time	(cf.	equations	(30)	
and	 (31))	 provide	 exactly	 enough	 information	 to	 obtain	 a	 fixed	 point	 for	 all	 time	 paths	
concerned.	To	see	this,	it	should	be	noted	that	we	need	to	obtain	fixed	points	for	the	time	paths	
for	three	different	state	variables	(KA,	KB	and	E),	and	for	their	corresponding	co‐state	variables,	
                                                            
25	ܪ௧௉	is	short	for	the	value	of	the	Hamiltonian	pertaining	to	phase	P	at	time	t.	In	the	equality	ܪ௧௉ ൌ ܪ௧௉ାଵ	it	follows	that	the	 time‐coordinate	of	ܪ௧௉	 cannot	be	exactly	 the	 same	as	 that	of	ܪ௧௉ାଵ	 since	P+1	 is	 the	phase	 coming	directly	after	phase	 P.	 Consequently,	 ܪ௧௉ ൌ ܪ௧௉ାଵ	must	 be	 read	 as	 limఌ↓଴ ܪ௧ିఌ௉ ൌ ܪ௧௉ାଵ,	 but	 for	 simplicity	we	 stick	 to	 our	 original	notation.	
26	Note	that	the	shadow	price	of	emissions	itself	 is	negative,	since	an	additional	unit	of	cumulative	emissions	would	
reduce	potential	welfare	rather	than	increasing	it.	
27	See,	e.g.,	Johansen	(1959)	and	Solow	et	al.	(1966).	More	recently,	Boucekkine	(2011)	also	used	this	condition,	which	
states	that	a	vintage	once	installed	should	be	discarded	as	soon	as	it’s	quasi‐rents	become	negative,	a	rule	that	holds	in	
this	 case	 since	 the	 quasi‐rents	 consist	 of	 the	 social	 welfare	 value	 of	 discounted	 output	 less	 total	 variable	 CO2	
emissions	costs.			
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as	well	as	the	optimum	values	of	the	phase	lengths	of	phases	U	and	J.	Hence,	for	BAM	we	need	8	
pieces	of	information.	We	have	initial	values	available	for	ܭ஺,଴௎ ൌ ܭഥ஺,଴௎ 	,		ܭ஻,்௃௃ ൌ 0	,	and	ܧ଴௎ ൌ ܧത଴௎.	
In	 addition,	we	 have	 a	 terminal	 value	 for	 cumulative	 emissions:ܧ்ிி ൌ ܧത்ிி .	 The	 transversality	
conditions	given	by	equations	(27),	(29),	(30)	and	(31)	then	provide	the	remaining	information	
that	is	needed.	
A	numerical	solution	of	SU	can	easily	be	obtained,	conditional	on	some	a	priori	values	of		
ߣ௄ಲ,బ௎ , ߣா௎	 and	 TJ,	 given	 the	 initial	 values	 of	 ܭ஺,଴௎ 	 	 and	 ܧ଴௎.	 The	 solution	 of	 SU	 then	 provides	
terminal	values	 for	 	ߣ௄ಲ,೅಻௎ 	 	and	 	ߣா,்௃௎ 	 that,	on	account	of	 the	continuity	of	 states	and	co‐states	
give	 rise	 to	 initial	 values	 for	 SJ,	 since	 we	 must	 have	 that	 ߣ௄ಲ,೅಻௎ ൌ ߣ௄ಲ,೅಻௃ 	 ,	 	 ߣா,்௃௎ ൌ ߣா,்௃௃ ,	
ܭ஺,்௃௃ ൌ ܭ஺,்௃௎ 		,	ܭ஻,்௃௃ ൌ 0,	ܧ்௃௃ ൌ ܧ்௃௎ .		We	only	need	an	initial	value	for	ߣ௄ಳ,೅಻௃ 		as	well	as	an	a	priori	
value	for	TF	to	be	able	to	calculate	SJ	forward	in	time.		That	initial	value	is	provided	by	the	TVCs	
listed	in	equation	(30).	Given	the	a	priori	values	for		ߣ௄ಲ,బ௎ , ߣா௎	,		TJ	and	finally	TF,	we	are	able	to	
calculate	 the	 terminal	 values	 for	 ߣ௄ಳ,೅ಷ௃ 	 ,	 ߣா,்ி௃ 	 ,	 ܭ஻,்ி௃ 	 	 and	 ܧ்ி௃ 	 ,	 which,	 again	 using	 the	
requirement	 of	 the	 continuity	 of	 states	 and	 co‐states,	 imply	 that	 ܭ஻,்ிி ൌ ܭ஻,்ி௃ ,	 	ܧ்ிி ൌ ܧ்ி௃ ,	
ߣ௄ಳ,೅ಷி ൌ ߣ௄ಳ,೅ಷ௃ 	 and	 ߣா,்ிி ൌ ߣா,்ி௃ .		 	 The	 time	 paths	 thus	 obtained	 for	 all	 states	 and	 co‐states,	
taken	 in	 combination	 	with	 intitial	 guesses	 of	 the	 various	 phase	 lengths,	 can	 then	 be	 used	 to	
evaluate	the	differences	between	the	RHS	and	the	LHS	of		the	terminal	constraint	ܧ்ி்ி ൌ ܧത்ி்ி	and	
those	of	the	TVCs	not	used	so	far,	i.e.	those	from	equations	(27),	(29)	and	(31).	
	Obviously,	if	these	constraints	were	satisfied	by	the	values	chosen	a	priori	for			ߣ௄ಲ,బ௎ , ߣா௎,	
TJ,	and	TF,	we	would	have	found	the	solutions	for	all	the	welfare‐maximizing	time	paths.			Being	
the	result	of	a	guess,	however,	these	differences	generally	will	not	equal	zero	at	the	outset.	 	 In	
that	 case	 a	 search	algorithm	such	as	 the	 steepest	descent	method	 (which	we	have	been	using	
with	 success	 thus	 fare)	 should	 readily	 find	 the	 set	 of	 initial	 values	 that	 will	 simultaneously	
satisfy	all	of	the	TVCs.28		It	should	be	noted	that	a	similar	approach	can	be	followed	for	versions	
of	the	model	with	more	than	3	phases,	as	we	will	describe	further	below.	
	
3.	Extensions	of	the	BAM	Framework		
	
This	 section	 describes	 the	 modifications	 of	 the	 basic	 3‐phase	 model	 that	 extend	 the	
structure	 of	 BAM	 in	 two	ways.	 The	 first	 introduces	 the	 option	 of	 investment	 in	 research	 and	
development	 directed	 to	 lowering	 the	 unit	 capital	 costs	 of	 production	 facilities	 that	 embody	
technologies	that	do	not	use	fossil	fuel	as	an	energy	source,	and	the	second	takes	account	of	an	
                                                            
28	In	fact,	given	the	simplicity	of	our	system,	it	is	possible	to	obtain	analytical	solutions	for	all	time	paths,	even	though	
these	are	in	part	quite	intricate	non‐linear	expressions	involving	hyper	geometric	functions.	These	integral	equations	
link	 the	various	 initial	 and	 terminal	 conditions	as	well	 as	 the	values	of	TJ	 and	TF	 together	 through	a	simultaneous	
system	 of	 non‐linear	 equations.	 Using	 that	 system,	 we	 were	 able	 to	 find	 the	 fixed	 points	 for	 all	 time	 paths	 by	
numerically	 solving	 the	 non‐linear	 system	 for	 the	 fixed	 points.	 The	 time	 paths	 for	 each	 of	 the	 state	 and	 co‐state	
variables	 could	 then	 be	 obtained	 by	 substituting	 the	 numerical	 values	 thus	 found	 for	 the	 fixed	 points	 into	 the	
analytical	solutions	of	all	time	paths	involving	these	fixed	points.	This	procedure	proved	to	work,	but	is	rather	tedious	
and	time	consuming	and	it’s	feasibility	depended	crucially	on	the	simplicity	of	the	model.	Minor	deviations	from	the	
AK‐set‐up	 proved	 to	 make	 using	 the	 analytical	 method	 infeasible.	 This	 provided	 a	 strong	 incentive	 to	 use	 the	
sequential	numerical	solution	method	outlined	in	the	main	text.	Both	methods	do	generate	the	same	results,	as	they	
should,	 but	 the	 sequential	 numerical	 method	 is	 much	 more	 efficient	 in	 terms	 of	 both	 obtaining	 the	 system	 of	
differential	equations	to	be	solved,	and	finding	the	solution.	Nonetheless,	more	work	is	needed	to	improve	upon	the	
rather	 crude	 steepest	 descent	 search	 routine	 that	 we	 are	 employing	 at	 the	 moment.	 The	 latter	 converges	 rather	
slowly,	 if	at	all,	 for	 the	more	 intricate	versions	of	the	model	extensions	we	have	built	up	to	date	and	which	are	not	
reported	 here.	 Nonetheless,	 the	 numerical	model	 does	 allow	 us	 to	 expand	 the	model	 in	ways	 that	would	make	 it		
impossible	to	solve	using		the	analytical	solution	approach.	
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adverse	 feed‐back	effect	on	 the	global	economy	resulting	 from	 the	warming	 that	 accompanies	
the	transition.	
	
	
3.1	BAM	+	R&D:	The	modified	model’s	structure	
To	 introduce	 R&D	 investment‐driven	 endogenous	 technical	 changes	 affecting	 the	
economic	 performance	 of	 the	 carbon‐free	 technology,	we	 posit	 that	 these	will	 be	 confined	 to	
raising	 the	 average	 (and	 marginal)	 productivity	 of	 the	 capital	 goods	 that	 embodies	 the	 new	
technology.	 	 The	 latter	 lowers	 the	 real	 unit	 cost	 of	 carbon‐free	 production	 capacity	 by	
irreversibly	raising	B	above	its	initial	value	in	the	opening	(BAU)	phase,	and	doing	so	prior	to	the	
start	of	the	capital	 formation	that	 is	necessary	to	 implement	this	 form	of	 technical	change	and	
begin	the	transition	away	from	an	economy	reliant	upon	burning	fossil	fuels.		
		 Since	we	are	building	upon	the	BAM	framework	that	uses	an	AK	growth	model	setting,	
the	familiar	modeling	of	endogenous	technical	change	deriving	from	R&D	activities	is	not	readily	
applicable.	The	classic	exemplars	of	the	later	in	the	literature	–	found	in	Lucas	(1988),	or	Romer	
(1990),	or	(more	implicitly)	in	Aghion	and	Howitt	(1992)	‐‐	specify	that	the	dependence	of	the	
proportional	 rate	 of	 change	 in	 total	 input	 productivity	 upon	 the	 flow	 of	 R&D	 expenditures	 is	
described	by	a	simple	functional	relationship	of	the	following	form:		
	
	 B R B   	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (32)	
	
where	 R	 represents	 R&D	 resources	 measured	 here	 as	 consumption	 foregone.	 But,	 with	 the	
linear,	 single‐factor	 specification	 of	 the	 AK	 model’s	 production	 function,	 the	 average	 (and	
marginal)	 productivity	 of	 capital	 remains	 constant	 as	 the	 economy	 accumulates	 capital.	 No	
contributions	 from	 increases	 in	 other	 factors	 of	 production	 (say,	 the	 state	 of	 technical	
knowledge,	or	human	capital)	are	needed	to	prevent	the	capital	stock’s	growth	from	driving	its	
marginal	 productivity	 downwards.	 Were	 a	 specification	 such	 as	 (32)	 to	 be	 introduced	 in	 a	
simple	 AK‐setting	 (disregarding	 the	 embodiment	 requirement	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 simplicity	 in	
making	this	point	clear)	the	resulting	growth	path	of	the	system	would	become	explosive,	rather	
than	one	that	could	attain	a	steady‐state	equilibrium	rate.29	
	 	Hence,	we	have	opted	for	a	specification	of	the	R&D	process	that	allows	for	a	decreasing	
marginal	 product	 of	R&D	and	 a	 growth	 rate	 of	B	 that	 asymptotically	 approaches	 zero	 for	 any	
constant	positive	allocation	of	resource	to	the	R&D	activity.	This	assures	that	the	real	marginal	
rate	of	return	from	maintaining	investment	in	R&D	will	diminish	over	time.	The	simple	form	for	
this	function	therefore	is:	
	
	 ( )B R B B    	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (33)	
	
where	 B 	 is	 the	 fixed	asymptotic	value	of	capital	productivity,	and	 0  	and	 0 1  	are	also	
constant.30	 	 Starting	 out	 with	 a	 basic	 technical	 design	 that	 permits	 productivity	 to	 be	 at	 B0,
                                                            
29	This	follows	from	the	fact	that	with	a	constant	level	of		R	in	equation		(33)	the	rising	level	of	capital’s	marginal	(and	
average)	 productivity	would	 increase	 the	 attractiveness	 of	 engaging	 in	 R&D	while	 providing	 the	 extra	 investment	
resources	for	that	purpose	by	accelerating	output	growth.			
30		To	keep	keep	the	matter	simple	for	computational	purposes	in	this	investigation,	we	have	used	R,	the	current	flow	
of	resources	as	the	control	variable	in	the	R&D	process.	But	it	will	be	conceptuallymore	satisfactory,	and	should	not	be	
computationally	problematic	 in	future	work	with	this	model	to	replace	R	in	equation	(33)	by	a	latent	state	variable	
representing	the	depreciated	stock	of	knowledge	that	is	germane	to	this	particular	domain	of	directed	R&D	activities.	
Following	 conventional	 practice	 in	 the	 empirical	 literature	 on	 productivity	 effects	 of	 R&D,	 the	 curent	 state	 of	
knowledge	useful	for	modifying	the	state	variable	B,	can	be	indexed	by	the	current	value	of	the	integral	of	depreciated	
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00 B B  	 the	marginal	product	of	R&D	 investment	will	be	 falling	as	R	 increases	and	B	 rises	
towards	its	upper	bound.		
	 	Several	 features	 of	 this	 specification	 argue	 for	 its’	 use	 in	 the	 present	 applications	
context.		Firstly,	it	has	the	advantage	of	introducing	decreasing	returns	to	R&D	in	a	setting	that,	
unlike	 the	 conventional	 endogenous	 growth	 models,	 excludes	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 specific	
technology	 being	 rendered	 infinitely	 productive	 (and	 so	 resulting	 in	 infinitely	 rapid	 growth)	
merely	 by	 the	 application	 of	 more	 and	 more	 massive	 R&D	 expenditures	 at	 any	 particular	
moment	in	time.31		Allowing	decreasing	marginal	returns	in	R&D	recognizes	that	at	a	given	stage	
in	 the	advance	of	knowledge	 the	 state	of	 fundamental	 scientific	understanding	of	 the	physical	
processes	involved	may	still	be	inadequate	to	permit	the	effective	application	of	more	and	more	
resources	to	the	solution	of	a	particular	practical	problem	‐‐	such	as	the	further	improvement	of	
the	 productivity	 of	 a	 particular	 class	 of	 technology‐embodying	 capital	 facilities.32	 That	 more	
restrictive	view	of	the	transformative	power	of	 investment	in	R&D	is	appropriate	also	because	
the	 concern	 in	 this	 context	 is	 not	 with	 the	 undirected	 global	 expansion	 of	 the	 technological	
opportunity	 set	 typically	 envisaged	 in	 theoretical	 growth	 models.	 Rather,	 the	 aim	 of	 the			
“directed	R&D”	in	the	present	model	is	to	enhance	the	economic	properties	of	particular	kinds	of	
process	 inventions,	 with	 new	 product	 inventions	 only	 insofar	 as	 alterations	 in	 product	
characteristics	 are	 consequential	 for	 raising	 the	 efficiency	 of	 capital	 inputs	 into	 carbon‐free	
production	processes.33			
	 Introducing	 (33)	 into	 the	Basic	Model	 requires	 a	 number	 of	modifications:	 the	 first	 of	
these	 extends	 the	 Hamiltonian	 by	 adding	 the	 value	 of	 increases	 in	 B	 due	 to	 R&D.	 Next,	 the			
macro‐economic	budget	constraint	that	describes	the	accumulation	of	capital	must	be	adjusted	
to	 reflect	 the	 fact	 that	 a	 unit	 of	 resource	 inputs	 in	 R&D,	 R,	 requires	 allocation	 of	 a	 unit	 of	
aggregate	output	(i.e.,	foregoing	its	use	in	consumption	or	tangible	investment).		Instead	of	just	
the	one	control	variable	C,	we	now	have	an	additional	control	variable	R,	and	an	additional	state	
variable,	 i.e.	B	(the	carbon‐free	productivity	parameter	of	BAM).	B	has	become	a	state	variable	
since	 it	 can	 change	 as	 long	 as	 R&D	 is	 taking	 place,	 but	must	 remain	 constant	 after	 R&D	 has	
ceased.	 Leonard	 and	Van	Long	 (1992:	Ch.7)	describe	how	 the	 latter	 situation	 can	be	handled.	
Their	 approach	 is	 to	 regard	 the	 Hamiltonian	 as	 a	 function	 of	 B,	 i.e.,	H(B),	 while	 substituting	
0B  	as	the	dynamic	constraint	on	B	during	the	phases	when	investments	in	R&D	are	not	made	
                                                                                                                                                                                         
flows	 of	R,	 added	 to	 an	 initial	measure	 of	 the	 knowledge	 stock	 available	 at	 t=	 0	 ,	 the	 commencement	 date	 for	 the	
activity.	This	leaves	R	as	the	control	variable,	but	wil	have	the	effect	of	smoothing	changes	in	the	growth	rate	of	B.			
31	The	equilibrium	(steady‐state)	growth	rate	in	a	standard	AK‐model	rises	linearly	with	the	productivity	of	capital	(cf.	
Barro	and	Sala‐i‐Martin,	2004),	and	therefore	with	the	flow	rate	of	R&D	expenditures.	 	The	existence	of	technology‐
specific	 intrinsic	productivity	bounds	that	are	set	 in	 the	 limit	 (by	 the	physical	properties	of	 the	materials,	 chemical	
and	electrical	processes	entailed	in	production)		makes	this	so	implausible	that	even	its	assertion	as	a	metaphor	is	of	
dubious	usefulness	.	By	contrast,	a	further,	technical	advantage	of	the	specification	given	by	equation	(33)	is	that	the	
rate	of	improvement	in	the	productivity	of	capital	 is	 jointly	concave	in	B	and	R,	assuring		fulfillment		of	a	necessary	
condition	for	the	welfare	maximization	problem	to	have	a	solution.	
32	Conceptually,	 this	 formulation	of	 the	effects	of	 investment	 in	R&D	activities	may	be	 thought	 to	 reflect	 a	Platonic	
world	 in	which	a	 finite	number	of	 solution	possibilities	 for	 technical	 transformations	 are	present	 from	 the	 start	 of	
time,	but	these	as	a	rule	will	not	reveal	themselves	spontaneously.		They	can	be	uncovered,	however,	and	formulated	
for	 practical	 application	 through	 costly	 research	 and	 development	 procedures	 based	 upon	 the	 existing	 state	 of	
fundamental	 scientific	 knowledge,	 rather	 than	 being	 created	 de	 novo	 and	 without	 limit	 by	 the	 expenditure	 of	
resources	in	the	performance	of	R&D	activities			
33	Following	this	interpretation,	adding	endogenous	technological	change	to	the	Basic	Model	allows	us	to	characterize	
the	optimal	path	of	global	R&D	 that	 is	directed	 to	 increasing	 the	productivity	of	green	capital.	 	Correspondingly,	 the	
impact	of	R&D	investment	on	economic	welfare	is	modeled	as	being	felt	indirectly,	rather	than	directly	in	the	form	of	
pure	 product	 quality	 enhancements.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 welfare	 gains	 come	 through	 reduction	 of	 the	 sacrifice	 of	
consumption	utility	required	in	the	transition,	and	for	the	subsequent	sustained	growth	of	(per	capita)	consumption	
under	stabilized	climatic	conditions.		
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(and	B	therefore	will	remain	unchanged).		In	all	phases	we	have	that	the	equation	of	motion	for	
the	 co‐state	 variable	 associated	 with	 B	 is	 given	 by /B H B    .	 The	 reason	 for	 explicitly	
specifying	the	dynamic	constraints	on	the	co‐state	for	B	during	the	phases	where	B	itself	is	not	
changing	(because	R&D	has	halted)	is	that	the	terminal	value	of	B	(when	the	R&D	process	stops)	
will	influence	the	generation	of	welfare	in	the	following	phases.	Thus,	through	the	continuity	of	
co‐states	and	states,	information	about	the	future	welfare	effects	of	having	a	high	value	of	B	in	
the	JPR	and	CFR	phases,	can	influence	allocation	decisions	during	the	phase	with	positive	R&D	
that	 would	 directly	 involve	 the	 trade‐off	 between	 R&D	 and	 other	 uses	 of	 output,	 like	
consumption	and	tangible	capital	investment.	
	 Note	that	it	can	be	shown	that	once	an	initial	value	for	 0B is	available,	then	it	pays	not	to	
wait	 to	 improve	 the	productivity	 of	 capital	 embodying	 carbon‐free	 technology	 by	 engaging	 in	
R&D	 (see	 Appendix	 A).	 Hence,	without	 loss	 of	 generality,	we	may	 assume	 that	 the	 basic	 idea	
underlying	the	carbon‐free	technology	is	available	from	t=TU=0.	In	that	case,	R&D	should	start	
at	t=TU,	and	it	should	stop	at	t=TJ,	that	being	the	moment	at	which	investment	in	the	formation	
of	 carbon‐free	 production	 capacity	 commences.	 Consequently,	 the	 BAM+R&D	 model	 has	 the	
same	number	of	phases	as	BAM.	For	the	BAU	phase,	assuming	that	R&D	is	done	from	the	very	
beginning,	the	three	following	equations	have	to	be	added:34	
		 	 ( )B R B B    ;	 /B H B    ;	 / 0H R   ,	 	 	 	 											(34)	
	
and	 the	 capital	 accumulation	 constraint	 takes	 the	 correspondingly	 modified	 form	 of	 eq.(2):			
	 	 	
	 ( )A A AK A K C R     	.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 											(35)	 	
		 Furthermore,	 the	 revised	 Hamiltonian	 for	 the	 BAU	 phase	 is	 now	 given	 by:
	 . 1 /(1 ) {( ) }t A A A BH e C A K C R B                 		 	.							 	 											(36)		
Since	an	additional	state	variable	has	been	introduced,	with	it	come	an	additional	TVC.	As	usual,	
we	 require	 that	 at	 infinity	 the	 present	 (utility)	 value	 of	 B	 should	 approach	 zero,	 i.e.	
,lim 0t B t tB    .	 However,	 t TJB B t TJ   ,	 since	 R&D	 has	 ceased	 at	 t=TJ	 which	 has	
turned	 B	 into	 a	 constant	 for	 t  .	 Consequently,	 the	 additional	 TVC	 is	 reduced	 to	 the	
requirement	that	 ,lim 0t B t  .		Using	(25),	it	can	be	shown	that	the	latter	TVC	implies:	
	
ߣ஻,்ிி ൌ ܭ஻,்ிி ∙ ߣ௄ಳ,೅ಷி ∙ ఏሺ஻೅ಷಷ ିఋಳሻ∙ሺఏିଵሻାఘ		.	 	 	 	 	 											(37)	
	
It	 is	 hard	 to	 give	 a	 transparent	 interpretation	 of	 equation	 (37),	 and	 a	 fortiori,	 for	 the	
revised	version	of	the	transversality	condition	that	now	determines	the	optimum	length	of	the	
BAU	phase.	That	TVC	differs	from	the	corresponding	condition	in	BAM,	since	the	R&D	process	is	
active	 during	 the	 BAU	 phase	 and	 inactive	 during	 subsequent	 phases.	 Consequently,	 the	
Hamiltonians	of	 the	BAU	and	 JPR	phase	evaluated	at	 t=TJ	now	involve	 terms	coming	 from	the	
R&D	function	as	well	as	the	corresponding	co‐state	evaluated	at	t=TJ,	resulting	in	a	complicated	
expression	 linking	 the	 various	 states	 and	 co‐states	 together	 at	 t=TJ.35	 Note	 that	 (37)	 in	
                                                            
34	Note	 that	 for	 ease	 of	 notation	we	 have	 dropped	 the	 time	 subscript	 and	 the	 phase	 superscript	 except	where	 the	
presence	of	the	time	subscript	is	needed	for	clarity.	
35  Because	 it	 has	 resisted	 our	 attempts	 to	 give	 that	 mathematical	 expression	 an	 intelligibly	 simple	 economic	
interpretation,	 we	 do	 not	 present	 it	 here.	 An	 email	 request	 to	 the	 corresponding	 author	 will	 provide	 readers	
interested	in	finding	an	interpretation	for	it,	or	using	it	to	replicate	our	solution	of	the	model.		 
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combination	with	the	initial	value	for	B,	i.e.	B0,	provide	enough	information	to	solve	this	revised	
system	of	differential	equations.	
	
3.2	Allowing	for	warming‐driven	“Unscheduled	Capital	Losses”:	BAM+	R&D+UCL	
The	final	version	concerns	a	combination	of	BAM	and	R&D	that	includes	the	introduction	
of	a	“tipping	point”	beyond	which	further	warming,	driven	by	the	rising	concentration	of	CO2	in	
the	atmosphere,	will	bring	a	higher	expected	annual	rate	of	“unscheduled	losses”	of	productive	
capacity	due	to	the	direct	and	indirect	effects	of	damages	to	the	carbon‐based	capital	stock	‐‐	as	
a	 result	 of	 more	 frequent	 extreme‐weather	 events,	 and	 more	 extensive	 coastal	 and	 riverine	
flooding,	and	more	prolonged	drought	in	interior	regions.36			
For	present	purposes	we	have	modeled	this	in	the	following	(simplest)	way,	supposing	
that	there	is	a	threshold	that	when	crossed	will	trigger	the	onset	of	a	“high	damage”	regime,	and	
defining	that	“extreme‐weather	tipping	point”	to	be	a	critical	level	of	cumulative	CO2	emissions	
that	 is	reachable	within	the	BAU	phase.	A	step‐function	rise	 in	the	proportional	annual	rate	of	
physical	 losses	 of	 capital	 services,	 in	 effect	 a	 jump	 in	 the	 decay	 parameter	 from	 the	 normal	
physical	 rate	of	 depreciation,	 takes	place	when	 that	 tipping	point	 is	 reached,	 thereby	splitting	
the	BAU	phase	 in	to	an	 initial	 “low	damage”	sub‐phase	and	the	subsequent	sub‐phase	of	 “high	
damages”.	All	 the	 phases	 following	 the	 latter	 part	 of	 the	BAU	phase	 are	 also	 characterized	by	
continuation	of	 the	 “high	damage”	 regime.37	Once	again,	 this	 is	a	 situation	 that	 is	described	 in	
Leonard	and	Van	Long	(1992:	Ch.10),	where	the	regime	shift	from	low	damages	to	high	damages	
initiated	by	a	state	variable	hitting	a	particular	threshold,	 implies	a	 jump	in	the	corresponding	
co‐state	variable.		
Since	 the	 rate	 at	 which	 CO2	 emissions	 are	 accumulated	 depends	 on	 production	
decisions,	the	moment	in	time	at	which	the	damage	threshold	will	be	hit,	depends	on	these	very	
production	decisions	too.	Hence,	the	arrival	time	of	the	high	weather	related	damage	sub	phases	
is	subject	to	choice	and	therefore	to	optimal	decision‐making.38	Consequently,	we	can	optimally	
                                                            
36			The		restriction	of		expected	annual	“unscheduled	losses”	of	productive	capacity	to	the	carbon‐using	capital	stock,	
implicitly	 assumes,	 firstly,	 that	 the	 inherited	 energy,	 transport	 and	 communications	 infrastructures,	 and	 areas	 of	
industrial	concentration	in	the	BAU	phase	reflected	locational	choices	made	in	an	era	before	the	greater	vulnerability	
of	those	regions	to	extreme‐weather	due	to	global	warming	was	foreseen.	Secondly,	a	form	of	adaptation	is	implied	in	
the	(optimistic)	assumption	that	the	subsequently	formed	carbon‐free	capital	stock	has	been	“defensively”	designed	
and/or	located	in	this	respect	–some	portion	of	the	directed	R&D	activities,	and	the	actual	deployment	cost,	reflecting	
the	 incremental	 costs	of	 thereby	protecting	 its	 expected	marginal	 social	 rate	of	 return	 from	being	reduced	by	high	
physical	damanges	 and	 temporary	 “outages”.	 	 See	 also	Brock	 et	 al.(2012)	 for	 recent	modeling	of	 	 regional	 climatic	
changes	 due	 the	 geographic	 variations	 in	 warming:	 these	 should	 be	 considered	 in	 modeling	 damage	 levels	 and	
defensive	adaptation	needs.	
37	Although	further	upward	steps	in	the	damage	rate	are	to	be	expected	beyond	the	climate	catastrophe	tipping	point	
(i.e.	the	TPIRCC),	it	is	not	necessary	to	specify	them—since	the	model	is	deterministic	and	goal	of	“social	planning”	is	
to	avoid	crossing	that	threshold.	It	is	important,	therefore,	that	the	calibration	of	the	model	assures	that	the	latter	of	
these	tipping	points	lies	beyond	the	close	of	the	BAU	phase.	
38	The	intricacies	of	the	foregoing	dynamics	are	among	the	reasons	why	we	have	not	followed	the	approach	taken	in	
by	de	Bruin,	Dellink	and	Tol	(2008)	in	AD‐DICE,	in	order	to	explicitly	consider	the	option	of	defensive	expenditures	for	
curtailing	anticipated	damages	to	productive	capacity	resulting	from	global	warming.		Because	technical	changes	are	
assumed	to	be	disembodied	 in	 the	DICE	model,	mitigation	of	C02	 induced	by	rising	carbon	taxes)	does	not	require	
specific	 capital	 formation	 to	 achieve	 low	 or	 zero‐emissions	 production	 capacity.	 	 Consequently,	 in	 AD‐DICE	 CO2	
mitigation	costs	do	not	compete	directly	with	concurrent	adaptation	expenditures	 for	gross	 investment	allocations.		
Although	the	 two	policies	are	substitutes	when	 their	 inter‐temporal	 	 effects	are	considered,	because	effective	early	
mitigation	would	check	the	pace	of	warming	and		reduce	the	future	need	for	defensive	adaptations,	this	relationship	is	
not	 symmetric:	 early	 reductions	 in	damage	 to	 capacity	would	 then	 to	 increase	output	 and	accompanying	CO2	 ,	 but	
while	that	would	call	for	more	vigorous	mitigation	efforts	the	incrementally	protect	production	capacity	would	not	be	
needed	to	implement	disembodied	lower	emissions	technology.	DICE’s	assumptions	regarding	technical	change	thus	
render	the	assessment	of	the	interactions	between	those	two	options	both	simpler	to	model	and	transparent	to	assess	
than	would	be	the	case	in	the	present	(but	in	our	view	more	empirically	relevant)	framework	of	analysis.		
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choose	 the	moment	 at	 which	 the	 high	 damage	 sub‐phase	will	 arrive.	We	 can	 implement	 this	
again	by	requiring	that	the	Hamiltonians	evaluated	at	the	moment	of	arrival	of	the	high	damage	
sub	phase	will	be	the	same	immediately	before	and	after	its	arrival.	This	implies	that	this	model	
will	have	 four	different	phases	 instead	of	 three.	 It	 follows	 that	we	need	to	determine	an	extra	
phase	length	in	addition	to	the	size	of	the	jump	in	the	co‐state	for	cumulative	emissions	at	the	
time	of	arrival	of	 the	 first	high	damage	sub‐phase.	 In	addition	to	the	given	initial	and	terminal	
values	of	the	BAM+R&D	model	as	well	as	the	corresponding	transversality	conditions,	we	have	
an	 additional	 terminal	 value	 in	 the	 form	 of	 the	 location	 of	 the	 damage	 threshold	 itself,	 in	
combination	 with	 the	 requirement	 of	 the	 equality	 of	 the	 Hamiltonians	 at	 both	 sides	 of	 the	
damage	phase	change.	 It	 turns	out	 that	 the	 transversality	 condition	 for	 the	arrival	of	 the	high	
damage	sub	phase	during	the	BAU	phase	is	given	by:39	
	
ߣ௄஺,்௎ு௎ ∙ ሺߜ஺ு െ ߜ஺௅ሻ ൌ ߳୹ ∙ ൫ߣா,்௎ு௎,ு െ ߣா,்௎ு௎,௅ ൯	 .	 	 	 	 	 (38)	
	
Equation	(38)	should	hold	exactly	at	the	arrival	time	of	the	high	damage	sub‐phase,	i.e.	at	
t=TUH.40			In	equation	(34),	the	superscripts	H	and	L	refer	to	low	and	high	damage	sub	phases,	
while	 the	 superscript	 U	 refers	 to	 the	 business‐as‐usual	 phase.	 The	 RHS	 of	 this	 equation		
expresses	the	jump	in	the	shadow	price	of	cumulative	emissions,	measuring	the	difference	in	the	
social	welfare	costs	associated	with	emissions	per	unit	of	capital	on	each	side	of	the	threshold	
concentration	level	for	the	onset	of	a	higher	damage	rate.	The	LHS	of	the	equation	(measures	the	
welfare	cost	associated	with	the	extra	decay	per	unit	of	capital.	Equation	(38)	therefore	implies	
the	equality	between	the	welfare	cost	of	using	a	unit	of	capital	before	and	after	the	arrival	of	the	
high	damage	sub‐phase.	
	We	conclude	that	the	jump	in	the	co‐state	must	be	such	that	the	welfare	cost	of	using	a	
unit	of	capital	remains	unchanged.	Since,	 in	effect,	 the	depreciation	costs	 (of	 the	carbon‐based		
capital	 stock)	 are	 higher	 after	 the	 jump,	 the	 marginal	 social	 costs	 of	 CO2	 emissions	 will	 be	
lowered,	which	 is	 	 tantamount	 to	 the	 occurence	 of	 a	 discrete	 drop	 (in	 absolute	 terms)	 in	 the	
shadow	price	of	emissions.41		
	
4.	Model	Calibration,	Solution	Results	and	Parameter	Sensitivity	Analysis	
	
4.1Calibrating	the	Basic	Model	and	its	extended	versions	
In	order	to	show	how	the	various	models	work,	the	parameters	of	the	model	need	to	be	
calibrated	or	fixed	a	priori.	To	this	end	we	have	made	use	of	the	Nordaus	RICE	2010	data,42	as	
                                                            
39	Obviously,	the	arrival	time	of	the	first	high	damage	sub‐phase	could	also	be	within	the	joint	production	phase.	But	
at	this	stage	we	are	mainly	interested	in	reporting	on	the	principle	involved,	which	would	be	the	same	in	whichever	
phase	the	damages	threshold	would	be	situated.		
40	Note	that	TUH	also	denotes	the	end	of	the	low	damage	sub‐phase	of	the	BAU	phase.	Note	therefore	that	in	this	case,	
TUH	comes	one	instant	before	the	value	of	TUH	that	represents	the	beginning	of	 the	high	damage	sub‐phase	of	the	
BAU	phase.	
41	The	latter	is	consistent	with	the	observation	that	a	faster	rate	of	decrease	of	the	carbon‐based	capital	stock	will	lead	
to	a	reduction	in	the	rate	at	which	CO2	emissions	are	accumulated,	other	things	remaining	the	same.		The	drop	in	the	
shadow	 price	 when	 the	 high‐damage	 sub‐phase	 of	 the	 transition	 begins	 reflects	 the	 assumption	 that	 continued	
emissions	during	 the	 joint	production	phase	will	not	 result	 in	 still	higher	 rates	of	damage	 to	existing	 carbon‐using	
productive	capacity.	Depending	upon	the	anticipated	magnitude	of	the	latter	feedback	effects	(and	the	discount	rate),	
the	initial	shadow	price	might	be	still	higher	and	a	drop	could	be	delayed	until	the	rising	damage	rate	reached	a	higher	
plateau.	See	below	began		remain	constant,	or	even		
42	 See	 http://nordhaus.econ.yale.edu/RICEmodels.htm	 for	 further	 details.	 In	order	 to	 obtain	 observations	 for	 2010	
from	the	ones	listed	for	2005	and	2015	in	the	RICE	data,	we	use	geometrical	interpolation.	
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well	as	some	direct	assumptions	necessitated	by	the	structural	difference	the	latter	model	and	
our	 DIRAM	 framework.	 Nordhaus	 (2010)	 updates	 the	 calibration	 of	 the	 essential	 neoclassical	
growth	model	 setting	 of	 the	 integrated	DICE	 and	 RICE	 policy	 assessment	models	 that	 have	 a	
single,	prolonged	phase,	whereas	we	employ	an	extension	of	the	more	primitive	AK‐setting	with	
multiple	phases.	This	implies	that	it	is	not	possible	simply	to	import	the	calibration	data	for	DICE	
and	RICE	into	our	model	
Therefore,	 in	order	 to	 reproduce	global	growth	rates	 and	saving	 rates	 that	have	about	
the	 right	 size	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 “bench‐mark”	 values	 provided	 by	 Nordhaus	 (2010),	 we	 have	
started	with	the	assumption	that	the	appropriate	capital‐output	ratio	for	the	BAM	model	in	the	
BAU	phase	is	equal	to	4,	a	value	that	is	well	above	the	capital‐out	ratio	in	the	multifactor	global	
production	system	specified	in	DICE	(and	RICE).	Implicitly	our	present	notion	of	“capital”	must	
be	a	more	comprehensive	one,	inasmuch	as	in	the	absence	of	explicit	specification	of	labor	as	a	
factor	of	production,	its	magnitude	must	allow	for	the	(proportionality)	between	conventionally	
defined	tangible	capital	and	all	human	capital	 inputs.	 	We	have	also	made	the	assumption	that	
depreciation	costs	as	a	fraction	of	output	is	15%.	This	also	is	relatively	high	value,	but	actually	
not	so	unrealistic,	given	the	much	broader	capital	concept.		
Using	Nordhaus’	data	on	TFP	growth	as	well	as	output	per	capita	and	population	growth,	
we	arrive	at	an	implied	growth	rate	of	output	(and	of	capital	in	an	AK‐setting)	equal	to	0.03436.	
From	equation	(27)	we	can	derive	the	steady	state	growth	rate	in	an	AK‐setting,	and	find	that	on	
the	 premise	 that	 total	 output	 and	 (carbon‐based)	 capital	 stock	 are	 growing	 on	 a	 steady	 state	
path	 in	 the	BAU	phase,	at	an	annual	 rate	equal	 to	0.03436	(sic!),	 the	 following	condition	must	
hold:		
	
෠ܻ ൌ ܭ෡ ൌ ஺ିఋಲିఘఏ ൌ 0.03436 ൌ
଴.ଶହ∗ሺଵିഃಲಲ ሻିఘ
ఏ ൌ
଴.ଶହ∗ሺଵି଴.ଵହሻିఘ
ఏ 	 .	 	 													(39)	
	
In	equation	(35),	we	have	used	the	assumption	that	depreciation	as	a	fraction	of	output	
is	15%,	implying	that		ఋ∙௄஺.௄ ൌ
ఋ
஺ ൌ 0.15.	The	latter	implies	that	ߜ ൌ 0.15 ∙ ܣ ൌ 0.15 ∙ 0.25 ൌ 0.0375.	
This	 value	 for	 the	 depreciation	 rate	 turns	 out	 to	 be	 much	 lower	 than	 the	 0.10	 rate	 used	 by		
Nordhaus.		Equation	(35)	implies	combinations	of	ߠ	and	ߩ	given	by:	
	
ߠ ൌ 6.185 െ 29.104 ∗ ߩ	 .	 	 	 	 	 	 													(40)	
	
Importing	the	value	ߩ ൌ 0.015	used	by	Nordhaus,	we	find	that	ߠ ൌ 5.748.	This	implies	a	
much	 lower	 inter‐temporal	elasticity	of	substitution	than	the	parameter	value	of	 	 	ߠ	=	1.5	that	
Nordhaus	 has	 used.	 In	 both	 cases,	 however,	 ߠ ൐ 1.	 The	 latter	 implies	 that	 the	 function	
conventionally	interpreted	as	expressing	an	index	of	utility	or	“felicity,”	namely,	f	=	 1 /(1 )C    ,	
must	be	negative,	but	becoming	less	so	with	increases	in	the	level	of	per	capita	consumption,	so	
that	marginal	 felicity	 remains	positive	and	decreasing	 in	 consumption.	 	 Since	 social	welfare	 is	
the	integral	over	(the	present	value)	of	felicity,	the	corresponding	welfare	index	also	is	negative.	
But	the	scaling	of	these	indexes	is	entirely	arbitrary,	and	it	is	a	permissible	and	simple	operation	
to	 remove	 this	unaccustomed	and	disturbing	negativity	of	 “welfare”	by	 renormalization	of	 the	
index	of	 felicity:	 adding	 to	 it,	 at	 each	moment	 of	 time,	 a	 positive	 term	equal	 to	 the	 (negative)	
value	of	 the	 index	of	 the	original	 index	at	 time	zero.	This	 forces	an	upward	shift	of	 the	 felicity	
function	(and	along	with	it,	the	corresponding	welfare	index)	into	the	positive	quadrant.		
Since	 ߠ	 is	 relatively	 large,	 felicity	 will	 be	 relatively	 small,	 as	 is	 also	 the	 case	 for	 the	
present	 value	 of	welfare.	 The	 numerical	 values	 of	 the	 co‐states	 consequently	will	 be	 small	 as	
well,	 since	 they	 represent	 the	 change	 in	welfare	 due	 to	 a	 1	 unit	 change	 in	 the	 corresponding	
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states.	 For	 example,	 since	 Y0=68.95	 trillion	 dollars	 of	 2005,43	 our	 assumptions	 imply	 that	
K0=275.8	and	that	C0=(1‐s)Y0=49.16.		Hence,	felicity	at	t=0	is	equal	to	ܨ଴ ൌ ஼బ
భషഇ
ଵିఏ ൌ െ1.958 ∗ 10ିଽ.	
Therefore	 we	 have	 introduced	 a	 multiplicative	 factor	 (equal	 to	 10ଽ	ሻ	to	rescale	 the	 felicity	
function,	which	results	in	values	for	states	and	co‐states	that	are	not	many	orders	of	magnitude	
apart.	
Even	 though	 our	 implied	 inter‐temporal	 elasticity	 of	 substitution	 is	 rather	 low,	 in	
combination	with	the	other	parameter	values,	plausible	values	for	both	the	growth	rate	and	the	
saving	rate	can	be	generated.	The	implied	value	of	the	saving	rate	(s)	is	given	by:	
	
ݏ ൌ ሺ௄ሶ ାఋ∙௄ሻ௒ ൌ
௄෡
஺ ൅
ఋ
஺ ൌ 0.287.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (41)	
	
With	respect	to	cumulative	CO2	emissions	and	the	location	of	the	climate	tipping	point	in	
terms	 of	 the	 cumulative	 emissions	 generated	 by	 our	 model,	 we	 have	 used	 the	 following	
procedure.	Since	the	atmospheric	concentration	of	carbon	rises	1	ppmv	per	2.1	GTC	(gigaton	of	
carbon)	 remaining	 in	 the	 atmosphere,	 the	 change	 in	 the	 atmospheric	 concentration	 of	 CO2	 is	
given	by:	
	
݌݌݉ ൌ 0.4762 ∗ ܩܶܥ			 ൌ൐ 		∆݌݌݉ ൌ 0.4763 ∗ ∆ܩܶܥ			,		 	 	 	 (42)	
	
where	∆	refers	to	the	first	difference	operator.	The	concentration	level	of	CO2	in	the	atmosphere	
circa	 2010	 stood	 at	 390	 ppmv.44	 The	 preindustrial	 concentration	 of	 CO2	 is	 280	 ppmv.	 The	
“climate	catastrophe	tipping	point”	has	been	associated	with	a	temperature	rise	in	the	range	of	
2‐3°	Kelvin	above	preindustrial	levels,	with	policy	attention	attention	having	focused	recently	on	
the	lower	figure.45	The	equation	describing	the	relationship	between	temperature	rises	and	the	
current	ratio	of	the	CO2	concentration	in	ppmv	relative	to	a	reference	level	is	given	by:	
	
݌݌݉ݒ ൌ ݌݌݉ݒ଴ ∗ ݁ሼ∆்ሾ௟௡ଶሿሽ/ௌ	=			݌݌݉ݒ଴ ∗ ݁ሼ∆்ሽ/ሺଵ.ସସଷሻௌ,	 		 	 	 (43)	
	
where	S	=	3.0	is	the	“climate	sensitivity”	parameter.46			
                                                            
43	t=0	refers	to	2010.	The	data	for	2010	are	obtained	by	means	of	geometrical	 interpolation	between	the	Nordhaus	
data	for	2005	and	2015.	
44	 See	 the	 U.S.	 Department	 of	 Commerce	 National	 Oceanic	 &	 Atmospheric	 Administration	 (NOAA)	 data	 (at	
http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/)	for	trends	in		monthly	mean		CO2	concentrations	levels	measured	on	
Mauna	Loa,	Hawaii.	For	the	month	of	October,	the	mean	stood	at	388.92ppmv		in	2011	and	at	391.01	in	2012,	giving	
the	 annual	midpoint	 of	 390	 ppm.	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 the	 trend	 of	 these	monthly	mean	 observations	 from	 the	
Scripps	Institution	of	Oceanography	has	been	exponentially	upwards	throughout	the	period	from	the	late1950s	to	the	
present.	Over	the	32	years	1980‐2012	the	average	annual	rate	of	increase	was	0.00476,	and	projecting	this	from	the	
390	ppm	annual	2011‐12	level,	the	concentration	level	will	have	reached	398	ppm	by	2016.		Yet,	a	NOAA	news	release	
on	31	May	2012	announced	that	at	Barrow,	Alaska	–	 its	only	remote	northern	site	with	continual	atmospheric	CO2	
monitoring	‐‐		the	concentration	level	in	the	spring	touched	the	400	ppm	mark	for	the	first	time,	in	concert	with	the	
same	“milestone”	readings	reported	by	remote	northern	monitoring	sites	in	Canada,	Finland,	Norway	and	an	island	in	
the	 north	 Pacific.	 	 This	 has	 supported	 the	 consensus	 view	 among	 NOAA’s	 climatologists	 	 and	 their	 international	
colleagues	 that	 by	 2016	 mean	 global	 CO2	 concentrations	 will	 have	 risen	 to	 400	 ppm	 (cf.	
http://researchmatters.noaa.gov/news/Pages/arcticCO2.aspx.).			
45	See,	e.g.,	See	Hansen,	Sato,	Ruedy,	et	al	(2006);	Hansen,	Sato,	Kharecha		et	al	(2007).	
46		See	Knutti	and	Hergl	(2008:	pp.	735‐736)	for	underlying	physical	relationships.		S	=	[3.7	MWm‐2]	κ	,		where	3.7	is	
the	gain	in	long‐wave	forcing	corresponding	to	a	doubling	of	the	atmospheric	CO2	concentration	in	ppmv,	i.e.,	(Ct/C0)	=	
2	;	κ	is	the	Kelvin	(or	Celsius)	scale	temperature	gain	corresponding	to	a	unit	of	radiative	forcing:		κ	=	0.8	(K/	MWm‐2	).	
The	 equilibrium	 climate	 sensitivity	 parameter	 is	 therefore	 (3.7)(0.8)	 =	 2.96,	 essentially	 a	 gain	 of	 3o	 C.	 Nordhaus	
(2007)	sets	3.0	as	the	magnitude	of	this	parameter,	and	left	 it	unaltered	in	the	2009	recalibration	of	the	DiCE	2007	
model.	 Cai,	 Judd	 and	 Lontzek	 (2012)	 in	 SDICE	 therefore	 incorporated	 that	 point	 estimate	 SDICE,	 the	 annualized	
stochastic	 reformulation	 of	 DICE	 (2007).	 Wikipedia	 currently	 gives	 3.0	 as	 the	 “consensus”	 estimate	 (see	
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Climate_sensitivity#Consensus_estimates).	 Needlin	 (2011:	 p.	 205),	 however,	 reports	
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In	equation	(43),	∆ܶ	represents	the	temperature	rise	relative	to	a	baseline	temperature	
at	a	baseline	concentration	of	CO2	given	by	ppmv0.	It	follows	that	the	tipping	point	at	2°	Kelvin	
relative	 to	 preindustrial	 levels	 is	 given	 by	 280	݌݌݉ݒ ∗ ݁ మర.యమవ ൌ 444.4	݌݌݉ݒ.	 For	 a	 3°	 Kelvin	
temperature	rise,	the	corresponding	concentration	of	CO2	would	be	560	ppm.	The	current	rate	
at	which	 the	CO2	 concentration	 is	 rising	 equals	 approximately	2	ppmv/year.47	 	Assuming	 that	
before	carbon‐based	productive	capacity	is	replaced	that	rate	of	increase	would	be	following	the	
rate	of	growth	of	output,	we	find	that	the	room	to	emit	provided	by	the	2°	Kelvin	tipping	point	is	
equal	to	444.4	–	390	=	54.4	ppmv.	implying	that	there	can	be	a	further	54.4∗2.1=114.2	GTC	net	
carbon	emissions	until	the	critical	2°	Kelvin	rise	in	mean	global	temperature	will	be	reached.	The	
corresponding	 allowed	 “budget”	 of	 net	 carbon	 additions	 to	 the	 atmospheric	 concentration	 	 of		
carbon	 before	 reaching	 a	 3°	 Kelvin	 rise	 in	 temperature	 is	 therefore	 357	 GTC	 {=[(560‐
390)ppmv]∗2.1}	–on	the	optimistic	assumption	that	S	has	not	drifted	upwards	as	∆ܶ → 3°	.	
CO2	emissions	rate	from	KA,	and	a	simplified	Carbon	Cycle	module:	
To	simplify	the	computational	solutions	for	the	optimum	multi‐phase	transition	paths	of	
our	 models,	 we	 substituted	 a	 radically	 simplified	 representation	 of	 the	 carbon	 cycle	 by	 the		
three‐layer	model	of	carbon	exchange,	such	as	the	sub‐system	specified	in	DICE(2007)	and	other	
IAMs.	These	account	for	the	CO2	released	into	the	atmosphere	and	not	being	sequestered	by	the	
vegetation	of	the	 land	surface	are	subsequently	cycled	between	the	atmosphere	and	the	upper	
and	 lower	oceans.	Our	simplification	 is	 indeed	radical,	 for	 it	 specifies	 that	somewhat	 less	 than	
half	of	the	current	gross	emissions	of	carbon	(0.48)	remain	in	the	atmosphere,	thus	constituting		
the	net	flow	of	CO2	that	immediately	is	added	to	the	atmospheric	stock.48		It	thereby	suppressed	
computation	 of	 the	 complicated	 thermal	 oceanic	 lags	 in	 the	 adjustment	 of	 the	 changes	 in	 the	
atmospheric	 concentration	 of	 carbon	 in	 response	 to	 a	 given	 GTC	 release	 of	 carbon	 into	 the	
atmosphere	due	to	the	burning	fossil	fuels	and	other	non‐anthropogenic	sources.	
	Nonetheless,	for	our	purposes,	the	consequences	this	simplification	have	been	found	to	
be	far	less	misleading	than	one	might	suppose:	the	divergence	between	of	the	time	path	of	the	
atmospheric	concentration	level	of	CO2	in	the	solutions	of	the	model	are	found	to	track	the	trend	
behavior	of	those	variables	that	are	obtained	by	running	the	gross	CO2	emissions	generated	by	
the	 our	 optimal	 transition	 path	 solution(s)	 through	 a	 complete	 annual	 3‐layer	 model	 of	 the	
carbon	cycle.	The	 rise	 in	 the	CO2ppmv	 concentration	generated	by	 the	simplified	carbon	cycle	
                                                                                                                                                                                         
3.2	as	the	calculated	mean	(with	std.	dev.	+	0.7)	of	the	“sensitivity”	estimates	in	18	studies	reviewed	by	ICCP	(2007).	
Compared	with	the	quite	limited	margin	of	uncertainty	associated	with	the	parameter’s	value	in	the	present	modeling	
context,	where	the	durations	of	the	forecast	scenarios	extend	for	several	decades	(rather	the	centuries	envisioned	by	
DICE	 and	 derivated	 IAMs,	 much	 greater	 uncertainties	 surround	 the	 magnitude	 of	 the	 	 climate	 sensitivity	 that	 is	
relevant	for	long‐term	changes	in	CO2	concentration	levels.	As	Knutti	and	Hergl	(op.	cit.,	pp.	739‐41)	emphasize,	the	
sensitivity	 is	 state	 dependent	 as	 well	 as	 time	 dependent:	 thus,	 albedo	 will	 be	 lower	 and	 positive	 feedbacks	 from	
radiative	forcings	corresponding	will	be	stronger	in	a	world	with	much	 less	 ice	and	snow low than the present one;  
“slow feedbacks with their own intrinsic timescales, for example changes in vegetation or the retreat of ice sheets and 
their effect on the ocean circulation could increase or decrease sensitivity on long timescales (p.740). 		
47	 See	 the	 NOAA	 (http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/)	 data	 for	 the	 annual	 increases	 in	 the	 CO2	
concentrations	 levels	 measured	 on	 Mauna	 Loa,	 Hawaii.	 Calculated	 for	 the	 years	 2002‐2012	 (from	 the	 time‐series	
available	at		ftp://ftp.cmdl.noaa.gov/ccg/co2/trends/co2_gr_mlo.txt	),		the	average	annual	gain	was	2.06	ppm.	
48	 	 See	Neelin(2011:	pp.64‐68),	based	on	data	 from	Denman(2007)	 show	 that	of	 the	9	Gigatons	of	 carbon	 released	
annually	into	the	atmosphere	–	1	CTC	from	the	land	released	by	non‐anthropogenic	land	sources,	and	8	GTC	from	the	
combustion	of	fossil	 fuels,	and	2.5	GTC	are	sequestered	by	vegetation	on	the	land,	and	2.2	GCT	are	absorbed	by	the	
oceans,	leaving	4.8	GTC	in	the	atmosphere,	or	0.48	of	the	annual	release.	This	is	close	to	the	approximate	fraction	of	
one‐half	 that	many	 climate	 scientists	 cite	 in	 answer	 to	 the	 question	 of	what	 is	 the	 equilibrium	 proportion	 of	 CO2	
emissions	that	stay	in	the	atmosphere,	but	we	use	the	slightly	lower	figure		for	the	purposes	of	our	radically	simplified	
model	of	the	carbon	cycle.		
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module	 modestly	 understates	 the	 level	 implied	 by	 using	 a	 3‐layer	 carbon	 cycle	 module	 to	
compute	the	effects	of	the	model’s	flow	of	CO2	emissions:	mid‐way	through	the	transition	phase	
the	proportional	understatement	 is	3.0	percent	of	 the	 lower	 level	of	cumulative	net	emissions,	
whereas	at	the	peak	(when	the	carbon	free	phase	begins)	the	corresponding	understatement	is	
3.5.	 	 The	 associated	 understatement	 of	 the	 rise	 in	 temperature	 is	 more	 marked,	 however,	
especially	 at	 the	 peak,	 and	 if	 one	 considers	 the	 continuous	 function	 for	 unscheduled	 capital	
losses	 (eq.	 41),	 in	which	 the	 second	 derivative	with	 respect	 to	 T	 is	 positive,	 the	 proportional	
understatement	of	the	high	annual	damage	rate	is	very	rapidly	the	transition	phases	second	half		
–	 having	 reaching	 52	 percent	 by	 the	 time	 that	 CO2	 emissions	 are	 stopped.	 Thereafter,	 with		
additions	 to	 the	 cumulative	 net	 stock	 of	 emissions	 having	 dropped	 to	 zero,	 the	 atmospheric	
concerntration	level	computed	from	the	3‐layer	carbon	cycle	model	begin	a	dampen	fluctuating	
decline	towards	much	lower	equilbrium	level.49			
An	 estimate	 for	 gross	 flow	 of	 CO2	 emissions	 flow	 in	 2010,	 obtained	 by	 interpolation	
between	the	Nordhaus	(2010)	decadal	estimates	 for	2005	and	2015,	 is	about	10.63	GTC/year.	
Under	the	simplified	carbon	cycle	model’s	assumptions,	this	corresponds	to	a	net	yearly	increase	
in	the	atmospheric	concentration	of	(10.63∗ 0.48 ൌሻ	5.10	GTC.		Were	that	annual	flow	rate	to	be	
remain	 constant,	 say,	 because	 the	 carbon	 intensity	of	 global	 real	 gross	production	declined	 at	
just	 the	 same	 annual	 pace	 as	 gross	 production	 continued	 to	 grow,	 the	 implication	 is	 that	 a	
“tipping	 point”	 at	 the	 vis‐à‐vis	 the	 pre‐industrial	 temperature	 level	 would	 be	 reached	 during	
2032	 ‐‐	 i.e.,	 2010	 +	 22.4	 years	 (=	 114.2	 GTC/5.10	 GTC	 per	 year).	 Under	 the	 same	 artificial	
conditions,	the	3°	Kelvin	gain	in	temperature	would	be	reached	another	48	years.	
The	CO2	emissions	rate	from	KA:	 	 	
Given	 the	 proportional	 relationship	 between	 CO2	 emissions	 and	 changes	 in	 the		
cumulative	 additions	 to	 the	 atmospheric	 stock	 ܧ	,ሶ 		 under	 the	 assumptions	 of	 our	 simplified	
treatment	 of	 the	 carbon	 cycle	 	 the	 parameter	 ߝ஺	 in	 equation	 (8)	 ‐‐	ܧ	ሶ ൌ ߝ஺ ∙ ܭ஺௎	 ‐‐	 reflects	 the	
emissions	 intensity	 of	 gross	 output,	 the	 average	 (and	marginal	 productivity)	 of	 	 carbon‐using	
production	facilities	and	the	proportion	of		gross	emissions	that	remain	in	atmosphere.	For	the	
magnitude	of	real	gross	global	product	in	2010	we	obtain	the	value	68.95	in	trillions	of	constant	
2005	 dollars	 by	 interpolation	 from	 the	Nordhaus’	 (2010)	 DICE	 calibration	 data	 for	 2005	 and	
2015,	which	sets	the	2010	carbon‐intensity	of	gross	output	at	0.1542	(=10.63/68.95).		Since	the	
corresponding	 global	 capital‐output	 ratio	 is	 taken	 to	 be	 4.8	 times	 that,50	 the	 flow	 of	 net	
                                                            
49	The	rise	in	the	CO2ppmv	concentraction	generated	by	the	simplified	carbon	cycle	module	modestly	understates	the	
level	implied	by	using	a	3‐layer	carbon	cycle	module	to	compute	the	effects	of	the	model’s	flow	of	CO2	emissions:	mid‐
way	through	the	transition	phase	the	proportionaleunderstatement	is	3.0	percent	of	the	lower	level		of	cumulative	net	
emissions,	whereas	at	the	peak	(when	the	carbon	free	phase	begins)	the	corresponding	understatement	is	3.5	percent.		
The	associated	understatment	of	the	rise	in	temperature	is	more	marked,	however,	especially	at	the	peak.	Moreover,	
and	if	one	considers	a	continuous	function	for	unscheduled	capital	losses		in	which	the	second	derivative	with	respect	
to	T	is	positive	(such	that	in	equation	45,	below)	the	proportional	understatement	of	the	high	annual	damage	rate	is	
rising	 very	 rapidly	 in	 the	 latter	 half	 of	 the	 transition	 phase	 –reaching	 a	 much	 higher	 peak	 by	 the	 time	 that	 CO2	
emissions	are	stopped.	Thereafter,	with		additions	to	the	cumulative	net	stock	of	emissions	having	dropped	to	zero,	
the	 atmospheric	 concerntration	 level	 computed	 from	 the	 3‐layer	 carbon	 cycle	model	 begins	 a	 dampen	 fluctuating	
decline	 towards	much	 lower	equilbrium	 level.	 	Details	of	 these	calculations	are	available	 in	Appendix	B,	on	request	
from	the	authors.			
50	The	high	capital‐output	ratio	specified	here	is	more	than	twice	that	in	the	DICE	(2009)	calibration,	and	justified	on	
the	 following	 considerations:	 firsly,	 the	 Nordhaus	 figure	 appears	 to	 give	 undue	 weight	 to	 the	 fixed	 reproductible	
capital‐output	ratio	found	the	the	U.S.	and	other	high	income	countries	 in	OECD,	whereas	the	 	productivity	of	 	both	
infrastructure	and	industrial	capital	in	the	developing	countries	is	lower,	as	it	that	of	the	total	reproducible	and	non‐
reproducable	capital	in	their	agricultural	sectors.	Even	the	U.S.	in	the	late	19th	century	the	capital‐output	ratio	was	in	
was	approximately	4.0	(see	Abramovitz	and	David,	2001).	Secondly,	the	AK	model	has	no	other	inputs	besides	caital	
services,	and	the	figure	of	4.0	was	inflated	by	20	percent	to	approximate	a	“total	capital”‐output	ratio.			
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emissions	 per	 unit	 of	 total,	 carbon‐using	 capital	 (in	 GTC	 per	 trillion	 dollars	 of	 2010)	 at	 	 the	
beginning	of	the		(BAU=)	U	phase	is	found	from:	
	
߳஺ ൌ 0.48 ∗ 	 ଵ଴.଺ଷሺସ.଼	ሻ	଺଼.ଽହ ൌ 0.0154	 .		 	 	 	 	 													(44)	
	
The	effect	of	R&D	expenditures	on	productivity	of	KB:	
For	the	carbon‐free	technology	we	have	made	the	assumption	that	depreciation	is	equal	
to	 that	 of	 the	 carbon‐based	 technology.	 In	 addition,	 for	 the	 Basic	 Model	 the	 average	 (and	
marginal)	productivity	of	carbon‐free	capital	is	set	at			ܤ ൌ 0.12.		Further,	in	specifying	the	R&D	
impact	 function	 we	 have	 made	 the	 following	 parameter	 assumptions:	 	 ߚ ൌ 0.5, ߞ ൌ 0.1,	
and	ܤഥ ൌ 0.2.		
Normal	depreciation	of	tangible	capital,	and	the	warming‐	driven	capacity	loss	rate:	
The	normal	annual	rate	of	depreciation	of	tangible	capital	of	all	kinds	is	set	at	0.0375,	on	
the	assumption	at	26‐27	year	average	service	life	reflects	the	mixture	of	long‐lived	fixed	capital	
in	 the	 infrastructure	 services	 sector	 (including	 	 the	 energy	 and	 transport	 sectors,	 and	 non‐
reproductable	 capital	 in	 agriculture	 and	 forestry)	 with	 generally	 shorter‐lived	 capital	 in	 the	
directly	productive	activities.		
The	step‐function	specification	of	the	incremental	impact	of	rising	global	temperature	on	
the	proportional	rate	of	unscheduled	losses	of	carbon‐using	productivity	capacity,	obviously,	is	
an	 arbitrary	 simplification	 of	 the	 continuous	 feedback	 of	 economic	 damage	 from	 the	
accumulating	concentration	of	atmospheric	CO2.	Yet,	the	choice	of	0.0375	for	the	annual	global	
high‐damage	 rate	 of	 losses	 of	 existing	 carbon‐based	 productive	 capacitytaty	 due	 to	 extreme	
weather	 is	 not	 purely	 ad	 hoc.	 	 Its	magnitude	 can	 be	 considered	 by	 reference	 to	 the	 range	 of	
damage	 rates	 implied	 by	 the	 following	 ing	 continuous	 specification	 of	 a	 warming‐driven	
economic	 damage	 function	 in	 which	 our	 proportional	 (weather‐driven)damage	 rate	 (Dw/Y)	
would	be	a	positive	power‐function	of	the	gain	in	global	mean	temparature	()T):		
	
	 	ሺDw Y⁄ ሻ	ݐ	=	"1ሺ	)T)	ݐ			+		"2ሺ)T)"3ݐ		.			 	 	 	 	 													(45)	
	
	Equation	45	actually	is	the	specification	for	the	gross	damage	rate	in	the	AD‐DICE	model	
of	de	Bruin,	Kelly	and	Tol(2009:	esp.	68‐69)	,	with	parameter	values	"1	=	.0012,		"2	=	.0023	,	"3		=	
2.32.	 	The	authors’	calibration	proceedure	 involved	fixing	"1	and	"2	 	a	priori,	and	then	 	 finding		
the	value	of	"3		that	gave	the	best	fit	of	the	simulation	output	from	AD‐DICE	to	the	corresponding	
output	 from	 DICE.	 	 As	 was	 noted	 above	 (in	 footnote	 36),	 DICE	 implicitly	 nets	 out	 adaptive	
benefits	against	damage	curtailment	costs	to	obtain	an	equation	describing	net	damages.)		From	
the	standard	relationship	for	the	equilibrium	gain	in	temperature	corresponding	to	an	increase	
in	atmospheric	CO2		in	equation	(32)	above,	we	obtain:	ΔT*	=	S[(ln{Et/E0})/(ln2)],	where	(Ct	‐	C0)	
=	Et	 ‐	E0	 ,	 the	 latter	being	the	cumulated	net	emissions	of	CO2	from	the	notional	pre‐industrial	
revolution	date	(c.1750)	when	E0	=	280.	Taking	the	value	of	the	equilibrium	climate	sensitivity	
parameter	to	be	S=3	(see	above)	one	can	findthe	correspondences	between	temperature	gains	
and	expected	proportional	rates	of	weather‐related	losses	of	carbon‐using	productive	capacity	
(gross	output	being	proportional	to	the	capital	stock	KA	in	our	linear	production	system.51	
                                                            
51	Thus,	at		c.	1990	when	Ct=350	and		)T	=	1°	Kelvin,	ߜ஺ு ൌ 	 .0035	;		at	c.	2012	with	Ct	=396	and	)T	=	1.50°Kelvin,		ߜ஺ு	=	
.0077;		at	)T	=	2.53°	with	Ct=	502,	ߜ஺ு	=.0228;		at	)T	=	3.68°,	with	Ct	=655.2,	ߜ஺ு	=.	0517.	
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		The	range	of	variations	in	the	“high‐damage”	rate	considered	in	the	sensitivity	analysis	
experiments	 reported	 in	 section	 4	 corresponds	 to	 the	 range	 of	 increased	 CO2	 concentration	
levels	 starting	 in	 2012	 and	 rising	 three‐fold,	 i.e.,	 Et	 =[125,	 375],	 or	 terms	 of	 absolute	
concentrations	 (ppmv)	 levels	 gains	 from	 the	 preindustrial	 level	 of	 (Et+280)	 =	 [396,	 655].		
Therefore,	the	high‐damage	rate	of	unscheduled	losses	of	carbon‐based	production	capacity	that	
is	 specified	 by	 our	 step‐function’s	 jump	 to	 a	 constant	 at	 3.75	 percent	 per	 annum	 rate	
corresponds	to	temperature	that	 is	1.31°	above	 the	2010	 level	 (already	1.5	°	Kelvin	above	 the	
pre‐industrial	 level).	 That	 represents	 just	 under	 six‐tenths	 of	 the	 2.18	 °	 Kelvin	 change	 that	 is	
envisaged	by	varying	the	the	atmospheric	CO2	concentration	level	from	396	to	655ppmv.		
The	catastrophe	tiping	point:	
Lastly,	we	have	put	the	climate	“catastrophe	tipping	point”	just	beyond	the	upper	end	of	
the	2	–	3°	Kelvin	range	of	gains	of	mean	global	temperature	above	the	pre‐industrial	level	which	
Hansen(2007)	along	with	other	climate	scientists52	have	indicated	as	“dangerous	for	humanity.”	
This	has	been	done	purely	to	insure	that	solutions	to	the	basic	model	yield	a		business‐as‐usual	
phase	that	is	longer	than	a	mere	5‐10	years,	rather	than	reflecting	any	judgment	on	our	as	to	the	
precise	 location	of	 the	 that	 “tipping	point.”	Putting	 the	 stopping	point	 for	 carbon	emissions	at		
324.1ppmv	 over	 the	 pre‐industrial	 concentration	 level	 (280ppmv)	 corresponds	 to	 )T	 =	 3.1°	
Kelvin	(or	Celsius).		In	the	same	spirit,	in	order	to	assure	that	the	expected	higher	rate	of	losses	
of	 capital	 services	 (due	 to	warming‐driven	 extreme	weather	 events)	 emerges	within	 the	model’s	
endogenously	lengthened	business‐as‐usual	phase,	the	CO2	concentration	level	for	its	onset	has	
been	set	at	43.5ppmv	above	the	390ppmv	benchmark	level	for	2010.		At	the	recently	accelerated	
annual	rate	of	gain	(2.86ppmv)	that	has	brought	the	concentration	level	to	c.	400	at	the	midpoint	
of	2013,	however,	the	onset	of	the	phase	of	higher	rate	of	capacity	losses	in	the	model	would	lie	
only	11	to	12	years	in	the	future.			
				
	
4.2	BAM	solution	results	
Preliminary	 parameter	 sensitivity	 analyses	 performed	 using	 the	 models	 show	 model	
reactions	that	are	familiar	from	growth	theory.	Changes	in	the	rate	of	discount	or	 in	 the	 inter‐
temporal	elasticity	of	substitution	all	have	the	expected	impact.	This	holds	for	the	productivity	
parameters	 as	well.	When	 cumulative	 emission	 thresholds	 are	 tightened,	 the	 shadow	price	 of	
CO2	 emissions	 rises	 (in	 absolute	 terms).	 When	 productivity	 parameters	 increase,	 so	 do	 the	
corresponding	co‐states	of	the	associated	state	variables.		
Rather	 interestingly,	 the	 linking	 of	 various	 sequential	 phases	 results	 in	 anticipatory	
adjustments	that	introduce	transitional	dynamics	which	are	missing	in	an	ordinary	single‐phase	
AK	 endogenous	 growth	 setting.	 The	 results	 obtained	 for	 the	 Basic	 Model	 (BAM)	 with	 the	
parameter	set	and	the	initial	values	described	at	the	end	of	the	preceding	sub‐section	(4.1)	are	
displayed	in	Figures	2.1	and	2.2.	
The	top	row	of	plots	 in	Figure	2.1	displays	 the	outcomes	with	respect	 to	carbon‐based	
capital	KA.	The	vertical	dotted	lines	mark	the	arrival	times	of	the	joint	production	phase	and	the	
carbon‐free	 phase.	 They	 are	 situated	 at	 TJ=23.78	 and	TF=40.17,	 implying	 that	 the	BAU	phase	
takes	slightly	less	than	24	years,	while	the	JPR	phase	is	slightly	longer	than	16	years.	In	this	row,	
the	left‐most	of	the	graphs	shows	the	shadow	price	of	carbon‐based	capital	decreasing	steadily	
throughout	both	phases.	The	next	graph	shows	the	buildup	of	carbon‐based	capacity	during	the	
                                                            
52	Hansen,	Sato,	Kharecha		et	al	(2007:p.7)	suggest	that	“it	may	be	useful	in	considering	this	issue	to	contrast	today’s	
climate	with	 the	warmest	 interglacial	 periods	 and	with	 the	middle	 of	 the	 Pliocene	 [a	 period	 of	marked	 instability	
referred	as	“climate	flickering”]	when	global	temperature	was	2–3°C	warmer	than	today.”	
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opening,	BAU	phase	and	the	subsequent	run	down	of	that	capacity	during	the	JPR	phase.		These	
events	are	mirrored	in	the	last	graph	in	the	row,	which	plots	the	instantaneous	rate	of	change	in	
the	carbon‐based	capital	stock.	We	see	that	net	investment	in	carbon‐based	capital	accelerates	
towards	the	end	of	the	business‐as‐usual	phase,	and	turns	negative	during	the	joint	production	
phase	‐‐	although	becoming	less	negative	over	time	as	the	absolute	amount	of	capital	lost	due	to	
technical	depreciation	of	given	size	of	stock	KA	is	becoming	smaller.	
	
le	
	
Figure	2.1	BAM	baseline	results	for	KA,	KB	and	E	
	
	 The	second	row	of	graphs	in	Figure	2.1	shows	the	corresponding	events	for	carbon‐free	
capital.	Since	the	accumulation	of	carbon‐free	capital	begins	at	the	start	of	the	joint	production	
phase,	 there	 is	now	 just	one	dotted	vertical	 that	marks	 the	arrival	of	 the	carbon‐free	phase.	 It	
should	be	noted	that	net	investment	in	carbon‐free	capacity	is	rapidly	increasing	during	the	joint	
production	phase	‐‐	in	anticipation	of	the	drop	in	capacity	that	will	occur	at	the	time	of	arrival	of	
the	 carbon‐free	 phase,	 when	 carbon‐based	 capital	 will	 be	 discarded.	 During	 the	 carbon‐free	
phase,	 net	 investment	 in	 the	 carbon‐free	 capital	 stock	 is	 much	 lower	 than	 during	 the	 joint	
production	phase.	
	 In	 the	 third	 row,	 the	 left‐most	 graph	 depicts	 the	 exponential	 rise	 of	 the	 atmospheric	
concentration	 of	 CO2	 (accumulating	 from	 the	 past	 flow	 of	 emissions)	 during	 the	 business‐as‐
usual	 phase.	 These	 continue	 to	 rise	 but	 at	 slowing	 growth	 rates	 over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 joint	
production	phase,	 eventually	 stabilizing	 at	 the	 threshold	 level	when	 the	economy	has	 entered	
the	carbon‐free	phase	of	production.	The	corresponding	shadow	price	of	cumulative	emissions	
is	 negative,	 since	 it	 reflects	 the	 social	 cost	 of	 adding	 an	 incremental	 unit	 to	 the	 stock	 of	
atmospheric	CO2.	The	constancy	of	this	negative	shadow	price	throughout	the	transition	to	the	
carbon‐free	production	regime	is	a	striking		departure	from	the	familiar	optimal	solution	results	
obtained	by	Nordhaus	(1994,	2000,	2007)	with	the	DICE	model	and	its	close	variants,	as	well	as	
by	other	contributions	to	the	IAMS	climate	policy	assessment	literature	that	find	a	time‐path	for	
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the	 “social	 cost	 of	 carbon”	 ‐‐i.e.,	 that	 of	 the	 current	 flow	 of	 CO2	 emissions	 ‐‐	 that	 gradually	
“ramps	up”	pari	passus	with	the	rising	cumulative	stock	of	greenhouse	gas	in	the	atmosphere.53		
The	 explanation	 for	 this	 apparent	 “anomaly”	 is	 simply	 that,	 unlike	 most	 of	 the	 IAM	
studies,	in	our	models	the	effects	of	cumulative	emissions	are	not	represented	as	“damages”	that	
directly	 and	 continuously	 enter	 the	 social	 welfare	 function.	 In	 BAM,	 the	 current	 level	 of	
cumulative	 emissions,	 taken	 in	 combination	 with	 a	 pre‐specified	 level	 of	 the	 climate‐tipping	
point	 (marking	 the	 onset	 of	 the	 climate	 catastrophe	 that	 is	 to	 be	 averted),	 set	 the	 remaining	
permissible	 volume	 of	 cumulative	 CO2	 emissions.	 So	 long	 as	 that	 volume	 is	 positive	 (actual	
cumulative	 emissions	 being	 below	 the	 	 critical	 threshold),	 the	 complementary	 slackness	
theorem	tells	us	that	the	product	of	the	Lagrange	multiplier	ߤ	and	its	corresponding	inequality	
constraint	set	by	the	threshold	level	should	be	zero	at	all	times.	Hence,	so	long	as	there	is	“room	
for	maneuver”	ߤ	should	be	zero.	In	optimum	control	terms,	this	translates	into	the	fact	that	the	
derivative	of	the	Hamiltonian	with	respect	to		cumulative	emissions	equals	െߤ ൌ 0,	making	the	
time‐derivative	of	 the	corresponding	co‐state	also	equal	 to	zero,	 thereby	 implying	 that	 the	co‐
state	 itself	(the	shadow	price)	should	be	constant	over	time.54	 	As	will	be	seen	(below,	 in	sect.	
4.2),	 the	foregoing	results	are	found	also	 in	the	extended	versions	of	BAM	that	recognizes	that	
rising	atmospheric	CO2	concentration	levels	will	drive	“damages”	from	the	increasing	frequency	
of	severe	weather	events	and	climatic	shifts	causing	coastal	flooding	and	interior	droughts,	all	of	
which	translate	into	effective	losses	of	productive	capacity.55		
Figure	2.2	presents	 the	corresponding	BAM	paths	 found	 for	 total	output,	consumption,	
along	with	their	respective	growth	rates,	and	the	indexes	of	“felicity”	(F)	and	social	welfare	(W).	
Note	that	the	rescaling	of	 the	“felicity	 function”	has	yielded	positive	values	for	both	that	 index	
and	W,	 as	will	 be	 seen	 from	 the	 bottom‐most	 row	 of	 this	 Figure.	 	 The	 growth	 rate	 of	 output	
shows	some	anticipatory	reactions	to	the	changes	that	the	arrival	of	a	new	phase	will	bring.	For	
example,	during	the	joint	production	phase,	the	average	productivity	of	capital	must	fall,	as	the	
amount	of	relatively	productive	carbon‐based	capacity	decreases,	and	the	amount	of	relatively	
unproductive	carbon‐free	capacity	increases.	This	holds	a	fortiori	for	the	arrival	of	the	carbon‐
free	 phase:	 when	 the	 remaining	 carbon‐based	 capacity	 is	 discarded,	 aggregate	 capital	
productivity	 suddenly	 drops	 to	 the	 level	 associated	 with	 carbon‐free	 capacity.	 In	 order	 to	
mitigate	the	effects	on	the	consumption	path	of	the	corresponding	drop	in	output,	the	buildup	of	
carbon‐free	capacity	during	the	joint	production	phase	should	be	speeded	up	towards	the	end	of	
the	 production	 phase.	 A	 similar	 pattern	 can	 be	 observed	 (in	 Figure	 2.1)	 for	 the	 buildup	 of	
carbon‐based	 capacity	 during	 the	 business‐as‐usual	 phase,	 as	 an	 increase	 of	 the	 carbon‐using	
                                                            
53	 The	 reference	 here	 is	 to	 optimal	 control	 simulations	 using	 deterministic	models.	 Cai,	 Judd	 and	 Lonztek	 (2012),	
however,	have	found	that	optimal	solutions	of	a	stochastic	control	model	(SDICE)	based	on	an	annualized	version	of	
DICE	(2007)	that	indicate	a	time‐path	for	the	incremental	“social	cost	of	carbon”	that	starts	out	substantially	higher	
than	that	found	with	the	corresponding	deterministic	version	of	the	model,	 	and	remains	essentially	constant	rather	
than	 gradually	 “ramping	 up”	 with	 the	 passage	 of	 time	 and	 the	 rising	 in	 cumulative	 emissions.	 	 The	 intuitive	
interpretation	of	this	difference	is	that	under	conditions	of	uncertainty	arising	in	the	feedback	effects	of	the	flow	of	
emissions	as	well	as	in	the	the	control	variable,	optimization	of	a	social	welfare	function	characterized	by	increasing	
relative	risk	aversion	calls	for	early	and	strong	CO2	mitigating	action	a	form	of	“insurance”	against	the	risks	of	later	
adverse	shocks	to	the	flow	of	consumption.		
54	 Since,	 by	 construction,	 the	 threshold	 is	 not	 binding	 during	 the	 BAU	 and	 the	 JPR	 phase,	 the	 emission	 constraint	
hasn’t	 been	 explicitly	 introduced	 in	 the	 Hamiltonians	 pertaining	 to	 both	 phases.	 If	 they	 would	 have	 been,	
complementary	slackness	would	have	‘neutralised’	them	for	the	reasons	given	here.	
55	The	damages,	however,	are	not	modeled	as	losses	of	“environmental	amenities,”	which	would	impinge	directly	upon	
“fecility”	 and	 therefore	 be	 treated	 as	 directly	 damaging	 social	 welfare.	 Instead,	 they	 impinge	 upon	 welfare	 only	
indirectly	 through	 the	 optimizing	 resource	 allocation	 adjustments	 that	 have	 to	 be	 made	 to	 compensate	 for	 the	
anticipated	losses	of	the	capital	stock	by	lowering	present	and	future	levels	of	consumption.	
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capital	stock		also	allows	a	relatively	high	rate	of	investment	in	carbon‐free	capacity	during	the	
next	 phase.	 This	 nicely	 illustrates	 a	 general	 implication	 of	 technical	 innovations	 that	must	 be	
physically	 embodied	 in	 production	 facilities,	 one	 that	 often	 is	 overlooked	 in	 discussions	 of	
policies	 to	mitigate	 CO2	 emissions:	 because	 capital	 is	 a	 produced	means	 of	 production,	 a	 fast	
buildup	of	carbon‐free	capacity	will	require	a	large	pre‐existing	stock	of	carbon‐using	capital	–	
at	least	during	its	initial	stage.	
		
Figure	2.2	BAM	baseline	results	for	Y,	C,	F	and	W	
	
	 In	Figure	2.3	we	report	the	consequences	for	the	shadow	prices	of	cumulative	emissions	
and	of	carbon‐based	capital	of	altering	the	location	of	the	“climate	catastrophe	tipping	point,”	in	
the	BAM	setting.		This	sensitivity	experiment	varies	the	critical	CO2	concentration	level	over	the	
range	125‐375	ppmv,	which	 is	consistent	with	 temperature	gains	of	2‐3	degrees	Kelvin	above	
preindustrial	levels.		From	the	lower	left	plot	is	seen	that	when	is	the	TPIRCC	is	set	at	the	bottom	
end	of	 its	 range	 ‐‐	 i.e.,	 at	Emax	=125‐130	corresponding	 to	an	atmospheric	CO2	concentration	
level	(405‐410	ppmv)	and	not	far	so	above	the	390	ppmv	mark	reached	by	the	average	record	
reported	 for	 2011‐12	 by	 the	 observatories	 on	 Mauna	 Loa	 (cf.	 below,	 footnote	 44)	 ‐‐	 the	
remaining	 “emissions	 budget”	 is	 so	 small	 that	 there	 are	 less	 than	 10	 years	 left	 to	 accomplish	
whatever	has	to	be	done	before	end	of	the	business‐as‐usual	phase.	Thereafter,	the	duration	of	
the	BAU	phase	increases	almost	linearly	and	less	than	proportionately	in	relation	to	the	further	
relaxation	 of	 the	 constraint	 set	 by	 the	 “permitted	 budget”	 for	 total	 cumulative	 emissions,	 but	
each	“relaxing		
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Figure	2.3	Sensitivity	results	BAM	
	
step”	will	be	raising	the	mean	global	temperature	that	prevails	at	the	beginning	of	the	switch	to	
carbon‐free	 capital	 formation,	 and	 by	 the	 time	 another	 9	 years	 have	 been	 allowed	 for	 the	
(optimized)	 BAU	 duration,	 the	 temperature	 gain	 in	 this	 simple	 illustrative	model	would	 have	
will	have	exceed	the	“dangerous”	2o	C.		
	 Since	 the	 carbon‐free	 end‐phase	has	 a	 constant	 steady	 state	 growth	 rate,	we	 can	 limit	
ourselves	 to	 looking	 only	 75	 years	 into	 the	 future,	 and	 thus	 showing	 just	 the	 first	 part	 of	 the	
corresponding	 time	 paths	 following	 the	 successful	 completion	 of	 the	 climate	 stabilizing	
transition.	 	Figures	3.1A	and	3.1.B	show	investment	 for	values	of	 the	emissions	 threshold	 that	
are	 varied	 uniformly	 over	 this	 range.	 	 Low	 threshold	 values	 are	 associated	 with	 the	 low	
frequency	part	 of	 the	 rainbow	color	 spectrum,	 and	higher	 values	of	 the	 threshold	 correspond	
with	correspondingly	higher	color	frequencies,	ending	with	the	violet	part	of	the	color	spectrum	
for	 the	highest	 threshold	 value	within	 the	 range.	Hence,	 the	 red	 lines	 correspond	with	a	 tight	
emission	constraint	and	the	violet	lines	are	associated	with	the	loosest	emission	constraint.	
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	 We	 can	 observe	 that	 as	 the	 threshold	 becomes	 tighter	 the	 arrival	 of	 the	 carbon‐free	
phase	is	speeded	up.	Figure	3.1A	shows	two	blocks	of	lines.	The	leftmost	block	is	associated	with	
the	business‐as‐usual	phase.	The	rightmost	block	is	associated	with	the	joint	production	phase.	
Note	that	the	endpoint	of	a	particular	time	path	in	the	leftmost	block	coincides	in	time,	but	not	
necessarily	in	value,	with	the	initial	point	of	that	same	time	path	in	the	rightmost	block.	In	Figure	
3.1.B	these	points	not	only	share	the	same	time	coordinate,	but	also	the	same	value	of	the	capital	
stock.	This	is	because	states	and	co‐states	cannot	jump,	whereas	time	derivatives	can.	
	One	sees	immediately	from	Figure	3.1.B	that	when	the	emissions	constraint	is	loosened,	
the	business‐as‐usual	phase	 lengthens	and,	 for	a	given	duration	of	 the	 joint	production	phase,	
that	implies	and	equal‐length	postponement	of	the	arrival	time	of	the	carbon‐free	phase.	But	the	
effect	of	relaxing	that	constraint	is	that	the	phase	of	joint	production	(and	investment	in	carbon‐
free	 capacity)	 also	becomes	 longer.	 	There	 is	 a	 striking	difference,	 however,	 between	 the	way		
that	the	net	investment	patterns	for	carbon‐based	capital	and	for	carbon‐free	capital	are	affected	
by	varying	Emax.	 	As	the	emission	constraint	is	loosened,	the	net	investment	curve	for	carbon‐
free	 capital	 is	 shifted	 upwards	 throughout	 the	 entire	 joint	 production	 period.	 In	 the	 case	 of	
carbon‐based	capital,	however,	a	loosening	of	the	emission	constraint	implies	both	a	lengthening	
of	the	business‐as‐usual	phase	and	a	downward	shift	of	the	net	investment	time	path.	At	the	end	
of	the	business‐as‐usual	phase,	however,	the	downward	shift	is	more	than	compensated	by	the	
rise	 in	 net	 investment	 taking	 place	 over	 a	 longer	 stretch	 of	 time.	 The	 counterpart	 of	 this	
sequence	of	events	is	shown	in	figure	3.1.G	which	shows	the	time	paths	of	consumption.	There	
we	 see	 that	 the	 BAU	 phase	 allows	 higher	 levels	 of	 consumption	 in	 the	 beginning,	 and	
correspondingly	lower	levels	of	net	investment	in	carbon‐free	capacity.	
	 The	implications	for	the	level	of	the	carbon‐free	capital	stock	are	shown	in	Figure	3.1.D.	
With	a	tightened	emissions	constraint,	the	joint	production	phase	comes	earlier	and	the	capital	
stock	reaches	a	lower	level	at	t=75	and	hence	will	be	lower	also	at	ݐ ൌ ∞.	Once	again,	this	is	a	
consequence	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 capital	 is	 a	 produced	 means	 of	 production:	 if	 the	 carbon‐based	
capital	 stock	 is	 limited	 in	 size	 by	 the	 existence	 of	 more	 binding	 cumulative	 CO2	 emission	
constraints,	 then	 the	 implication	 is	 that	 the	 carbon‐free	 capital	 stocks	will	 be	more	 limited	 in	
size	as	well.	
	
	
	 	
Figure	3.1.C	ܭ஻ሶ 	:		Emax=125‐375	 	 	 Figure	3.1.D		ܭ஻	:		Emax=125‐375	
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Figure	3.1.E	Cumulative	emissions,	E	:		Emax=125‐375	
	
	 Obviously,	 more	 limiting	 emissions	 show	 up	 directly	 in	 the	 time	 paths	 of	 cumulative	
emissions,	both	in	terms	of	the	value	of	the	endpoints,	but	also	in	terms	of	the	associated	time	
coordinate,	 as	 can	 be	 seen	 from	 Figure	 3.1.E.	 Events	 for	 output	 are	 more	 interesting,	 since	
output	in	the	most	constrained	case	reaches	higher	levels	at	the	end	of	the	BAU	phase,	but	then	
loses	out	to	the	less	constrained	cases,	as	shown	in	Figure	3.1.F	(below).		
	
	
	 Figure		3.1.F	Output:		Emax=125‐375		 		 Figure	3.1.G	Consumption:	Emax=125‐375	
	
	 That	twist	in	the	relative	levels	of	output,	however,	is	not	mimicked	by	the	time	paths	of	
consumption	 which	 are	 seen	 from	 Figure	 3.1.G	 to	 growth	 in	 parallel.	 Throughout	 the	 entire	
duration	 of	 the	 transition	 it	 is	 the	 less	 tightly	 constrained	 solutions	 that	 yield	 the	 persisting	
higher	 levels	 of	 per	 capita	 consumption.	 	 The	 twist	 in	 the	 relative	 levels	 of	 output,	 just	
mentioned,	is	reflected	by	the	pattern	of	growth	rates	depicted	in	Figure	3.1.H.	The	values	of	the	
growth	rate	of	output	at	 the	end	of	 the	business‐as‐usual	phase	are	the	same	 for	all	 threshold	
values	within	the	range.	However,	the	periods	of	time	during	which	these	growth	rates	affect	the	
level	of	output	are	very	different,	so	much	so	that	the	positive	effect	on	the	level	of	output	(see	
Figure	 3.1.F)	 of	 an	 extension	 of	 the	 BAU	 phase	 with	 the	 relaxation	 of	 the	 Emax	 constraint	
outweighs	the	initial	negative	effect	of	that	change	on	the	rate	of	growth	of	output.		The	fact	that	
the	model	converges	to	the	same	steady‐state,	albeit	at	different	points	 in	time,	 is	reflected	by	
the	horizontal	line	in	the	rightmost	part	of	Figure	3.1.H	
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Figure	3.1.H	Growth	rate		 ሶܻ /ܻ	:		Emax=125‐375	 Figure	3.1.I	Welfare	W	:		Emax=125‐375	
	
The	 effect	 on	 welfare	 of	 less	 stringent	 constraints	 on	 cumulative	 CO2	 emissions	 is	
positive,	as	one	would	expect,	as	can	be	seen	in	Figure	3.1.I.	In	addition,	the	time	paths	become	
closer	together	in	the	vertical	direction	with	the	relaxation	of	that	constraint.	The	implication	of	
this	 is	 that	 both	 the	 welfare	 effects	 associated	with	 the	 trade‐offs	 between	 consumption	 and	
investment	during	the	earlier	BAU	phase,	and	those	welfare	effects	in	the	joint	production	phase,		
become	stronger	when	tighter	constraints	on	emissions	shorten	the	BAU	phase.		
	
	 4.3	Solution	results	for	BAM+R&D	
	
	 The	base	 line	results	 for	BAM+R&D	are	presented	 in	Figure	4.1.	The	 length	of	 the	BAU	
phase	and	the	JPR	phase	are	now	27.36	and	13.45	years.	Hence,	the	arrival	date	of	the	carbon‐
free	phase	has	been	ever	 so	 slightly	postponed	 relative	 to	BAM	 (TF=40.81	 for	BAM+R&D	and	
TF=40.17	for	BAM),	but	the	main	difference	is	in	the	relative	lengths	of	the	BAU	and	JPR	phases.	
With	endogenous	R&D,	the	BAU	phase	is	lengthened	from	a	value	of	23.8	to	27.4	years,	whereas	
the	 length	 of	 the	 JPR	 phase	 is	 reduced	 from	 16.4	 in	 BAM	 to	 13.4	 in	 BAM+R&D.	 This	 is	 an	
illustration	of	the	fact	that	accumulation	of	physical	carbon‐free	capital	with	low	productivity	for	
longer	 periods	 of	 time	 (as	 in	 BAM)	 is	 a	 substitute	 for	 the	 accumulation	 of	 high	 productivity	
carbon‐free	 capital	 for	 shorter	 periods	 of	 time	 (as	 in	 BAM+R&D)	 plus	 the	 accumulation	 of	
productivity	change	through	R&D	prior	to	the	JPR	and	CFR	phases.	
	 The	big	difference	between	the	results	found	(below)	in	Figure	4.1	and	those	shown	for	
BAM	in	Figure	2.1	is	the	presence	of	the	third	row	of	plots	that	is	now	associated	with	the	capital	
productivity	 B	 of	 the	 carbon‐free	 technology:	 the	 shadow	 price	 of	 capital	 productivity	 rises	
during	the	business‐as‐usual	phase,	and	then	falls.		
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Figure	4.1	BAM+R&D	baseline	results	for	KA,	KB	and	E	
	
	 The	reason	why	the	shadow	price	rises	at	first	is	that	during	the	business‐as‐usual	phase	
the	 capacity	 to	 produce	 carbon‐free	 capital	 that	 will	 embody	 the	 new	 value	 of	 the	 capital	
productivity	 is	 rising.	 This	 represents	 an	 increase	 of	 the	 value	 of	 doing	 R&D.	 But	 since	 the	
productivity	of	doing	R&D	is	high	for	low	values	of	the	productivity	of	capital,	the	corresponding	
impact	on	R&D	levels	is	positive	but	 limited,	as	long	as	B	is	relatively	low.	As	B	approaches	its	
asymptotic	value,	however,	the	level	of	R&D	activity	increases	exponentially,	but	this	happens	at	
a	 relatively	 late	 stage	 in	 the	 business‐as‐usual	 phase.	 	 At	 the	 close	 of	 that	 phase	R&D	 activity	
ceases	and	B	remains	at	a	constant	level	(below	its	asymptotic	value)	while	the	shadow	price	of	
B	will	be	falling	from	then	onwards.	
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Figure	4.2	BAM+R&D	baseline	results	for	Y,	C,	R&D,	F	and	W	
	
	 Figure	4.2	shows	the	absolute	R&D	expenditures	(RD)	as	well	as	the	percentage	share	of	
R&D	expenditures	 in	 total	output,	 from	which	 it	 can	be	 seen	 that	 the	exponential	 rise	 in	R&D	
expenditures	at	the	end	of	the	BAU	phase	is	reflected	in	the	slowdown	of	the	growth	rate	of	Y	at	
the	end	of	 the	BAU	phase.	The	 retardation	 in	output	growth	 is	 traceable	 to	 the	slowing	of	net	
investment	in	the	carbon‐based	capital	stock	to	accommodate	the	increase	in	R&D	expenditures.	
During	 the	 joint	 production	 phase	 the	 rate	 of	 net	 investment	 in	 carbon‐free	 capacity	 is	
significantly	higher	in	the	case	of	BAM+R&D	than	it	was	in	the	Basic	model,	because	the	effect	of	
R&D	activities	during	the	preceding	phase	has	raised	the	marginal	rate	of	return	on	investment	
in	carbon‐free	capacity,	relative	to	the	level	at	which	it	was	exogenously	fixed	in	the	case	of	BAM.	
For	BAM+R&D	we	have	run	the	same	sensitivity	experiment	regarding	the	location	of	the	
cumulative	emission	 threshold	as	was	carried	out	 for	 the	BAM	model.	 Figure	4.3	presents	 the	
initial	 values	 for	 the	 co‐states	 of	 cumulative	 emissions	 (ߣܧܯܷܷܶሻ,	 of	 carbon‐based	 capital	
ሺߣܭܣܷܷܶሻand	of	 the	productivity	 of	 carbon‐free	 capitalሺߣܤܷܷܶሻ,	 as	well	 as	 the	 length	 of	 the	
BAU	phase	(Δܷሻ	and	the	JPR	phaseሺΔܬሻ.	
		The	 plots	 for	 the	 initial	 values	 of	 the	 co‐states	 of	 cumulative	 CO2	 emissions,	 and	 of	
carbon‐based	capital	are	very	similar	to	the	ones	we	had	obtained	 for	BAM,	whereas	 the	plots	
for	 the	 initial	 value	 of	 the	 shadow	 price	 of	 carbon‐free	 capital	 productivity	 show	 that	 tighter	
emission	constraints	tend	to	raise	the	value	of	doing	R&D,	as	one	would	expect.	We	also	find	that	
the	BAU	phase	has	been	lengthened	by	a	couple	of	years,	across	the	board.	One	of	the	reasons	for	
this	result	 is	 that	 the	strongly	concave	relationship	between	R&D	expenditures	 in	 increases	 in	
the	productivity	of	capital	embodying	the	carbon‐free	technology	introduces	a	tendency	for	R&D	
investment	to	be	spread	out	over	time.	Consequently,	the	longer	the	BAU	phase,	the	higher	the	
benefits	that	can	be	obtained	by	spreading	out	R&D	expenditures.	
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Figure	4.3	Sensitivity	results	BAM+R&D	
	
In	discussing	the	optimal	solution	found	for	the	BAM	transition	path,	it	was	pointed	out	
that	 the	 duration	 of	 the	 JPR	 phase	 depended	 only	 on	 the	 technology	 parameters,	 which	
remained	fixed	in	the	BAM	setting.	Endogenous	R&D	activity,	however,	causes	B	to	change	over	
time.				As	a consequence,	the	effects	of	varying	the	TPIRCC’s	location	in	the	BAM+R&D	model	are		
	
Figure	5.1	Time	paths	of	capital	productivity	B	
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quite	 different	 from	 those	 in	 BAM	 ‐‐not	 only	 during	 the	 BAU	 phase,	 but	 in	 the	 duration	 of	
following	 joint	 production	phase.	 	 Figure	 5.1	 displays	what	 happens	 to	 the	development	 over	
time	 of	 carbon‐free	 capital	 productivity	 in	 this	 model	 when	 the	 constraint	 imposed	 on	 CO2	
emissions	by	 the	 climate	 catastrophe	 tipping	point	 is	 relaxed.	One	 sees,	 first,	 from	 the	 spread	
between	the	spread	between	the	red	and	the	violet	bounds,	that	an	increasingly	distant	tipping	
point	 allows	 the	pace	 of	 R&D‐driven	productivity	 enhancements	 (during	BAU)	 ramp	up	more	
slowly,	stretching	out	that	first	phase	of	the	transition,	but	raising	the	terminal	value	of	carbon‐
free	capital	productivity	(B).	The	latter	translates	into	a	lower	aggregate	capital‐output	ratio	and	
a	faster	rate	of	steady‐state	growth	during	the	eventual	epoch	of	carbon‐free	production.		
	To	appreciate	the	complicated	collateral	changes	in	the	behavior	of	tangible	investment	
during	 the	BAU	phase,	 it	 is	helpful	 to	start	with	a	comparison	of	Figures	4.1.A,	B	with	Figures	
2.1.A,	 B.	 From	 this	 it	 is	 seen	 that	 the	 duration	 of	 the	 (BAU)	 phase‐‐when	 net	 investment	 is	
building	up	the	carbon‐using	capital‐‐is	noticeably	more	prolonged	in	the	case	in	which	the	R&D	
option	is	being	exercised	(BAM+R&D)	than	when	it	not	(BAM).	Nevertheless,	in	the	BAM	model	a	
higher	and	accelerating	growth	rate	of	the	carbon‐using	capital	stock	results	in	the	BAU	phase	
ending	with	the	stock	of	that	type	of	capital	being	substantially	bigger	than	its	counterpart	in	the	
optimized	 solution	 for	 the	 BAM+R&D	 model.	 With	 regard	 to	 the	 behavior	 of	 tangible	 net	
investment,	therefore,	there	is	a	much	less	abrupt	passage	in	the	latter	model	between	the	BAU	
phase	the	following	(joint	production)	phase	of	the	transition	path.	
	 Looking	now	at	the	contrast	between	the	solutions	for	these	two	models	with	regard	to	
the	effects	of	variations	 in	the	 location	of	the	tipping	point	(TPIRCC	=	Emax),	 it	was	seen	from	
Figures	3.2.A,B	that	in	case	of	BAM	the	more	distantly	positioned	is	the	constraint	on	Emax,	the	
longer	is	the	“stretch‐out”	of	net	investment	in	carbon‐using	capital‐‐deferring	the	largest	annual	
changes	 to	 the	 later	years	of	 the	more	prolonged	BAU	phase.	When	the	option	 to	 improve	 the	
productivity	of	carbon‐free	capital	through	R&D	is	being	exercised,	however,	capital	 formation	
to	 increase	 carbon‐based	 productive	 capacity	 continues	 for	 a	 much	 shorter	 time.	 Other	
comparisons	 reveal	 that	 the	 level	 of	 net	 investment	 in	 carbon‐based	 capacity	 similarly	 is	
lowered	more	in	the	case	of	BAM+R&D	than	it	is	in	the	model	where	the	option	to	invest	in	R&D	
is	not	present.	
	 	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 effects	 of	 varying	 Emax	 on	 the	 terminal	 values	 of	 the	 carbon‐
based	capital	stock	at	the	end	of	the	BAU	phase	are	found	to	be	similar	in	magnitudes,	and	the	
time	paths	of	the	stock	of	carbon‐based	capital	remain	packed	together	more	tightly	in	the	case	
of	BAM+R&D	than	they	are	with	BAM	alone.	For	the	carbon‐free	capital	stock,	however,	the	rate	
of	 net	 investment	 under	 BAM+R&D	 rises	 more	 rapidly	 over	 time	 than	 under	 BAM,	 and	 the	
periods	during	which	the	buildup	of	carbon‐free	capacity	is	realized	are	somewhat	shorter.	
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	 	In	 all	 cases,	 however,	 the	 carbon‐free	 capital	 stock	 at	 the	 end	of	 the	 JPR	phase	under	
BAM+R&D	 exceeds	 that	 of	 the	 corresponding	 terminal	 value	 under	 BAM.	 But,	 varying	 the	
climate	 catastrophe	 tipping	 point	 generates	 a	 spread	 in	 terminal	 values	 for	 the	 carbon‐free	
capital	stock	at	t=75	that	is	much	smaller	in	the	BAM+R&D	model	than	those	found	when	there	
is	no	R&D.			
	
	 	
Figure	5.2.C	capital		ܭ஻ሶ 	:		Emax=125‐375		 													Figure	5.2.D			ܭ஻	:		Emax=125‐375	
	 	
	 With	respect	 to	the	time	path	of	emissions,	Figure	5.2.E	exhibits	 the	“shock	absorbing”	
effect	of	exercising	the	R&D	option,	damping	the	impacts	of	the	tighter	constraints	imposed	by	
setting	the	tipping	point	at	lower	CO2	concentration	levels.	From	a	comparison	with	the	results	
for	 BAM	 (in	 Figure	 3.2.E)	 it	 is	 evident	 that	 the	 time‐paths	 of	 cumulative	 emissions	 virtually	
coincident	 throughout	 a	 large	 part	 of	 the	 somewhat	 longer	 BAU	 phase,	 and	 the	 subsequent	
“feathering”	of	the	paths	is	narrower:	a	range	of	40	ppmv,	compared	with	70	ppmv	in	BAM.	
	
Figure	5.2.E	Cumulative	emissions,	E		:		Emax=125‐375	 	
The	 more	 even	 development	 over	 time	 under	 BAM+R&D	 than	 under	 BAM	 is	 also	
reflected	in	the	plots	regarding	output.	The	kinky	growth	patterns	observed	under	BAM	are	far	
less	pronounced	in	the	case	of	BAM+R&D	(compare.	Figures	5.2.F	and	3.1.F	as	well	as	5.2.H	and	
3.1.H),	and	this	holds	also	for	consumption	(Figures	5.2.G	and	3.1.G).			
One	difference	between	BAM+R&D	and	BAM	is	very	noticeable	from	the	comparison	of	
Figures	5.2.H	with	3.1.H.	First	of	all,	during	the	BAU	phase	under	BAM+R&D	the	average	growth	
rate	of	output	is	lower	than	the	average	growth	rate	under	BAM.	Secondly,	under	BAM+R&D,	the	
average	 growth	 rate	 slows	 down	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 business‐as‐usual	 phase.	 During	 the	 joint	
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production	phase,	however,	 the	 range	of	variation	of	 the	growth	rate	of	output	 is	much	 larger	
under	 BAM+R&D	 than	 under	 BAM,	 while,	 moreover,	 the	 steady	 state	 growth	 rate	 under	
BAM+R&D	 is	 higher	 than	 under	 BAM	 and	 slightly	 rising	 as	 emission	 constraints	 become	 less	
tight.	All	of	this	leads	to	a	much	more	even	development	over	time	of	consumption,	welfare	and	
felicity,	as	 can	be	seen	by	comparing	Figures	5.2.G	and	3.1.G	as	well	as	Figures	5.2.I	 and	3.1.I.	
These	Figures	highlight	the	fact	that	having	the	possibility	to	change	productivity	through	R&D	
helps	to	fight	the	negative	effects	of	tightening	emission	constraints.	
	 	
				Figure	5.2.F	Output	:		Emax=125‐375	 	 Figure	5.2.GConsumption	:	Emax=125‐375	
	 	
	Figure	5.2.H	Growth	rate		 ሶܻ /ܻ	:		Emax=125‐375	 Figure	5.2.I	Welfare	W	:		Emax=125‐375	
	 	
	
	 4.4	Solutions	results	for	BAM+R&D+UCL:	Sensitivity	Experiments	
	 The	results	 for	 this	experiment	have	been	obtained	as	 follows.	We	have	 first	made	 the	
assumption	 that	 the	 high	 damage	 depreciation	 parameters	 are	 exactly	 the	 same	 as	 the	 low	
damage	parameters,	 in	which	 case	 the	model	 is	 reduced	 to	 the	BAM+R&D	model,	 providing	 a	
base‐line	 against	 which	 to	 gauge	 the	 effects	 of	 recognizing	 higher	 rates	 of	 warming‐driven	
damages.	 Then	we	 set	 damage	 threshold	well	within	 the	BAU	phase	 of	 the	BAM+R&D	model.	
With	the	onset	threshold	situated	at	87	GTC	net	cumulative	emissions	 from	current	 levels,	 the	
high‐damage	 threshold	 as	 reached	 after	 15	 years.	 	 To	 perform	 the	 sensitivity	 analysis	 that	 is	
reported	here,	the	depreciation	parameter	for	carbon‐based	capacity	was	varied	over	the	range	
0.0375‐0.075,	i.e.	twice	the	initial	value.	In	other	words,	the	largest	increase	in	the	expected	rate			
of	annual	gross	weather‐related	damages	considered	here	 is	3.75	percent	of	real	gross	output,	
with	the	1.875	percent	being	the	mid‐point	of	the	parameter	variation	range.	
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	 Because	 this	model	 is	 so	 similar	 to	 BAM+R&D,	we	 do	 not	 report	 the	 outcomes	 of	 the	
climate	 change	 threshold	 here.	 Rather,	 we	 focus	 on	 the	 experiment	 in	 which	 we	 account	 for	
extra	damages	for	carbon‐based	capital.	The	damage	threshold	effectively	splits	the	BAU	phase	
into	 a	 low	 damage	 first	 sub‐phase	 and	 then	 a	 high	 damage	 sub‐phase.	 The	 joint	 production	
phase	and	the	carbon‐free	phase	now	will	now	also	be	high	damage	phases.	We	can	generate	the	
corresponding	BAM+R&D	model	phase‐durations	by	setting	these	physical	depreciation	rates	at	
ߜ஺ு ൌ ߜ஺௅ ൌ 0.0375,which	yields:	15.36	for	the	low	damage	sub	phase	of	BAU	(i.e.	Δܷܮ),	12.0	for	
the	high	damage	sub‐phase	of	the	BAU	phase	(i.e.Δܷܪ),	and	12.83	for	the	JPR	phase	(i.e.	Δܬ),	and	
from	Figure	5.3	it	is	clear	that	a	rise	in	the	decay	parameter	in	the	high	damage	phase	will	bring	
about	a	rise	(in	absolute	terms)	in	the	initial	shadow	price	of	emissions.		
	 	
	
	
	
	
Figure	5.3	Sensitivity	results	BAM+R&D+UCL	
	 	
	 This	 is	 reflected	 also	 in	 Figure	5.4,	which	displays	 the	magnitudes	of	 the	 effect	 on	 the	
shadow	price	of	cumulative	CO2	emissions	for	the	first	15	years	of	the	transition.	In	Figure	5.4	it	
also	is	evident	that	the	absolute	elevation	of	the	shadow	price	of	CO2	emissions	is	an	anticipatory	
effect	of	the	future	rise	in	the	rate	of	losses	from	the	net	stock	of	capital,	and	is	confined	to	the	
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low	 damage	 sub‐phase.	 From	 the	 high	 damage	 BAU	 sub	 phase	 onwards,	 the	 shadow	 price	
remains	unaffected	by	rises	in	the	rate	of	decay,	suggesting	an	absolute	rise	of	the	shadow	price	
as	compared	to	the	BAM+R&D	baseline	results.	The	reason	why	this	absolute	rise	occurs	is	that	
the	net	rate	of	return	on	carbon‐based	capital	in	the	low	damage	sub‐phase	has	risen	relative	to	
the	 high	 damage	 sub	 phase.	 Consequently,	 there	 is	 more	 demand	 for	 carbon‐based	 capital	
during	 the	 low	 damage	 sub‐phase,	 and	 therefore	 also	 more	 derived	 demand	 for	 the	 existing	
room	left	for	cumulative	emissions	before	the	climate	catastrophe	tipping	point	will	be	reached.		
The	reason	why	this	absolute	rise	occurs	is	that	the	net	rate	of	return	on	carbon‐based	capital	in	
the	low	damage	sub‐phase	has	risen	relative	to	the	high	damage	sub	phase.	Consequently,	there	
is	more	demand	for	carbon‐based	capital	during	the	low	damage	sub‐phase,	and	therefore	also	
more	 derived	 demand	 for	 the	 existing	 room	 left	 for	 cumulative	 emissions	 before	 the	 climate	
catastrophe	tipping	point	will	be	reached.		
	
	 	
Figure	5.4		Shadow	price	of	CO2	emissions		 Figure	5.5	Carbon‐free	capital	productivity,	B	
	
	 Note	further,	that	higher	damages	also	makes	it	attractive	to	allocate	greater	investment	
resource	to	R&D	activity,	whereas,	due	to	the	higher	expected	rates	of	damages	in	the	future,	the	
effective	rate	of	return	on	investment	in	building	future	carbon‐based	productive	capacity	will	
be	reduced,	 leading	to	a	slower	rate	of	physical	carbon‐free	capital	accumulation.	The	negative	
effects	of	this	on	long‐term	carbon‐free	capacity	can	be	mitigated	to	some	extent	by	making	the	
lower	volume	of	 carbon‐free	capacity	more	productive	–	 through	greater	 investments	 in	R&D.	
That	is	exactly	what	can	be	observed	from	Figure	5.3:	one	sees	that	that	higher	weather	related	
damages	 tend	 to	 rotate	 the	 time	 path	 of	 carbon‐free	 capital	 productivity	 upwards,	 while	 the	
arrival	of	the	joint	production	phase	is	brought	forward		in	time,	albeit	only	slightly.	
	 A	higher	rate	of	decay	also	makes	the	business‐as‐usual	phase	slightly	shorter,	especially	
because	 the	 low	 damage	 sub‐phase	 decreases	 in	 length.	 The	 latter	 results	 from	 some	 of	 the	
investment	in	carbon‐based	capacity	during	the	high	damage	sub‐phase	being	brought	forward	
in	time,	as	can	be	seen	in	figure	5.6.A.	In	that	Figure,	we	see	that	the	violet	time	paths	are	on	top	
of	 the	 collection	 of	 low	 damage	 sub	 phase	 time	 paths,	 whereas	 during	 the	 high	 damage	 sub	
phase	of	the	BAU	phase,	they	are	at	the	bottom	of	the	collection.56	A	higher	rate	of	carbon‐based	
capital	 accumulation	 in	 the	 low	 damage	 sub‐phase	 ultimately	 implies	 a	 higher	 volume	 of	 the	
capital	 stock	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 low	damage	 sub‐phase.	 This	would	 lead	 to	 a	 higher	 volume	 of	
capital	to	be	discarded	at	a	later	date,	unless	the	accumulation	process	itself	stops	earlier	than	
                                                            
56	Note	that	the	red	time	path	doesn't	show	a	break	at	all,	because	it	reflects	the	baseline	of	the	BAM+R&D	model	in	
which	there	was	no	difference	between	the	low	damage	and	the	high	damage	sub	phase	of	the	BAU	phase.	
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before.	 Hence,	 during	 the	 joint	 production	 phase,	 carbon‐based	 capital	 is	 seen	 to	 depreciate	
considerably	faster	than	in	the	previous	experiments.	The	forward	shift	in	time	of	carbon‐based	
net	 investment	 shows	 up	 as	 a	 distinct	 kink	 in	 the	 high	 decay	 parameter	 time	 paths.	 For	 low	
decay	parameters	values,	 the	BAM+R&D+UCL	results	are	very	close	 to	 the	BAM+R&D	baseline	
results	that	are	identical	to	the	reddest	time	path	in	figure	5.6.B.		
	 The	results	for	net	investment	in	carbon‐free	capacity	exhibit	very	different	behavior	for	
low	 and	 for	 high	 damages.	When	 damages	 are	 low,	 the	 rate	 of	 capital	 accumulation	 is	 rising	
exponentially	 over	 time.	 When	 carbon‐based	 capital	 damages	 are	 high,	 the	 rate	 of	 net	
investment	 in	carbon‐free	capacity	 is	 initially	higher	than	 in	the	 low	damage	phase,	but	at	 the	
end	of	 the	 joint	production	phase	 the	rate	of	net	 investment	 is	even	slightly	 lower	 than	at	 the	
beginning.		The	reason	is	that	due	to	increased	damages	of	carbon‐based	capital,	the	opportunity		
	
	 	
	
Figure	5.6.A	ܭ஺ሶ 	:		ߜ஺ு ൌ 0.0375 െ 0.075		 Figure	5.6.B	ܭ஺	:				ߜ஺ு ൌ 0.0375 െ 0.075	
	
	 	
Figure	5.6.C	ܭ஻ሶ 	:		ߜ஺ு ൌ 0.0375 െ 0.075	 	 Figure	5.6.D	ܭ஽	:				ߜ஺ு ൌ 0.0375 െ 0.075	
	
The	pattern	in	net	investment	observed	in	Figure	5.6.C	is	reflected	in	Figure	5.6.D,	which			
shows	the	slightly	higher	carbon‐free	capital	stock	in	the	beginning	of	the	joint	production	phase	
for	the	high	damage	time	paths,	although	after	a	while	those	high	damage	time	paths	show	levels	
for	the	carbon‐free	stock	of	capital	above	those	for	the	low	damage	time	paths.	Under	these	high	
damage	conditions,	the	arrival	of	the	carbon‐free	phase	is	postponed	somewhat.	
From	 Figure	 5.6.E	 one	 can	 see	 that	 the	 extra	 net	 investment	 in	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	
business‐as‐usual	phase	under	high	weather‐related	damage	conditions	rotates	the	cumulative	
10 20 30 40
t
60
40
20
0
20
KAdot
10 20 30 40
t
200
300
400
500
600
700
KA
30 40 50 60 70
t
40
60
80
100
120
140
KBdot
30 40 50 60 70
t
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
KB
‐ 47 ‐ 
 
emission	time	path	upwards	for	the	largest	part	of	the	phases	before	the	carbon‐free	phase.	The	
rate	 at	which	 the	 flow	of	 emissions	 decreases	 on	 the	 high	damage	 time	 paths	 is,	 however,	 so	
large	that	the	upward	shift	in	the	beginning	of	the	curve	is	more	than	compensated	at	the	end	of	
the	curve,	leading	to	an	intersection	of	the	high	damage	cumulative	emissions	curve	and	the	low	
damage	cumulative	emissions	curve	a	few	years	before	the	beginning	of	the	carbon‐free	phase.		
	
	
Figure	5.6.E	Cumulative	emissions	E	:	ߜ஺ு ൌ 0.0375 െ 0.075	
	
	 The	time	paths	for	output	are	provided	in	Figure	5.6.F.	There	is	a	major	disruption	when	
the	 carbon‐free	 phase	 begins,	 but	 this	 doesn't	 really	 affect	 the	 development	 over	 time	 of	 the	
corresponding	 consumption	paths,	 as	we	have	 seen	before,	 and	now	also	 in	Figure	5.6.G.	 The	
only	 slight	 hiccup	 in	 consumption	 occurs	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 high	 damage	 sub‐phase	 of	 the	
business‐as‐usual	phase.		
	 	
	 	 	
Figure	5.6.F.	Output	:	ߜ஺ு ൌ 0.0375 െ 0.075		 						Figure	5.6.G.	Consumption	:	ߜ஺ு ൌ .0375 െ .075	
	
	 Figure	 5.6.H	 shows	 the	 time	 paths	 of	 the	 growth	 rate	 of	 output.	 For	 the	 high	 decay	
parameter	paths	the	drop	in	the	growth	rate	of	output	at	the	beginning	of	the	joint	production	
phase	 is	 much	 higher	 than	 for	 the	 low	 decay	 parameter	 time	 paths.	 Nevertheless,	 welfare	 is	
hardly	affected,	as	can	be	seen	from	Figure	5.6.I.	
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Figure	5.6.H	Growth	rate		 ሶܻ /ܻ				 					Figure	5.6.I	Welfare	W:		ߜ஺ு ൌ 0.0375 െ 0.075	
	
	
4.		Summary,	Interpretations	and	Concluding	Remarks			
	
This	 paper	 presents	 a	 multiphase	 transition	 model	 that	 can	 be	 solved	 to	 obtain	 the	
optimum	 timing	 and	 magnitudes	 of	 tangible	 and	 intangible	 investments	 that	 are	 required	 to	
effect	the	integrated	system’s	transition	from	a	carbon‐based	economy	to	one	whose	production	
activities	are	essentially	“carbon‐free”	‐‐	in	the	sense	of	having	ceased	to	generate	CO2	emissions	
exceeding	the	Earth’s	natural	abatement	capacity	‐‐	and	therefore	will	have	stabilized	the	global	
climate	 system.	 	 That	 transition	 is	 shown	 to	 be	 optimal	 when	 it	 is	 completed	 just‐in‐time,	
because	our	modeling	approach	posits	the	existence	of	a	catastrophic	tipping	point	in	the	Earth’s	
climate	system.	To	have	 failed	 to	stop	short	of	 that	 critical	 threshold,	which	 is	defined	 for	 the	
purpose	 of	 our	 models	 in	 terms	 of	 an	 exogenous	 terminal	 bound	 on	 the	 atmospheric	 CO2	
concentration	 level,	 would	 have	 initiated	 the	 onset	 of	 irreversible	 runaway	 global	 warming	
featuring	abrupt	climate	changes	that	would	create	an	environment	inhospitable	to	the	survival	
of	civilization,	and	the	greater	part	of	the	Earth’s	human	population.			
			On	the	latter	premise,	for	which	advances	in	climate	science	and	paleoclimatology	now	
provides	 a	 considerable	 measure	 of	 support,	 asserting	 the	 relevance	 of	 the	 precautionary	
principle	for	designing	an	appropriate	policy	response	suffices	to	recast	the	economic	problem	
of	climate	stabilization	as	that	of	effecting	a	welfare	optimizing	transition	from	a	carbon‐based	
economy	to	a	zero	net	CO2	emission	production	regime	in	time	to	avert	driving	the	atmospheric	
concentration	 to	 the	 catastrophe	 tipping	 point.	 	 A	 technical	 virtue	 of	 this	 reformulation	 is	 its	
explicit	 acknowledgment	 that	 the	 behavior	 of	 the	 coupled	 economic	 and	 geophysical	 systems	
beyond	 the	 tipping	 point	 would	 be	 marked	 by	 the	 high	 frequency	 recurrence	 of	 abrupt	
discontinuities	 in	 temperature	 and	 economic	 and	 demographic	 system‐dynamics.	 Proper	
theoretical	modeling	would	 include	 those	non‐convexities,	 and	 thus	 vitiate	 the	 use	 of	 optimal	
control	analysis.			
	In	 addition	 to	 avoiding	 that	 particular	 cul‐de‐sac,	 this	 paper	 has	 taken	 an	 analytical	
approach	 that	 diverges	 in	 a	 second	way	 from	 the	 one	 that	 has	 come	 to	 characterize	 research	
contributions	in	the	field	of	integrated	assessment	modeling	(IAM)	of	climate	policy.	It	addresses	
the	 problem	 of	 finding	 the	 sequence	 of	 technological	 options	 whose	 development	 and	
deployment	 would	 be	 required	 to	 stabilize	 the	 global	 climate	 in	 the	 finite	 but	 endogenously	
determined	timespan	of	an	optimal	transition	to	an	essentially	carbon‐free	regime	of	production	
that	is	compatible	with	sustainable	economic	development	and	continuing	economic	growth.	
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A	central	feature	in	our	approach	to	that	problem	is	the	supposition	that	the	transition	
towards	the	desired	state	of	carbon‐free	production	will	require	a	switch	in	the	deployment	of	
alternative	 capital‐embodied	 technologies.	 This	 will	 entail	 building	 carbon‐using	 production	
facilities	 that	 are	 sufficient	 to	 allow	 the	 production	 of	 enough	 capital	 of	 the	 kind	 in	 which	
carbon‐free	 technologies	 are	 embodied	 so	 that	 the	 latter	 can	 completely	 displace	 the	
troublesome	CO2‐emitting	production	facilities.		Accordingly,	we	have	opted	for	a	basic	growth	
model	 setting	 that	 features	 two	 distinct	 classes	 of	 technology,	 both	 of	 which	 can	 produce	
malleable	(homogeneous)	output	from	which	either	carbon‐based	or	carbon‐free	capital	goods	
may	be	formed.	Utilizing	the	former	class	of	production	assets,	however,	results	in	the	release	of	
CO2	 emissions	 in	 excess	 of	 the	 natural	 abatement	 capacity	 of	 the	 Earth’s	 forests	 and	 oceans,	
thereby	contributing	to	global	warming.	We	assume,	not	unrealistically,	that	at	the	outset	of	the	
transition	process	the	“dirty”	(carbon‐using)	mode	of	production	characterized	by	a	higher	level	
of	 productivity	 than	 the	 “green”	 alternative:	 its	 technologies	 offer	 average	 unit	 capital	 costs	
lower	than	those	for	production	facilities	that	embody	the	available	carbon‐free	technologies.	
	These	two	(linear)	technology	options	are	introduced	into	the	otherwise	simple	setting	
of	 the	 AK	 endogenous	 growth	 model	 by	 Rebelo	 (1991),	 but	 complicating	 the	 latter	 by	 the	
implied	 requirement	 that	 a	 technical	 change	 in	 the	 state	 of	 the	 production	 system	 requires	 a	
specific	kind	of	tangible	capital	formation	to	implement	the	(carbon‐free)	alternative	technology.		
This	is	a	distinctive	feature	of	the	modelling	approach	pursued	here,	and	rests	squarely	on	the	
technological	premise	that	embodiment	in	physical	capital	goods	will	be	necessary	to	implement	
switches	non‐carbon	techniques,	the	increasing	relative	diffusion	of	which	would	tend	to	lower	
the	 global	 production	 regime’s	 overall	 carbon‐intensity	 more	 rapidly	 the	 more	 closely	 the	
average	 productivity	 of	 carbon‐free	 facilities	 came	 to	 approach	 (and	 surpass)	 that	 of	 carbon‐
based	capital	stock.	
	The	 “embodiment”	 assumption	 and	 its	 implications	 are	 especially	 appropriate	 in	 our	
view,	 and	 perhaps	 more	 importantly	 that	 expressed	 by	 engineers	 with	 experience‐based	
expertise	with	 innovation	processes	 in	 energy	 supply	 systems.	 Yet,	 our	 explicit	 recognition	 of	
this	constitutes	an	important	departure	of	the	present	analysis	(and	its	account	of	the	dynamics	
of	 the	 optimal	 climate‐stabilizing	 transition	 path)	 from	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	 effects	 of	
endogenous	 technological	 change	 have	 been	 treated	 in	 previous	 economic	 contributions	 to	
integrated	 modelling	 of	 climate	 policy	 measures	 –	 where	 assuming	 that	 technical	 change	 is	
disembodied	has	long	remained.		
Focusing	on	sequencing	the	deployment	of	different	categories	of	technology	policy,	our	
imposition	 of	 minimally	 restrictive	 efficiency	 conditions	 leads	 to	 a	 multi‐phase	 optimization	
framework	in	which	the	Basic	Model	of	technology	switching	recognizes	three	separate	phases	
of	 production,	 each	 of	 them	 characterized	 by	 different	 technologies	 or	 combinations	 of	
technologies	being	active.	 It	 is	shown	that	due	to	the	 linear	production	technologies	employed	
there	will	always	be	an	active	tangible	capital	formation	process	to	implement	one	or	the	other	
of	 these	 technologies	 ‐‐	 even	 though	 output	 can	 be	 produced	 using	 both	 technologies	
concurrently	 as	 long	 as	 there	 is	 still	 room	 to	 emit	 CO2	 from	 the	 facilities	 that	 use	 energy	
obtained	by	burning	fossil	fuels.			The	first	of	the	three	phases	is	called	the	‘Business‐as‐usual’	or	
BAU	phase,	 in	which	 carbon‐based	 capacity	 is	 still	 being	 built	 up,	 and	 the	output	 produced	 is	
completely	carbon‐based.	At	some	point	in	time	the	next	phase	arrives,	in	which	investment	in	
carbon‐based	capital	ceases	and	the	buildup	and	concurrent	use	of	carbon‐free	capacity	begins.	
During	 that	 phase,	 production	 using	 carbon‐based	 capital	 continues	 but	 the	 production	 level	
falls	 over	 time	as	 the	 capital	 stock	 is	worn	down	due	 to	 technical	 decay.	The	 second	phase	 is	
called	the	joint	production	phase	(JPR	phase	for	short),	as	both	technologies	are	used	to	produce	
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output.	At	the	beginning	of	the	third	phase,	called	the	‘carbon‐free’	phase	(CFR	phase	for	short)	
the	 remaining	 carbon‐based	 capacity	 is	 scrapped	 and	 production	 is	 from	 then	 on	 completely	
carbon‐free:	the	green	future	has	arrived	(just‐in‐time).	
We	 extend	 the	 basic	 three‐phase	 BAM	 setting	 in	 two	 ways.	 First	 we	 introduce	
endogenous	 R&D	 driven	 technical	 change	 that	 improves	 the	 productivity	 of	 the	 carbon‐free	
technology	 up	 to	 the	 moment	 of	 the	 installation	 of	 the	 first	 unit	 that	 embodies	 the	 new	
technology.	The	reason	to	do	this	is	that	the	embodiment	of	technology	in	fixed	capital	implies	
that	the	buildup	of	significant	stocks	of	carbon‐free	capital	will	take	time	which	may	turn	out	to	
be	in	short	supply	on	the	one	hand,	while	on	the	other	hand	it	will	also	draw	upon	the	existing	
carbon‐based	capacity	at	the	expense	of	consumption,	which	is	the	sole	source	of	welfare	in	the	
standard	AK‐model	and	in	our	model	too.	To	keep	matters	simple,	we	make	the	assumption	that	
R&D	driven	technical	change	stops	the	moment	 the	new	technology	starts	 to	be	 implemented.	
	 The	build‐up	of	carbon‐free	capacity	to	a	level	that	is	sufficient	to	mitigate	the	aggregate	
productivity	 drop	 associated	 with	 the	 scrapping	 of	 remaining	 carbon‐based	 capacity	 at	 the	
beginning	 of	 the	 carbon‐free	 phase	 will	 take	 time.	 That	 fact	 is	 one	 of	 the	 main	 reasons	 for	
focusing	 attention	 on	 the	 optimum	 timing	 of	 the	 changes	 between	 the	different	 phases	 of	 the	
model.	 The	 specification	of	 the	way	R&D	alters	 the	productivity	 of	 capital	 embodying	 carbon‐
free	technologies,	when	incorporated	in	an	AK‐setting	with	a	limiting	constant	marginal	product	
of	 capital,	 generates	 productivity	 levels	 for	 the	 class	 of	 “alternative”	 technologies	 that	 are	
bounded	 from	 above	 (asymptotic	 technical	 change)	 ‐‐	 reflecting	 the	 ‘fishing‐out’	 effect	
recognized	 in	much	 of	 the	 endogenous	 growth	 literature	 since	 Jones	 (1995).	 The	 latter	 effect	
seems	especially	relevant	in	regard	to	the	further	development	of	a	specific	class	of	technologies,	
as	 opposed	 to	 innovation	 and	 realized	 technical	 changes	 occurring	 at	 the	 macro‐level	 as	
consequence	of			expansion	of	technical	constraints	affecting	a	broad	and	diverse	array	of	goods	
and	processes.		
The	second	extension	of	the	BAM	model	pertains	to	the	introduction	of	a	weather	related	
damage	 threshold.	 For	 this	 purpose	 we	 proceed	 simply,	 by	making	 the	 assumption	 that	 high	
rates	of	loss	of	productive	capacity	due	to	expected,	but	unscheduled	rates	of	loss	in	productive	
capacity	 will	 occur	 after	 the	 system	 reaches	 an	 “extreme	 weather	 tipping	 point”	 (defined	 in	
terms	of	mean	global	temperature,	or,	equivalently,	a	CO2	concentration	level).	The	latter	is	set	
below	 the	 climate	 catastrophe	 tipping	 point,	 and	 triggers	 an	 upward	 jump	 in	 the	 expected	
proportional	rate	of	technical	decay	of	the	capital	stock.	The	effect	is	tantamount	to	raising	the	
annual	rate	of	physical	depreciation	of	the	capital	stocks.		
The	timing	of	the	phase	changes	present	in	the	various	model	versions	are	governed	by	
transversality	 conditions	 following	 from	 the	 optimality	 condition	 that	 the	 values	 of	 the	
Hamiltonians	must	be	 identical	when	evaluated	at	 the	moment	of	 the	phase	change	under	 the	
conditions	pertaining	to	the	phases	just	before	and	just	after	the	passage	between	phases.		In	the	
Basic	 Model	 (without	 R&D	 and	 extra	 weather	 related	 damages)	 the	 condition	 defining	 the	
optimum	 length	 of	 the	 BAU	phase	 turns	 out	 to	 be	 the	 requirement	 that	 the	 shadow	prices	 of	
carbon‐based	 and	 carbon‐free	 capacity	 should	 be	 the	 same	 at	 the	moment	 investment	 in	 the	
latter	technology	takes	over	from	investment	in	the	former.	This	makes	perfect	economic	sense,	
as	the	opportunity	cost	of	a	unit	of	investment	in	terms	of	consumption	foregone	is	the	same	in	
both	 cases.	 For	 the	 timing	 of	 the	 change	 from	 the	 J‐phase	 to	 the	 F‐	 phase,	 the	 optimality	
condition	 results	 in	a	 transversality	 condition	 that	states	 that	 the	moment	 that	 the	CFR	phase	
should	begin	is	defined	by	the	requirement	that	the	benefits	of	continuing	to	use	carbon‐based	
capacity	(the	utility	value	of	its	output)	is	outweighed	by	the	cost	of	doing	so	(i.e.,	by	the	negative	
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utility	 value	 of	 the	 corresponding	 emissions).57	 For	 the	 other	 versions	 of	 the	 model,	 more	
complicated	 transversality	 conditions	 arise	 out	 of	 the	 same	 general	 optimality	 conditions	
pertaining	to	the	equality	of	Hamiltonians	at	the	moment	of	a	phase	change.	
BAM	contains	two	further	transversality	conditions,	i.e.	the	standard	one	associated	with	
the	pure	AK‐setting	of	the	CFR	phase58	and	the	one	implied	by	the	fact	that	from	the	start	of	the	
CFR	phase	the	shadow	price	of	carbon‐based	capital	should	be	zero,	as	carbon‐based	capacity	is	
worthless	from	then	on.	Using	the	requirement	of	the	continuity	of	state	and	co‐state	variables	
at	 the	moment	of	a	phase	 change,	 the	 transversality	 conditions	 in	 combination	with	 the	given	
initial	 and	 terminal	 values	 for	 the	 state	 variables	 in	 the	 model	 allow	 us	 to	 use	 a	 (steepest	
descent)	search	method	that,	for	a	priori	“guesses”	of	the	still	missing	initial	values	of	a	subset	of	
co‐states	 and	 of	 the	 phase	 lengths	 of	 the	 BAU	 and	 the	 JPR	 phases,	 solves	 the	 systems	 of	
differential	equations	resulting	from	the	first	order	conditions	of	the	Hamiltonian	problems	for	
each	of	the	individual	phases.	Given	this	solution	that	is	contingent	on	the	a	priori	initial	values,	
we	can	evaluate	to	the	extent	to	which	the	different	transversality	conditions	and	the	boundary	
condition	for	cumulative	emissions	are	met.	If	one	or	more	of	these	transversality	conditions	or	
the	boundary	condition	are	not	met,	the	initial	value(s)	need	to	be	adjusted;	if	all	the	conditions	
are	met	then	the	optimum	path	has	been	found.	
We	have	calibrated	the	parameters	and	initial	values	of	the	BAM	model,	based	to	a	large	
extent	on	Nordhaus’	2010	(DICE	and)	RICE	model	dataset	and	added	some	a	priori	assumptions	
regarding	 the	capital	productivity	parameters	and	 the	parameters	of	 the	R&D	 function.	 	Using	
this	 setup,	 we	 have	 run	 a	 number	 of	 simulations	 to	 investigate	 the	 sensitivity	 of	 the	 optimal	
solutions	of	the	various	model	versions	to	changes	in	the	structural	parameters	featuring	in	the	
utility	function	and	in	the	production	functions,	which	all	showed	the	expected	outcomes	known	
from	the	standard	endogenous	growth	models.	
	We	 then	 reported	 the	 graphically	 displayed	 results	 of	 parameter	 sensitivity	 analyses			
involving	varying	the	location	(in	the	spectrum	of	atmospheric	CO2	concentration	levels)	of	the	
tipping	point	for	irreversible	runaway	climate	change,	and	the	(lower	concentration	levels)	 	of	
the	threshold	for	the	onset	of	greater	expected	rates	of	extreme‐weather		damages	to	productive	
capacity.	 	 In	 the	simulations	where	the	catastrophic	climate	“tipping	point”	was	systematically	
varied	to	show	the	implications	of	more	stringently	applying	the	precautionary	principle	in	the	
BAM	setting,	it	was	that	that	a	faster	pace	of	accumulation	of		carbon‐based	capital	was	optimal	
when	 the	 “tipping	 point”	 in	 cumulative	 CO2	 emissions	 was	 lower,	 so	 that	 the	 arrival	 of	 the	
carbon‐free	 phase	 could	 be	 brought	 forward	 in	 time.	 To	 facilitate	 this	 adjustment,	 a	 quicker	
buildup	of	the	carbon‐based	capital	stock	was	required	to	enable	switching	at	an	earlier	point	to		
carbon‐free	 capital	 formation	 and	 production,	 thereby	 permitting	 higher	 rates	 of	 both	
investment	 and	 consumption	 when	 carbon‐based	 capacity	 was	 being	 allowed	 to	 depreciate	
before	 having	 to	 be	 shut	 down.	 	 Tightening	 the	 cumulative	 emissions	 constraint	 not	 only	 the	
shadow	price	of	CO2	emissions	(in	absolute	terms),	but	also	that	of	carbon‐free	capital.	Rather	
more	unexpected,	however,	was	its	effect	in	also	raising	the	(absolute)	magnitude	of	the	shadow	
price	of	carbon‐based	capital	–	simply	because	 	the	value	attributed	to	the	carbon‐based	capital	
stock	 is	 derived	 in	 large	 part	 from	 the	 value	 of	 the	 carbon‐free	 capital	 stock	 that	 it	 is	 able	 to	
produce.	
                                                            
57	 This	 equality	 closely	 resembles	 the	 ‘negative	 quasi‐rent’	 scrapping	 condition	 that	 is	 familiar	 in	 the	 theoretical	
literature	 on	 vintage	 models	 with	 ex	 post	 fixed	 factor	 proportions	 (i.e.,	 the	 so‐called	 “putty‐clay”	 and	 “clay‐clay”	
models).	See		Johansen	(1959),	and	Solow	et	al.	(1966).	
58	In	the	endogenous	R&D	version	of	the	model,	still	another	transversality	condition	is	that	as	time	goes	to	infinity,	
the	present	value	of	the	welfare	value	of	carbon‐free	capital	productivity	should	approach	zero.	
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When	 account	 is	 taken	 within	 this	 framework	 of	 the	 greater	 expected	 frequency	 of	
warming‐driven	 “extreme	 weather”	 damages	 to	 the	 flow	 of	 real	 output	 from	 vulnerable	
productive	 capacity,	 such	 that	 the	 rate	 of	 unscheduled	 losses	 of	 KA	 is	 irreversibly	 shifted	
upwards	at	some	point	during	the		U‐phase,	an	extra	phase	is	added	to	the	Basic	Model’s	three	
phases.		The	resulting	extended	version	of	the	Basic	model	has	a	low	damage	sub‐phase	that	the	
calibration	 assures	 begins	 before	 the	 J‐phase,	 and	 a	 high	 damage	 sub‐phase	 that	 extends	
throughout	the	J‐phase	and	affects	the	remaining	carbon‐based	capital	stock.59		The	expectation	
of	 extra	 weather‐related	 damages,	 in	 effect,	 resembles	 an	 anticipated	 accelerated	 rate	 of	
depreciation,	creating	a	wedge	in	the	rate	of	return	on	carbon‐based	investment	throughout	the	
low	 damage	 portion	 of	 the	 U‐phase.	 Consistent	 with	 this,	 it	 is	 found	 that	 there	 is	 extra	
investment	in	carbon‐based	capacity,	especially	during	the	later	portion	of	the	low	damage	sub‐
phase	 portion	 within	 the	 U‐phase.	 	 An	 increase	 in	 the	 annual	 proportionate	 toll	 taken	 of	
productive	 capacity	 by	 extreme	 weather	 damages	 also	 leads	 to	 a	 more	 even	 distribution	 of	
carbon‐free	 investment	 over	 time,	 as	 that	mitigates	 the	 negative	 impact	 on	 consumption,	 and	
hence	 on	 social	 welfare.	 	 During	 the	 initial	 sub‐phase	 when	 the	 damage	 rate	 remains	 low,	
investments	 in	 carbon‐based	 capacity	 are	 increasing,	 in	 anticipation	 of	 the	 need	 during	 the	
ensuing	J‐phase	(of	joint	production)	to	build	up	carbon‐free	capacity	quickly	in	order	to	cushion	
consumption	 as	much	 as	 is	 possible	 against	 the	 forced	 drop	 in	 aggregate	 output	 that	 will	 be	
entailed	 by	 the	 shut‐down	 of	 the	 remaining	 carbon‐based	 capital	 stock	when	 the	 F‐phase	 (of	
zero	net	CO2	emissions)	begins.		With	higher	damages	having	been	concentrated	on	the	carbon‐
fueled	portion	of	total	productivity	capacity,	ceteris	paribus	that	drop	in	the	level	of	output	will	
have	been	rendered	less	pronounced.	
	
5.2	Interpreting	the	effects	of	exploiting	the	R&D	investment	option					
	 	
	 When	 the	 basic	 model	 was	 extended	 to	 allow	 for	 endogenous	 adjustments	 of	 R&D	
expenditures,	 the	 duration	 of	 the	 U‐phase	 increased	 relative	 to	 that	 observed	 in	 the	 BAM	
solution.	 This	 result	 is	 evident	 from	 the	 comparison	 of	 the	 optimized	 phase	 durations	
summarized	by	the	comparative	tableau	that	is	presented	below.		Consequently,	R&D	activity	is	
spread	 out	 more	 evenly	 spread	 over	 time,	 which,	 due	 to	 the	 concavity	 of	 the	 relationship	
between	increases	in	carbon‐free	capital	productivity	and	the	level	of	R&D	investments,	has	the	
effect	of	raising	the	overall	effectiveness	of	a	given	R&D	budget	during	the	U‐phase.		There	also	
is	more	time	to	accumulate	carbon‐based	capital,	so	that	when	BAU	ends	(at	the	end	of	 the	U‐	
phase)	there	will	be	a	considerably	enlarged	terminal	value	for	KA.		Thus,	the	lengthening	of	the	
U‐phase	associated	with	 the	 introduction	of	R&D	allows	 the	economy	“to	eat	 its	 carbon‐based	
cake	and	still	have	a	considerable	amount	of	it	left”		in	the	form	of	carbon‐based	capacity	at	the	
beginning	of	the	J‐phase.		In	contrast	to	the	BAM	case,	the	joint	production	(J)	phase	is	shortened	
                                                            
59	 This	 admittedly	 simplistic	 specification	 –	 which	 avoids	 creating	 still	 more	 phases	 (needed	 to	 accommodate	 a	
number	of	discrete	upward	steps	in	the	capital	loss	rate)	may	be	rationalized	along	the	following	lines.	The	location	of	
fixed	infrastructure	facilities	in	the	BAU	will	be	legacies	of	a	previous	era	in	which	sea	levels	and	moisture	levels	in	the	
atmosphere	were	lower,	and	existing	KA	will	not	have	been	designed	to	reduce	their	vulnerability	to	the	distribution	
of	extreme	weather	events	that	will	ensue	from	the	warming	that	already	has	occurred.	Moreover,	further	additions	to	
the	stock	of	carbon‐based	infrastructure	are	likely	to	continue	to	be	sited	essentially	at	the	same	types	of	locations,	to	
exploit	existing	engineering	designs	lower	costs	of	servicing	existing	directly	productive	capacity.	 	While	KB	 	 ,	being	
newly	formed,	could	be	sited	so	as	to	be	less	vulnerable	to	the	weather	variations	in	the	altered	climate	conditions,	
uncertainties	 combined	with	 greater	 costs	 could	 combine	with	 increasing	 severity	 of	 storms	 and	 flooding	 (at	 still	
further	 elevated	 mean	 global	 temperature)	 not	 only	 throughout	 the	 JPR	 and	 CFR	 phases.	 A	 later	 specification,	
however,	will	 do	 away	with	 the	notion	of	one	 (or	more)	 temperature	 trigger	points	 for	 increased	expected	 capital	
losses,	by	making	the	latter	a	continuous	function	of	the	endogenous	level	of	mean	global	temperature.		
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as	more	of	the	cumulative	emissions	budget	has	been	used	by	the	accelerated	growth	of	output	
based	 upon	 fossil‐fueled	 capital.	 The	 overall	 effect	 is	 that	 the	 carbon‐free	 (F)	 phase	 comes	
slightly	earlier	than	in	BAM,	while	the	dispersion	in	the	welfare	effects	is	less	than	under	BAM.	
More	 generally,	 it	 is	 seen	 from	 the	 senstitivity	 of	 the	 results	 to	 parametric	 variation	 in	 the	
tipping	point,	the	possibility	of	enhancing	carbon‐free	capital’s	productivity	through	directed	R&D	
investments	helps	to	fight	the	negative	welfare	effects	of	tightening	emission	constraints.		
	
	
The	entries	 in	 the	 tableau’s	bottom	row	gives	greater	salience	 to	one	of	 the	broad	and	
important	 insights	gained	by	the	key	departure	of	our	modeling	approach	 from	the	traditional	
one	that	characterizes	the	IAMs	research	literature.		As	a	first	step	towards	the	design	of	a	‘tech‐
fix’	 climate	 stabilization	 policy,	 we	 have	 reformulated	 the	 problem	 as	 one	 of	 identifying	 the	
technological	measures	and	macro‐economic	 resource	 reallocations	 that	would	be	 required	 in	
order	 to	spend	the	entire	 “allowable	budget”	of	GHG	emissions	(in	CO2‐equivalent	ppmv)	on	a	
transition	 to	 a	 carbon	 free	global	production	 regime	 that	must	 satisfy	 two	 fundamental	meta‐
level	constraints.		Firstly,	it	is	necessary	to	complete	that	transition	in	time	to	avert	the	onset	of	
catastrophic	 “runaway”	 global	 warming	 and	 there	 by	 permit	 the	 subsequent	 attainment	 of	
sustainable	 development	 and	 economic	 growth.	 	 Secondly,	 subject	 to	 the	 first	 necessity,	 the	
required	 intangible	 (R&D)	 investment	 and	 tangible	 capital	 formation	 during	 that	 transition	
should	be	welfare	optimal	in	their	sequencing,	magnitudes	and	timing	‐‐	which	is	to	say	they	will	
be	subject	to	the	assumed	form	of	the	social	welfare	function,	 its	parametric	specifications	and	
the	 social	 rate	 of	 time	 discounting	 during	 each	 of	 the	 several	 phases,	 and	 satisfy	 the	
transversality	conditions	that	tie	the	phases	together	to	form	an	optimal	path.		
			Although	 the	 models	 vary	 in	 regard	 to	 the	 attributes	 of	 the	 technologies,	 and	 the	
consequent	climate	feedbacks,	the	total	duration	of	the	first	two	phases	of	the	optimal	transition	
is	essentially	 the	same	in	all	 three	models	because	 the	optimization	 in	effect	 is	utilizing	better	
technologies	created	by	R&D	expenditures	to	spend	the	allowable	budget	of	carbon	emissions	in	
a	 welfare‐enhancing	 way;	 	 similarly,	 the	 social	 planner	 adjusts	 the	 allocation	 of	 resources	 to	
minimize	the	adverse	welfare	effects	of	future	climate	feedbacks	driven	by	warming.	This,	as	has	
been	 seen,	 left	 the	 duration	 of	 the	 initial	 transition	 phase	 unaltered,	 while	 only	 slightly	
shortening	 the	 joint	 production	 phase	 throughout	 which	 a	 higher	 annual	 rate	 of	 extreme	
weather	events	caused	losses	of	available	carbon‐based	capacity.		
The	 close	 consilience	 of	 the	 length	 of	 the	 completed	 transitions,	 which	 cluster	 tightly	
around	 the	 40‐year	 mark	 despite	 the	 underlying	 shifts	 in	 BAU	 and	 JPR	 phases,	 provides	 a	
striking	degree	of	 “concrete‐ness”	 to	 the	point	 that	has	been	made	qualitatively	 in	 Section	4’s	
discussion	of	the	effect	of	exploiting	the	R&D	investment	option.		Comparing	the	results	for	BAM	
with	those	for	BAM+R&D	in	order	to	gauge	the	effect	of	exercising	the	R&D	investment	option,	
the	 right‐most	 column	 in	 the	 tableau	 shows	 the	 offsetting	movements	 of	 the	 two	 component	
phases:	R&D	 investment	prolongs	 the	optimal	duration	of	 the	U	phase	vis‐à‐vis	 that	 found	 for	
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BAM,	while	its	effect	in	lowering	the	real	unit	capital	costs	of	the	subsequently	installed	carbon‐
free	 capital	 stock	 works	 in	 the	 same	 direction	 during	 the	 extra	 4.4	 years	 of	 the	 U	 phase	 –	
promoting	the	build‐up	more,	 less	costly	carbon‐using	production	capacity.	 	One	should	notice	
also	 that	 although	 anticipated	 capacity	 losses	 from	 in	 the	 “high	 damage”	 sub‐phase	 of	 (BA)	U	
tends	to	reduce	the	subsequent	annual	flows	of	output	and	emissions,	that	effect	is	offset		by	the	
additional	 carbon‐based	 capital	 formation	 carried	 out	 during	 the	 U	 phase.	 	 Together,	 these	
effects	of	the	R&D	investments	lessen	the	transition’s	toll	on	consumption	and	the	level	of	social	
welfare	by	making	possible	a	faster	and	less	costly	switch	to	carbon‐free	production	during	the	J	
phase.	60			
	 It	 is	worth	emphasizing	 the	point	 that	 in	 the	 framework	of	 this	 transition	analysis	 the	
welfare‐enhancing	 effect	 of	 conducting	 R&D	 to	 lower	 the	 unit	 capital	 costs	 of	 alternatives	 to	
fossil	fueled	technologies	‐‐	and,	more	generally	of	optimally	deploying	still	other	CO2	mitigating	
techniques			‐‐	is	the	dual	of	the	essential	constancy	in	the	endogenously	determined	duration	of	
the	 transition	 to	 a	 stabilized	 climate.	 That	 result,	 however,	 is	 not	 an	 artifact	 of	 any	 particular	
features	in	the	specifications,	or	in	the	calibrations	of	the	models	–	for	none	were	selected	with	a	
view	 to	 yielding	 this	 common	 property	 of	 the	 solutions	 exhibited	 in	 the	 foregoing	 tableau.		
Instead,	the	clustering	of	the	combined	durations	of	the	first	two	phases	(i.e.,	the	“transitions”)	in	
these	models	 has	 a	 very	 different	 and	 quite	 generic	 cause,	 one	 that	 can	 be	 stated	 simply	 and	
grasped	intuitively	from	the	following	considerations.		
	 Each	model	 starts	 from	 the	 same	 implicit	 level	 of	 atmospheric	 CO2	 concentration	 and	
has	 the	 identical	 “budget”	 for	permissible	 further	cumulative	emissions.	That	 follows	 from	the	
requirement	 that	 in	 each	 case	 the	 transition	 to	 a	 carbon‐free	 production	 regime	 must	 be	
completed	before	the	arriving	at	the	hypothesized	“tipping	point”	–	set	at	a	3°	Kelvin	rise	above	
the	pre‐industrial	epoch’s	mean	global	temperature	level.	The	uniformity	of	the	resulting	“hard	
carbon	 budget	 constraint”	 (in	 terms	 of	 the	 volume	 of	 net	 emissions	 generated	 during	 the	
transition)	 is	 a	 property	 of	 the	 common	 climate	 system.	 It	 is	 necessary	 in	 order	 to	 establish	
comparability	 among	 the	 optimized	 solutions	 for	models	 that	 consider	 different	 technological	
options	and	climate	feedbacks	affecting	the	macro‐economy.	In	other	words,	imposing	a	uniform	
hard	 budget	 constraint	 is	 a	 generic	 condition	 for	 comparative	 analysis	 of	 integrated	 climate	
stabilization	models	that	specify	any	selected	pair	of	[start,	stop]	CO2	concentration	levels.		
			 Consequently,	 the	 intuitive	 way	 understanding	 what	 is	 going	 on	 in	 these	 DIRAM	
transition	 path‐optimization	 problems	 is	 that	 the	 “social	 planner”	 is	 maximizing	 the	 global	
present	value	of	 social	welfare	 from	consumption	utility	 (‘felicity’)	by	 taking	whatever	actions	
are	required	to	spend	her	“allowed	carbon	emissions	budget”	efficiently	by	exploiting	whatever	
technological	means	already	exist	or	 can	be	made	available	 for	 the	purpose.	 	Furthermore,	on	
grounds	of	efficiency	she	always	will	contrive	to	have	completely	exhausted	the	fixed	emissions	
budget	just	before	the	economy	enters	the	phase	of	zero	(net)	emissions.	Given	the	anticipated	
constraints	 imposed	 upon	 optimization	 by	 the	 dynamics	 of	 the	 climate	 system,	 better	
technological	 tools	 therefore	 will	 be	 translated	 into	 the	 highest	 attainable	 (which	 is	 to	 say,	
“constrained”)	level	of	social	welfare.		Of	course,	the	social	planner,	having	come	onto	the	scene	
after	 global	warming	has	 been	 underway	 for	 some	 long	 time,	 cannot	 escape	 realities	 that	 are	
                                                            
60	The	 identical	 durations	of	 the	U	 (BAU)	phase	 in	 the	models	with	R&D	added	 to	 the	BAM	model,	whether	or	not	
allowance	is	made	of	weather‐related	“unscheduled	capacity	loses”	(UCL)	reflects	the	assumption	that	R&D	activities	
do	not	entail	CO2	emissions,	and	thus	do	not	directly	contribute	to	exhausting	the	budget	of	allowable	emissions.	(In	
view	of	the	appreciable	and	rising	share	of	electric	power	consumed	by	computers,and	other	research	facilities,	this	
assumption	might	well	be	reconsidered.	To	the	extent	that	R&D	during	the	U‐phase	must	draw	primarily	on	power	
from	fossil	 fuel	equipment,	neglecting	 it	 results	 in	overstatement	of	 the	trend	rate	of	growth	of	consumption	goods	
and	services	in	the	later	years	of	the	U	phase.				
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legacies	of	that	history:	 	if	the	emissions	budget	already	had	been	squandered,	the	game	might	
well	be	over	before	any	ameliorative	actions	could	be	taken	to	avert	a	climate	catastrophe.61			
	 	The	main	purpose	in	building	and	analyzing	models	such	as	those	presented	here	is	to	
expose	 and	 illuminate	 the	 complex	 nature	 of	 the	 dynamic	 interrelationships	 entailed	 in	 those	
catastrophe‐averting	 actions,	 rather	 than	 to	 predict	 the	 required	 duration	 of	 the	 completed	
transition,	 or	 of	 its	 constituent	 sub‐phases.	 Therefore,	 no	 particular	 significance	 should	 be	
attached	to	the	40‐year	duration	‐‐	around	which	the	optimized	transitions	in	the	present	group	
of	models	 turns	 out	 to	 be	 tightly	 clustered.	 	 Indeed,	 the	 discussion	 of	 the	 calibration	 of	 these	
models	 (above,	 sect.	 3.1)	 points	 out	 that	 the	 combined	 effect	 of	 modeling	 simplifications	
imposed	 for	 computational	 reasons	 tends,	 on	 balance,	 to	 create	 a	 more	 optimistic	 outlook	
regarding	the	time‐duration	that	is	available	for	an	optimal	transition	to	a	stable	global	climate,	
and	correspondingly	suggests	that	the	process	would	exact	a	less	heavy	toll	in	terms	of	reduced	
social	welfare.62	 	One	 therefore	should	 firmly	resist	 carrying	any	such	comforting	 impressions	
from	the	present	exploratory	analysis	into	the	sphere	of	pragmatic	climate	policy	discussions,	let	
alone	draw	upon	them	in	advocating	specific	technology	policy	actions.					
	 Nevertheless,	coming	now	to	the	second	striking	aspect	of	the	models’	outcomes	in	this	
regard,	 we	 have	 been	 surprised	 (and	 could	 not	 help	 but	 be	 a	 little	 ‘tickled’)	 by	 the	 specific	
numerical	result	that	has	emerged	from	this	exploratory	application	of	the	DIRAM	approach	‐‐	
viz.,	 that	 the	 “required”	 transition	 period	 on	which	 the	 computed	 solutions	 concur	 lasts	 four	
decades	from	the	t=0	point,	which	our	calibrations	set	to	correspond	with	2010.		That	outcome	
happens	 to	 be	 perfectly	 aligned	 with	 the	 conclusions	 of	 recent	 comprehensive	 studies	 of	 the	
feasibility	 and	 extent	 of	 the	 technological	 and	 physical	 transformation	 in	 modern	 energy	
systems	such	as	that	of	the	U.S.	economy.		Based	upon	detailed	technical	engineering	design	and	
implementation	 considerations	 that	 are	 essentially	 orthogonal	 to	 the	models	 developed	 here,	
the	current	consensus	of	expert	 judgments	 is	 focused	on	the	decades	2010‐2050	as	the	period	
during	 which	 a	 concerted	 technological	 effort	 could	 manage	 to	 end	 the	 contribution	 of	
anthropogenic	 GHG	 emissions	 to	 global	 warming.63	 That	 would	 be	 a	 source	 of	 mutually	
                                                            
61	The	adjective	“ameliorative”	signals	an	important	qualification	in	this	phrasing.	The	analysis	of	classes	of		
technological	options	presented	here	does	not	include	that	category	of	geo‐engineering	options	(see	discussion	of	
treating	these	as	a	“backstop”	in	a	stochastic	optimization	framework,		in	David	and	van	Zon,	2012).		Because	potential	
methods	of	atmospheric	carbon	capture	and	solar	radiation	management	are	usually	proposed	as	meliorative,	in	the	
sense	of	stabilizing	a	viable	climate,	the	category	of	“geo‐engineering”	does	not	usually	extend	to	include	the	option	of	
using	nuclear	or	thermonuclear	devices	placed	in	the	caldera	of	active	volcanoes	to	stop	and	reverse	a	runaway	
process	of	warning	by	creating	an	extended	“nuclear	winter”.			Grave	uncertainties	in	regard	to	the	“viability”	of	the	
environment	that	might	thus	be	created	is	there	for	implicit	in	the	statement	that	the	social	planner	who	has	arrived	
in	media	res	(being	melioratively	motivated)	will	be	a	prisoner	of	the	antecedant	climate	history.			
62	 To	 review	 those	 points	 briefly,	 recall	 that:	 (1)	 the	 catastrophe	 tipping	 point	 was	 set	 at	 the	 upper	 end	 of	 the	
temperature	 gain	 range	 that	 presently	 is	 regarded	 to	 be	 “safe”,	 (2)	 the	 radically	 simplified	 representation	 of	 the	
carbon	understates	 the	 rise	 in	 the	 atmospheric	 concentration	 levels	during	 the	 latter	half	 the	 the	 transition,	 and	a	
fortiori,	 the	 rise	 in	 global	 temperature,	 and	 (3)	 the	 specification	of	 a	 step‐function	model	 of	 unscheduled	 losses	 of	
carbon‐based	capacity	due	to	rising	temperature	during	the	joint	production	phase		very	substantially	underestimates	
the	costs	of	adjusting	previous	tangible	investment	in	anticipation	of	the	future	lowering	in	the	effective	productivity	
of	the	remaining	carbon‐based	capital	stock.		
63	 For	 example,	 the	 National	 Research	 Council	 (2010)	 Report	 of	 its	 Committee	 on	 America’s	 Energy	 Future	made	
detailed	technical	assessments	of	the	energy‐supply	and	end‐use	technologies	that	were		judged		most	likely	to	have	
meaningful	impacts	on	the	U.S.	energy	system	during	the	three	time	intervals:	2009–2020	for(deployment	of	existing	
technologies,	2020–2035	for	development	of	new	technologies	 for	commercial	deployment),	2035–2050	for	 further	
development	 and	widespread	 deployment	 of	 advanced	 technologies	 (cf.	 Full	 Report,	 pp.134‐135.	 A	member	 of	 the	
AEF	Committee,	 	Robert	W.	Fri	(2013:p.6),	 	remarking	more	recently	on	the	scale	and	complexity	of	the	U.S.	energy	
system,	has	stressed	the	point	that	“a	few	decades	is	not	a	very	long	time	to	overhaul	 it	 to	the	point	where	it	emits	
essentially	no	greenhouse	gases”....But	it	is	difficult	to	come	up	with	a	high‐probability	scenario	that	does	not	exhaust	
the	emissions	budget	by	2050.”	We	view	these	coinciding	references	to	2050	as	the	transition’s	endpoint	to	be	little	
more	than	“coincidental.”		
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reinforcing	 comfort	 about	 both	 the	 reality	 of	 the	 climate	 change	 challenge	 and	 this	 particular	
research	 exercise	 –	 if	 only	we	 did	 not	 have	 grounds	 for	 believing	 that	 the	 specifications	 and	
calibrations	employed	here	are	likely	to	err	in	painting	too	rosy	a	picture.	
	 A	 further	 set	 of	 interpretive	observations	 are	 in	 order	 in	 regard	 another	 aspect	 of	 the	
DIRAM	transition	results	presented	in	section	4	that	is	common	to	the	solutions	found	for	each	
of	the	models,	especially	they	may	serve	to	underscore	the	need	for	caution	and	restraint	of	the	
impulse	to	casually	draw	overly	concrete	“policy	insights”	from	heuristic	modeling	of	the	kind	on	
which	this	paper	reports.		In	every	instance,	as	has	been	noticed,	the	optimal	time‐path	found	for	
the	co‐state	of	E(t)	 ‐‐	which	 is	 to	 say	 the	 (negative)	marginal	 values	of	 current	period	 flow	of	
emissions	that	will	add	to	the	atmospheric	concentration	of	CO2	–	appears	as	a	horizontal	 line	
throughout	the	transition	in	the	case	of	BAM,	or	the	low‐damage	and	high‐damage	sub‐phases	of	
the	 transition	 (in	 the	 case	 of	 BAM+R&D+UCL)	 until	 its	 completion	 and	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	
carbon‐free	phase	of	economic	growth.		Applying	the	label	“social	cost	of	carbon”	is	an	entirely	
valid	 way	 to	 interpret	 the	 economic	 welfare	 significance	 of	 that	 “shadow	 price”	 (marginal	
valuation)	 of	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 currently	 stock	 of	 atmospheric	 CO2	 and	 its	 	 pre‐
industrial	level	‐‐that	being	the	way	the	state	variable	E(t)	is	defined.	 	Yet,	 it	would	be	entirely	
inappropriate	to	casually	take	the	further	interpretive	step	and	think	of	the	social	cost	of	carbon	
found	from	the	solutions	to	the	stacked	Hamiltonians	in	the	present	analysis	as	indicative	of	the	
size	of	“an	optimal	carbon	tax.”	
		 That	 interpretation	 of	 the	 shadow	price	 of	 CO2	 emissions	We	 close	 these	 interpretive	
observations	by	remarking	on	a	particular	aspect	of	the	DIRAM	transition	results	presented	in	
section	4	that	is	common	to	the	solutions	found	for	each	of	the	models,	and	which	may	serve	to	
underscore	the	need	for	interpretive	caution	and	restraint	from	overly	casual	drawing	concrete	
“policy	insights”	from	heuristic	exercises	such	as	those	conducted	in	this	paper.		In	every	case,	as	
was	noticed,	the	optimal	time‐path	found	for	the	co‐state	of	E(t)	‐‐	which	is	to	say	the	(negative)	
marginal	 values	 of	 current	 period	 flow	 of	 emissions	 that	 will	 add	 to	 the	 atmospheric	
concentration	 of	 CO2	 –	 appears	 as	 a	 horizontal	 line	 throughout	 the	 transition,	 up	 until	 its	
completion	and	the	beginning	of	the	carbon‐free	phase	of	economic	growth.		Applying	the	label	
“social	cost	of	carbon”	is	an	entirely	valid	way	to	interpret	the	economic	welfare	significance	of	
that	 “shadow	 price”	 (marginal	 valuation)	 of	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 currently	 stock	 of	
atmospheric	 CO2	 and	 its	 	 pre‐industrial	 level	 ‐‐that	 being	 the	 way	 the	 state	 variable	 E(t)	 is	
defined.	But	it	would	be	entirely	inappropriate	to	casually	take	the	further	interpretive	step	and	
think	of	 the	 social	 cost	of	 carbon	 found	 from	 the	solutions	 to	 the	 stacked	Hamiltonians	 in	 the	
present	analysis	as	indicative	of	the	size	of	“an	optimal	carbon	tax.”	
		 That	interpretation	is	a	perfectly	valid	step,	and	one	that	is	taken	as	a	matter	of	course	in	
IAM	climate	policy	assessment	exercises	of	the	kind	that	have	been	made	familiar	by	the	DICE	
and	 RICE	 models	 applied	 developed	 by	 Nordhaus	 (e.g.,	 1994,	 2000,	 2007,	 2010),	 and	 other	
integrated	 assessment	 studies	 that	 have	 drawn	 directly	 and	 indirectly	 on	 those	 pioneering	
research	 contributions.	 But	 it	 doesn’t	 follow	 in	 the	 present	 context	 for	 a	 simple	 reason:	 the	
DIRAM	structure	differs	radically	from	that	class	of	IAM	structures,	most	obviously	in	not	having	
considered	 the	optimal	design	of	 climate	policy	 instruments	 such	 as	 scheduled	 taxes	on	 fossil	
fuel	 materials,	 or	 market‐determined	 prices	 for	 tradable	 licenses	 to	 release	 volumes	 of	 CO2	
generated	by	burning	carbon.	The	shadow	prices	of	the	stock	of	atmospheric	CO2	on	the	optimal	
“tech	fix”	transition	paths	examined	here	do	not	describe	the	time‐path	of	a	control	variable	in	
the	form	of	a	tax,	and	so	their	behavior	is	without	any	intrinsic,	independent	significance	for	the	
design	of	such	policy	instruments.	
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		 It	should	be	understood,	instead,	that	in	our	models	the	constancy	of	the	marginal	social	
cost	of	carbon	emissions	along	the	transition	path	during	the	low	damage	phase,	and	then	at	a	
reduced	level	in	the	once	the	high	damage	phase	was	entered,	is	simply	the	formal	reflection	of	
the	 following	 fact:	 throughout	 the	 period	 during	 which	 the	 cumulative	 stock	 of	 CO2	 (by	
construction)	has	been	kept	from	reaching	the	(pre‐specified)	tipping	point	into	“climate‐system	
catastrophe,”	the	marginal	social	costs	of	CO2	emissions	at	each	moment	are	measured	in	terms	
of	 the	 unchanging	 value	 of	 the	 “felicity”	 foregone	 by	 having	 to	 divert	 enough	 output	 from	
consumption	to	other	(investment)	activities	that	will	avert	adding	the	marginal	unit	of	carbon	
to	the	existing	atmospheric	concentration	of	greenhouse	gases.	 	Consequently,	were	the	simple	
step‐function	 specification	 of	 the	 effect	 of	 rising	 atmospheric	 concentrations	 of	 CO2	 and	
increased	warming	 to	 be	 replaced	 by	 continuous,	 progressively	more	 steeply	 rising	weather‐
damage	 function,	 the	prospect	of	greater	 consumption	sacrifices	needed	 to	moderate	or	offset	
losses	of	 future	productive	capacity	would	therefore	generate	a	quite	different	time‐profile	 for	
the	shadow	price	of	emissions.64			
	 Future	analysis	of	the	problem	of	policy	design	with	portfolios	of	distinct	technological	
options	 certainly	 should	move	 towards	 building	models	 in	which	 carbon‐pricing	mechanisms	
are	 available	 for	 use	 as	 policy	 instruments,	 and	 apply	 such	 modes	 to	 the	 analysis	 of	 “mixed	
control	systems”	that	use	those	tools,	along	with	a	variety	of	other	means	by	public	policy	and	
private	 non‐profit	 initiatives	 that	 would	 contribute	 to	 speeding	 costly	 transformations	 of	 the	
global	regime	of	production	in	the	world’s	“mixed	economies.”			
	 That	task	would	seem	to	open	a	temptingly	large	and	policy	relevant	field	for	systematic	
explorations	using	multiphase	optimal	control	 techniques.	Yet,	 at	present	 it	appears	 to	be	one	
that	may	be	 tackled	more	productively	once	 the	 frontier	 of	DIRAM	research	has	 advanced	 far	
enough	 to	 permit	 characterizations	 of	 the	 optimal	 transition	 paths	 for	 technological	 system‐
settings	that	afford	a	richer,	and	considerably	more	complicated	portfolio	of	options	than	those	
considered	in	this	preliminary	exploration.			
	 		
	 5.2	Concluding	remarks	‐‐	on	what	has	been,	and	still	remains	to	be	learned			
What	then	are	the	main	lessons	to	be	drawn	from	the	foregoing	welter	of	specific	details	
about	 the	optimal	 transition	dynamics	displayed	by	 these	very	 simple	models	of	 a	global	eco‐
climate	 system?	 	 First,	 one	 must	 stress	 the	 general	 point	 that	 the	 embodiment	 of	 technical	
change	in	physical	units	of	capital	underlines	the	practical	importance	of	the	notion	of	capital	as	
a	produced	means	of	production.	Recognition	of	this	highlights	the	need	to	build	or	maintain	a	
carbon‐based	 capital	 production	 system	 that	 is	 adequate	 to	 produce	 the	 right	 amount	 and	
quality	 of	 the	 carbon‐free	 production	 units	 on	 which	 future	 welfare	 will	 exclusively	 come	 to	
depend;	 and	 to	 do	 so	 within	 the	 remaining	 time‐span	 allowed	 by	 the	 accumulating	 stock	 of	
atmospheric	 CO2.	 	 	 The	 results	 thus	 draw	 attention	 that	 has	 remained	 largely	 ignored	 by	 the	
AIMs	research	literature,	whose	economic	growth	modeling	assumes	that	technical	changes	do	
not	 need	 to	 be	 embodied	 in	 durable	 capital	 goods.	 Those	 same	 models	 mask	 the	 point	 that	
emerges	here:	taking	into	account	embodied	technical	change	in	the	design	of	a	“tech	fix”	climate	
policy	shortens	the	remaining	duration	of	the	allowable	BAU	production	regime	to	a	degree	that	
                                                            
64	The	insurance		effect	in	the	context	of	the	equivalent	deterministic	modeling	of	the	expected	future	capital	losses	
due	to	extreme	weather	events	would	tend	to	raise	the	inital	absolute	value	of	the	shadow	price	of	carbon,	but,	the	
time	profile	could	be	markedly	more	stable	or	possibly	even	gently	upward	sloping		‐‐	depending	upon	the	
constellation	of	(i)	the	degree	of	non‐linearity	in	the	responds	of	those	damages	to	rising	CO2	concentrations	and	
attendant	warming,	(ii)	the	availability	and	costs	of	technological	options	to	mitigate	the	costs	of	repairing	or	
otherwise	subsituting	for	the	damage	production	capacity,	and	(iii)	the	discount	rate.					
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is	especially	worrisome,	and	all	the	more	so	in	view	of	the	optimistic	picture	that	is	generated	by	
certain	 assumptions	 that	 were	 made	 for	 computational	 purposes	 in	 calibrating	 the	 models	
developed	here.				
Secondly,	 R&D	 emerges	 from	 this	 analysis	 as	 an	 important	 means	 of	 cushioning	 the	
negative	welfare	effects	of	tighter	emission	thresholds	and	increasing	weather	related	damages.	
The	reason	 for	 this	 is	 that	physical	capital	 investment	 in	carbon‐based	capacity	 is	at	 the	same	
time	both	a	substitute	 for	and	a	complement	of	R&D	investment.	 It	 is	a	substitute	 from	a	pure	
production	point	of	view,	while	it	is	a	complement	because	of	the	embodied	nature	of	technical	
change	 that	 needs	 physical	 investment	 to	 turn	 potential	 productivity	 improvements	 into	 real	
ones.	 Because	 the	 return	 to	 R&D	 and	 physical	 investment	 in	 carbon‐free	 capacity	 depend	
positively	on	each	other,	output	 itself,	and	therefore	consumption	and	 investment	possibilities	
are	positively	affected	by	having	the	possibility	of	engaging	in	R&D.	Hence,	R&D	efforts	provide	
an	additional	means	to	both	reduce	the	dispersion	in	welfare	outcomes	and	to	maintain	or	even	
increase	 future	 carbon‐free	 output	 levels	 and	 growth	 rates	 in	 the	 face	 of	 increasingly	 volatile	
weather	events	and	corresponding	damages	and	a	rising	probability	of	runaway	global	warming.	
		Thirdly,	 the	 idealized	 “optimal	 planning”	 framework	 for	 endogenous	macroeconomic	
growth	 seen	 to	be	well	 suited	 to	 incorporating	 representations	of	 the	 technical	 aspects	of	 the	
array	of	existing	and	potential	technological	options	and	their	respective	resource	requirements,	
as	well	 as	 those	 required	 to	operationalizing	 a	welfare‐optimal	 transition	path.	Application	 of	
multi‐phase	optimal	control	analysis	provides	DIRAM	solutions	that	describe	the	optimal	flows	
of	tangible	and	intangible	capital	formation,	along	with	the	production	flows	using	carbon‐based	
or	 alternative	 technologies	 in	 each	 of	 the	 phases,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 sequencing	 and	 respective	
durations	of	the	latter	which	completely	describe	the	completed	transition	path.	
This	 very	 concrete	way	 of	 setting	 out	what	 has	 to	 be	 accomplished	 technologically	 in	
each	of	 the	phases,	 in	 our	 view,	 can	provide	a	useful	 starting	point	 for	 thinking	 about	how	 to	
design	and	coordinate	the	multiplicity	of	diverse	tasks	that	will	need	to	be	undertaken	in	order	
to	 adequately	 respond	 to	 the	 daunting	 existential	 challenges	 posed	 by	 global	 warming	 and	
climate	 instability.	 More	 intricate	 and	 computationally	 demanding	 modeling	 and	 analyses	 of	
temporally	extended	multi‐phase	transition	paths	surely	will	be	necessary	to	shed	greater	light	
on	the	complexities	entailed	 in	working	out	 the	proper	dynamic	sequencing	 for	 the	 integrated	
development	and	exploitation	of	the	variety	of	complementary	and	competing	technology	policy	
options	‐‐	beyond	the	very	few	that	have	figured	in	the	preceding	pages.	Among	the	myriad	“of	
other	options”	that	remain	to	be	considered,	the	following	handful	deserve	priority	positions	on	
the	agenda	for	continued	future	DIRAM	research	–	by	virtue	of	their	varied	functional	attributes:	
	(i)	 harvesting	 “low‐hanging	 fruit”	 ‐‐	 by	 investments	 that	 implement	 core	 engineering	
know‐how	 to	 incrementally	 retrofit	 existing	 carbon‐burning	 infrastructure	 and	 direct	
productive	 capital	 goods,	 allowing	 these	 to	 switch	 to	 the	 “less	 dirty”	 fossil	 fuels	 as	 energy	
sources	 (e.g.,	natural	gas,	 in	place	of	oil	 for	heating	and	(diesel)	 internal	 combustion	engines),	
and/or	upgrade	 the	energy	efficiency	of	existing	buildings	and	production	equipment,	and	 the	
same	might	well	be	said	for	curtailing	releases	of	methane	and	other	potent	GHGs;		
(ii)	 R&D	 expenditures	 on	 risky	 exploratory	 research	 programs	 that	 have	 longer‐time	
horizons	than	the	norm	for	applied	projects	(such	as	those	considered	here)	because	they	seek	
low‐frequency	“break‐through”	discoveries	and	inventions	that	would	drastically	lower	the	unit	
capital	costs	of	reliable	production	facilities	that	use	alternative,	non‐carbon	energy	sources;	
(iii)	Long‐term	resource	support	for	experimental	geo‐engineering	projects	that	work	in	
parallel	 on	 the	 development	 and	 field‐testing	 of	 safely	 scalable	 “back‐stop”	 technologies	 for	
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atmospheric	 carbon	 capture	 and	 sequestration	 (ACCS),	 and	 locally	 deployable	 solar	 radiation	
management	(SRM)	techniques.65		
(iv)	 Capital	 formation	 for	 reforestation	 with	 fast‐growing	 leafy	 trees	 in	 order	 to	
efficiently	raise	the	natural	capacity	CO2	abatement	capacity	of	the	Earth’s	present	forest	cover	
as	 far	 as	 possible.	 Although	 it	 is	 highly	 unlikely	 that	 this	 measure	 could	 compensate	 for	 the	
degraded	 abatement	 capacity	 of	 the	 oceans	 that	 would	 result	 from	 continuing	 warming,	
pursuing	this	option	should	be	seen	not	as	“a	fix”	but	as	a	“buy	time”	strategy	(similar	to	item	(i)	
above)	 in	 its	 effects	 on	 the	 net	 volume	 of	 CO2	 that	 is	 added	 to	 the	 atmosphere	 by	 burning	
carbon.	Policy	measures	aimed	at	slowing	or	actually	halting	the	clear‐cutting	of	 forests	would	
work	 in	 the	 same	 direction,	 and	 might	 also	 involve	 compensatory	 capital	 formation	 to	 raise	
agricultural	yields	and	the	livestock	carrying	capacity	of	already	cleared	lands,	thereby	tending	
to	reduce	the	economic	pressures	that	are	driving	deforestation	due	to	human	agency.		
	(v)	 “Defensive”	 expenditures	 for	 engineering	design	 research	and	 capital	 formation	 to	
implement	physical	 reinforcements	and	additions	 to	existing	 infrastructure	 that	would	 reduce	
the	 latter’s	 own	 vulnerability	 to	 damage	 caused	 by	 extreme	 weather	 events	 and	 extensive	
flooding.	This	would	serve	to	mitigate	direct	and	indirect	losses	of	productive	capacity	as	well	as	
providing	 a	measure	of	 protection	 from	 loss	of	 lives	and	 livelihoods	 in	 some	 forms	of	natural	
disasters	that	are	likely	to	become	more	destructive	due	to	regional	climate	changes.		
Quite	 obviously,	 it	 will	 be	 no	 mean	 task	 for	 future	 research	 to	 develop	 informative	
heuristic	 representations	 of	 the	 foregoing	 dynamic	 processes,	 and	 to	 explore	 the	 way(s)	 to	
sequence	 the	exercise	of	 the	enlarged	 set	of	policy	options	 in	 an	 integrated	multiphase	model	
that	would	 extend	 the	partial	 “BAM+(applied)R&D+UCL”	 structure	 that	 has	been	analyzed	 (in	
section	4.4).66		But	that	task	will	be	rendered	more	feasible	by	tackling	it	within	the	simplifying	
framework	of	a	“social	planning	model,”	as	the	 latter	setting	dispenses	with	a	 large	number	of	
complicated	 assumptions	 ‐‐	 concerning	 the	market	behaviors	 of	 private	 economic	 agents,	 and	
the	 ability	 of	 political	 authorities	 to	 coordinate	 and	 implement	 coherent	 regulatory	measures	
and	institutional	enforcement	mechanisms	on	a	global	scale	‐‐	that	otherwise	would	have	to	be	
specified	and	empirically	justified.	
Fourthly,	having	appreciated	the	difficulties	of	carrying	through	such	an	undertaking,	it	
is	all	the	more	important	to	appreciate	that	its	completion	would	nonetheless		stop	well	short	of	
                                                            
65	 Although	 under	 the	 suppostions	 of	 our	 deterministic	 optimal	 control	models	 of	 the	 climate‐stablizing	 transition	
path	 those	 techniques	 never	would	 need	 to	 deployed	 in	 a	 “back‐stop”	 role,	 even	were	 to	 some	 among	 them	 to	 be	
economically	as	well	as	 technically	 feasible	and	environmentally	safe	 to	 implement.	But	 in	 the	 latter	circumstances	
the	 investment	 in	 finding	 those	 method	 could	 nevertheless	 have	 a	 substantial	 social	 pay‐off,	 especially	 when	 the	
transition	to	a	low	carbon	global	production	regime	had	to	be	completed	in	reasonably	short	order.	In	that	case	it	is	
most	 likely	 that	 a	 considerable	 stock	 of	 operational	 carbon‐based	 capital	 would	 have	 to	 de‐activated	 before	 the	
sustainable	economic	growth	phase	began.		But,	by	deploying	atmospheric	carbon	capture	(ACC)	techniques	that	were	
(ex	 hypothesis)	 technically	 effective	 and	 economically	 practical,	 the	 concentration	 level	 of	 CO2	 could	 be	 gradually	
lowered	 far	 enough	 to	 allowing	 the	 “moth‐balled”	 carbon‐based	 production	 facilities	 to	 be	 brought	 back	 into	
production,	 thereby	 yielding	 a	 finite	 flow	 of	 social	 quasi‐rents.	 A	 fast	 transition	 also	would	 imply	 that	 the	 latter’s	
present	 value	would	 not	 have	 been	 so	 severely	 reduced	 by	 discounting.	 	 Of	 course,	 in	 a	 stochastic	 control	 setting,	
“back‐stop”	geo‐engineering	investment	would	have	positive	insurance	value	even	were	the	research	results	to	turn	
out	 never	 to	 be	 needed,	 or	 deemed	 too	 risky	 in	 their	 potential	 environmental	 side‐effects	 to	 be	 deployed	 only	 to	
capture	the	private	quasi‐rents..			
66	 A	 start	 was	 made	 on	 this	 research	 agenda	 by	 David	 and	 van	 Zon	 (2012:section	 3),	 in	 working	 out	 the	 phase	
structures	of	the	transition	path(s)	for	a	model	that	integrated	“BAM	+	R&D”	with	a	“buy	time”	option	that	involved	
incremental	“retrofitting	investments”	(for	applied	engineering	and	capital	equipment)	to	upgrade	the	environmental	
performance	 of	 carbon‐using	 capital.	 The	 specific	 functional	 purpose	 of	 the	 latter	 class	 of	 options	 is	 to	 lower	 CO2	
emissions	per	unit	of	output	 in	 the	selected	 facilitiesy,	even	though	the	upgrade	had	raised	 their	unit	 capital	 costs.			
Preliminary	computational	results	for	the	resulting	(uncalibrated)	optimal	sequencing	were	presented	for	that	option.	
Furthermore,	that	paper	sets	out	a	list	(in	section	4)	of	desireable	modifications	in	the	modeling	of	the	climate	system,	
of	the	production	system,	and	other	specification	changes.	The	preceding	text	has	offered	a	shorter	and	less	detailed	
sketches	in	the	same	spirit.			
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the	further	steps	leading	towards	articulating	the	available	practical	policy	instruments,	and	the	
possible	ways	they	might	be	used	to	reach	successive	milestones	on	the	DIRAM	multi‐phase	path	
–	even	one	 that	 the	omniscient	and	omnipotent	social	planner	would	 indicate	as	“required”	to	
achieve	the	optimal	transition.		This	poses	a	research	problem	far	more	daunting	than	anything	
that	we		have	contemplated	tackling;	indeed,	one	that	may	well	resist	plausible	formulations	for	
solution	using	optimal	control	methods	(whether	of	the	deterministic	or	stochastic	variety).	To	
the	already	complex	macroeconomic	and	geophysical	system	constraints	considered	in	a	DIRAM	
framework,	it	would	be	necessary	to	add	further	constraints	imposed	by	public	sector	political	
and	 administrative	 processes,	 and,	 of	 course,	 still	 others	 that	 properly	 reflected	 observed		
behavioral	 patterns	 of	 private	 economic	 agents	 in	 response	 to	market	 signals	 and	 regulatory	
inducements	and	restraints.			
			Moreover,	 it	 is	 to	 be	 expected	 that	 the	 design	 of	 the	 optimal	 inter‐temporal	 policy	
implementation	program	–	were	one	to	emerge	from	the	analysis,	would	depart	substantially	in	
many	respects	from	the	requirements	 indicated	by	the	social	planning	optimum.	 	Because	it	 is	
dealing	with	a	process	to	be	played	out	in	major	part	within	a	decentralized	market	setting,	the	
implementation	program	would	involve	recourse	to	the	use	of	policy	instruments	in	addition	to	
(inevitably	 interactive	 with)	 public‐private	 joint	 ventures	 and	 government	 led	 “technology	
push”	 measures.	 The	 plural	 here	 is	 inescapable	 in	 the	 relevant	 practical	 context	 of	 a	 global	
system	 with	 multiple	 sovereign	 political	 authorities‐‐however	 far	 one	 can	 hope	 to	 go	 by	
abstracting	 from	the	messiness	of	 the	processes	by	which	national	policies	emerge	 from	often	
chaotic	domestic	conflicts	among	conflicting	politically	mediated	interests.		
Fifthly,	with	this	situation	in	mind,	it	might	be	a	useful	way	forward	for	practical	policy	
design	research	to	focus	on	illuminating	how	and	to	what	extent	the	introduction	of	ostensibly	
“practical”	 means	 to	 implement	 the	 indicated	 allocation	 of	 resources	 (within	 each	 of	 the	
successive	phases	of	the	optimal	transition	path	found	by	the	DIRAM	planner)	would	distort	the	
allocation	 that	 materialized	 in	 the	 first	 phase,	 making	 it	 necessary	 to	 alter	 the	 indicated	
requirements	 for	 the	phase	 that	would	 follow,	 and	so	on.	 In	principle,	 at	 least,	 the	distortions	
and	 the	 welfare	 losses	 entailed	 by	 a	 well‐specified	 policy	 implementation	 program	 could	 be	
calculable.	 This	 step	 on	 the	 path	 toward	 stochastic	 control	 modeling	 that	 allows	 mid‐course	
corrections	 when	 expectations	 are	 not	 realized,	 however,	 generally	 would	 require	 taking	 an	
intervening	and	non‐trivial	task:	fully	specifying	a	model	of	the	behavior	of	private	sector	actors	
in	 response	 to	 the	array	of	 relative	price	and	 cost	 changes,	 and	 subsidies,	 taxes	and	penalties	
introduced	by	fiscal	and	regulatory	measures	designed	by	a	public	actor	in	order	to	implement	
the	 policy	 in	 question.	 Further	 allowance	 would	 need	 to	 be	 made	 for	 adjustment	 costs	 of	
alterations	 in	 pre‐existing	 tax,	 subsidy	 and	 regulatory	 structures,	 including	 such	 new	
institutional	developments	that	would	be	necessary.	
	Consequently,	although	it	is	both	interesting	and	informative	for	policy	design	purposes	
to	trace	the	complex	inter‐temporal	adjustments	that	are	set	in	motion	by	adding	to	the	variety	
of	technological	options	and	corresponding	control	variables	in	the	heuristic	DIRAM	framework	
presented	 in	 these	pages,	 the	policy	 relevance	 of	 showing	how	an	 enlightened	 social	welfare‐
optimizing	planner	might	run	a	“tech	fix”	program	to	stabilize	the	global	climate	system	under	
various	technological	and	climatic	system	constraints	remains		bounded	by	the	relevance	of	the	
circumstances	envisaged	by	 those	models.	The	extent	 to	which	 the	planner’s	optimal	program	
offers	 practical	 guidance	 for	 the	 design	 of	 climate	 policies	 that	 is	 of	 use	 to	 policy–making	 by	
individual	actors	and	agencies	 in	 the	world	as	 it	 is,	 remains	an	unresolved	question.	Yet,	 such	
guidance	will	be	needed,	even	if	it	is	not	presently	wanted	by	decision‐makers	and	public	actors	
and	agencies	that	lack	anything	approximating	the	mythical	social	planner’s	powers	to	shape	the	
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allocation	 of	 resources;	 they	 will	 have	 to	 cope	 as	 best	 they	 can	 by	 applying	 indirect	 and	
comparatively	weak	and	uncertain	 instruments	 in	highly	decentralized	political	 and	economic	
settings.		
In	view	of	the	formidable	challenges	posed	by	such	a	program,		perhaps	the	most	useful	
immediately	 feasible	 exercises	 that	 can	 be	 conducted	 using	 the	 foundations	 provided	 by	 our	
DIRAM	 results	 will	 be	 to	 assess	 the	 comparative	 welfare	 damages	 that	 would	 ensue	 from	
alternative	forms	of	deviation	from	the	optimal	path.	These	could	at	least	focus	attention	on	the	
design	of	policy	instruments	to	avoid	the	most	critical	implementation	failures	arising	from	both	
the	private	and	the	public	actors	and	agencies	in	the	global	economy,	and	the	interactions	among	
them.					
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Appendix	A.	The	Timing	of	R&D	
	
Consider	the	availability	of	B0>0	at	t=TU.	Consider	also	the	possibility	of	waiting	a	while,	
say	till	T*,	before	starting	R&D	activities	while	still	relying	only	on	A‐type	production	facilities.	.	
Then	at	T*	the	BAU	phase	would	be	effectively	split	into	two	sub‐phases,	first	U0	followed	by	U1.		
Assume,	moreover,	that	the	split	at	T*	is	optimal.	In	that	case,	the	only	difference	between	these	
sub‐phases	 involves	 the	 existence	 in	 U1	 of	 an	 R&D	process	 that	 needs	 resourcing	 from	 some	
portion	of	 current	production	 to	 raise	 the	 average	 (and	marginal)	 productivity	 of	 carbon‐free	
capital,	B,	above	level	(B0)	available	with	technology	of	that	kind	that	was	already	known	at	the	
start	of	the	BAU	phase.	So,	the	Hamiltonian	at	T*	for	sub‐phase	U0	would	be	given	by:	
	
	 }){()1/( ***
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*
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AA
TT
tU
T CKACeH    .	 	 	 	 									(A.1)	
	
Since	 the	 first	 order	 condition	 for	 consumption	 can	 be	 solved	 for	 C,	 giving	 rise	 to
* *( , *)
A
T TC f T ,	the	Hamiltonian	can	be	rewritten	as:				
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U A A A A A
T T T T TH g f T A K f T         	.	 	 	 	 									(A.2)	
	
		 For	U1,	we	therefore	have	the	Hamiltonian:			
	
1
* * * * * * *( ( , *)) {( ) ( , *) } ( )
U A A A A A R
T T T T T T TH g f T A K f T R R B B
                 ,	 										(A.3)	
	
and	find	that	the	first‐order	condition	for	an	optimal	allocation	of	R&D	resources	implies	that		
	
	 * * * * ( )A RT T T TR R B B          .	 	 	 	 	 	 								(A.4)	
	
Hence,	for	there	to	be	a	positive	level	of	R&D	activity	taking	place	from	T*	on,	it	must	be	the	case	
that:	
	 1 0 0* * * * *(1 ) ( )U U R UT T T T TH H R B B H           	.	 	 			 	 							(A.5)	
	
	 It	 follows	that	 0 1* * 0U UT TH H  	 for 0* TR ,	 implying	that	T*	was	set	too	 late	 in	the	BAU	
phase	and	should	be	moved	to	an	earlier	date.67.	In	this	case,	because	marginal	adjustments	will	
not	suffice	to	make	that	difference	between	the	two	Hamiltonians	vanish,	this	process	will	push	
the	arbitrary	start	point	of	the	U1	sub‐phase	all	way	the	back	to	T*=	TU,	i.e.,	to	the	beginning	of	
sub‐phase	U0.	 	That	means	that	the	R&D	process	optimally	must	begin	at	the	moment	that	the	
basic	idea(s)	become	available	as	to	how	proceed	with	research	and	development	on	a	practical	
carbon‐free	 alternative	 to	 the	 A‐type	 technology,	 i.e.,	 one	 that	 could	 be	 embodied	 in	 capital	
goods	with	positive	productivity.	Note		that	the	calibration	of	the	models	with	R&D	specifies	that		
B0>0	at	t=TU=0.	
	 	
                                                            
67	By	reducing	T*	by	1	unit	of	time,	i.e.	let	the	U1	phase	begin	one	unit	of	time	earlier,	we	lose	the	Hamiltonian	at	the	
end	of	U0	and	gain	the	Hamiltonian	at	the	beginning	of	U1,	which	in	this	case	would	lead	to	a	net	gain.	
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